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Abstract 
 
This research examines the expanding role of public-private partnerships (PPPs or 
P3s) in Denver metro transportation projects in three areas: (1) innovative funding and 
financing of transit infrastructure projects, (2) the partnerships between freight and 
passenger rail services, and (3) emerging collaborations of local governments, transit 
agencies, and transportation network companies (TNCs). 
The purpose of the first study was to examine the recent use of P3s in the Denver 
Regional Transportation District’s (RTD) FasTracks program, a 2004 voter-approved 
$4.7 billion transit expansion program.  After a shortfall in funding, RTD partnered with 
several private consortia to enable the FasTracks program to move forward.  Using in-
depth interviews with key stakeholders and policymakers in the Denver region, I found 
that the Eagle P3 commuter rail project and Union Station redevelopment were the most 
successful of the Denver P3s, and the FasTrack P3s could serve as a model for transit 
infrastructure expansion in other metropolitan regions in the U.S.  
The opportunity exists to minimize environmental and social impacts of 
expanding passenger rail transit by sharing existing corridors with freight rail operators.  
The purpose of the second study was to evaluate existing agreements between freight and 
passenger rail services and identify issues, challenges, and best practices of shared-use 
corridors.  Through in-depth interviews with local experts in shared-use rail corridors, I 
found the main issues surrounding FasTrack’s Northwest rail line were the absence of 
 iii 
accurate and timely cost estimates for the line and changing requirements for the shared 
track. Overall, the other FasTracks shared-use corridors involved successful negotiations 
of right-of-way (ROW) acquisitions. Recommendations include taking advantage of 
corridor banking for future rail expansion when possible. 
TNCs and public agencies are starting pilot P3 programs in the U.S., and these 
new P3s could greatly affect the cost and efficiency of transportation provision. Using 
interviews with public and private agencies involved in ridesourcing P3s, the third study 
documents the characteristics of two partnerships in the Denver metro region: Go 
Centennial and DU Moves. The pilot projects had lower than expected ridership, but the 
Go Centennial pilot was identified as a strong proof of concept for future partnerships. 
The most common reasons for public agencies to seek out partnerships with TNCs are to 
improve first-last mile connections and on-demand services, and reduce single-occupancy 
vehicle trips in a cost-effective manner.  TNCs also benefit from partnerships through 
increasing their brand awareness and creating positive relationships with cities. The role 
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Chapter One: Introduction to studies in public-private partnerships in U.S. 
transportation 
Introduction 
With population and traffic congestion growing in urban areas throughout the 
United States, the demand for transportation infrastructure and transit service 
improvements in U.S. cities is growing.  However, funding to expand and repair aging 
infrastructure is falling due to lack of federal funds, the recent economic crisis, and local 
revenue shortfalls. State and local governments are especially susceptible to funding 
woes and have increasingly turned to the private sector to fill in funding and service gaps 
and accelerate project build-outs.  Public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s) have become 
more widely utilized in recent years throughout the U.S. as a way to expand 
transportation infrastructure and transit services. More research is needed on the 
emerging trend of using PPPs in transit infrastructure procurement as well as transit 
service provision, especially in the U.S.  Research is needed to discern the benefits and 
shortcomings of transit PPPs, as well as analyze cooperation between private and public 
entities such as transit agencies and local governments, freight rail companies, and ride-
sourcing services.  
This research study examines the nature of PPPs that have been established to 
facilitate planning, construction, and operation of several transit and highway projects in 
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the Denver metropolitan area.  In particular, this research focuses on three areas in which 
the Denver metro area is utilizing public-private partnerships: (1) innovative funding and 
financing of transit infrastructure projects, (2) the partnerships between freight and 
passenger rail services, and (3) emerging collaborations of local governments, transit 
agencies, and ride-sourcing transportation network companies (TNCs). 
The studies together will address a common theme of transport PPPs in Denver, 
and each study will then answer its own research questions and objectives. Overall, the 
studies will analyze the role of PPPs in transport in Denver, assess their successes and 
failures, and recommend best practices for other agencies and governments looking to 
Denver as a potential model for developing transport P3s. The studies utilize in-depth 
interviews with experts and stakeholders and survey methods. 
This introductory chapter provides a discussion of significance of the studies by 
addressing their intellectual merit and broader impacts. Next, I discuss the theoretical 
framework of the new mobilities paradigm and neoliberalism that ground each of the 
studies. Then, I provide a more in-depth discussion of the methods used in the studies. 
Finally, I provide an outline for the rest of the dissertation. 
Intellectual Merit  
In a recent commentary in the journal Nature, Bruun and Givoni (2015) suggest 
six research routes to steer future transport research policy. This study addresses several 
of these research avenues. These papers answer their question, what kinds of governance 
works for transport systems? Research on the potential of ridesourcing P3s, which are 
still in the early stages of interaction with public agencies and regulatory issues, is 
especially relevant.  The research on ridesourcing P3s also answers the call by Bruun and 
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Givoni (2015) for studies of the long-term impacts of new technologies in transport. The 
policy implications of rapid changes in technologies, such as app-based ride-sourcing, are 
important to understand.  Much of the previous research on transport P3s comes from the 
international perspective or focuses on roads, bridges, and tunnels. This research 
advances the limited knowledge of U.S. public-private partnerships in transit and transit-
related services.  
Broader Impacts  
These studies are significant because of the growing involvement of the private 
sector in public sector transportation service and infrastructure procurement.  Research is 
needed to analyze the financial and social costs and benefits of these partnerships and to 
provide feedback on the level of success of these P3s for transit agencies to learn from 
the innovative practices taking place in Denver.  Policymakers, government officials, 
agencies, and private investors can use policy and best practice recommendations from 
this research to inform their decision-making and policy choices. 
Bruun and Givoni (2015) posit the question of how to evaluate the impacts of 
transport systems, suggesting that researchers should look beyond the typical economic 
cost-benefit analysis to include evaluation of transportation infrastructure and service 
based on their impact on social equity, accessibility, and mobility using both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The following research seeks to evaluate the impacts of 
transport systems using both qualitative and quantitative methods.  This research is 
socially relevant because it addresses urban mobility through the lens of social justice and 
urban sustainable mobility.  Improved and expanded transit infrastructure and service 
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provision addresses some of the social inequalities of urban mobility while also creating 
more options for reduced carbon emissions from transportation.  
Theoretical framework and contribution to the field  
Qualitative approach and new mobilities paradigm 
This research contributes to the field of transport geography by bridging the 
divide of quantitative and qualitative methods called out by Goetz et al. (2009).  Using 
in-depth interviews with experts and stakeholders in public-private partnerships, coupled 
with data driven results of innovative ride-sourcing partnerships, this research answers 
the call for alternative research approaches in transport-related research, bringing it more 
in line with other human geography subfields of urban and cultural geography (Goetz et 
al 2009). In addition, the following papers address the need to focus on critical transport 
geography by examining public policy, social justice, and environmental issues.  
These studies are grounded in the social theories of the new mobilities paradigm 
and neoliberalism. The field of transport geography has experienced a critical turn, 
incorporating and adapting the new mobilities paradigm of sociology (Sheller & Urry 
2006). As an example of critical geography, the mobilities turn at its core establishes that 
“no mode of transport, infrastructure, or technology can be understood in isolation of its 
social and cultural context” (Jensen, 2015, p. 485).  The mobilities turn differentiates 
travel as merely movement from point a to b from travel as movement that has the ability 
to affect different groups economically and socially.  This research recognizes this 
fundamental concept of the new mobilities paradigm and incorporates the idea that 
mobility and transportation studies must consider the socio-political context of transport 
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systems. This research delves into the social, political, and cultural context of transit 
systems in Denver, Colorado.  
Neoliberalism, growth machine, and financialization 
According to David Harvey (2007), 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. (p.2)  
 
The theory of neoliberalism underlies the current reductionist government spending and 
expansion of the private sector in public policy and financing (Springer et al., 2016). 
Neoliberalism incorporates political and economic practices that support free markets and 
free trade with privatization and market-driven forces as its bedrocks.  
Scholars have articulated the manifestations of neoliberalism in cities through the 
development of theoretical frameworks and empirical studies of the impacts of neoliberal 
policies. The growth machine theory of Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) is 
used to explain both regional cooperation and conflict in seeking economic development 
in an area. The local urban growth machine is typically made up of a city or region’s 
elites and entrepreneurs, from both the public and private sector. Their goal, which 
benefits themselves as landed elites or their locality through increases in land values, is to 
encourage economic growth in a city through land development. Thus, the growth 
machine theory can explain and interpret both the increasing regional collaboration 
amongst a mix of local and regional elites to bring development to its region as well as 
intraregional conflict because of increasing competition between cities for economic 
development funding and infrastructure provision. In addition, the local growth machine 
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may also work together to respond to increasing competition from national and global 
competition to attract development to its locality. The theory of the city as an urban 
growth machine helps to explain the rise of regionalism and the effects of neoliberalism 
on local governance in U.S. cities. 
Neoliberal policies in urban and transport development have increased the role of 
global finance markets at the local level. Financialization, the increasing dominance of 
the financial industry in the economy, is on the rise at the country level, but it 
increasingly affects local economies. Neoliberalism has been a strong driver of the 
globalization of economic markets.  More and more, local funding and financing of urban 
and transport infrastructure are influenced by credit-rating agencies and global investors. 
Neoliberalism in the highway and automobile sector 
Transportation provision in the U.S. has primarily been affected by neoliberal 
policies through expanded privatization and deregulation. Because of tax revenue 
shortfalls due to increased fuel efficiency, a recent decrease in the national vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT), and cost inflation, the traditional funding sources of highways are roads 
have not met the demand for maintaining and operating the aging road infrastructure. 
Neoliberal policies of privatization and free market ideologies have begun to change the 
conventional funding mechanisms, and state DOTS are looking to the private sector to fill 
in the gap of infrastructure provision. One example of privatization of roads is the 
propagation of toll lanes on roads, which charge a user fee to drivers to help pay for the 
building and maintenance of that road. The recent propagation of infrastructure PPPs in 
the U.S. can be juxtaposed with past public capital infrastructure investments such as the 
post-WWII Federal Interstate Highway System.  
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Neoliberalism in the railroad industry 
The railroad industry is privatized and has been from its inception, but because 
railroads created monopolies in the 1800s and were undermining interest of the public 
good, they were subject to extensive government regulations. After increased competition 
from trucking and highways diminished the railroad's competitive advantage by the mid-
20th century, the industry underwent deregulation through the 1980 passage of the 
Staggers Rail Act. The railroad network carries both freight and passengers, with the bulk 
being freight. As a result of the 1970 Rail Passenger Service Act, the railroad industry 
shed much of its unprofitable passenger service, and Amtrak, a government entity, now 
provides most of the intercity passenger rail service in the U.S. Because the provision of 
railroad infrastructure has historically been the responsibility of a private rail company, 
neoliberalism affected the railroad industry to a lesser degree than other modes. Massive 
expansion of the current railroad network is not expected in the future because of the high 
cost of building out new rail lines. Most of the costs of rail infrastructure provision lie in 
the maintenance of existing lines and the creation of new transit and passenger lines, 
many within freight rail corridors. Freight rail gets some additional capital through its 
partnerships with public transit agencies seeking to expand their operations in freight rail 
rights of ways or on freight rail tracks.  
Transit service expansion is traditionally funded through additional taxes levied 
within the transit district, usually voter-approved. The transit agency, as a public entity, 
can also sell tax-exempt bonds to pay off interest on loans they take out for infrastructure 
and capital improvements. One challenge to this type of funding is a limit to the transit 
agency’s debt capacity. This is where private investor and private equity firms have 
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stepped in to help take some of the debt off of the accounting sheets of transit agencies, 
allowing more money to be raised than by the agency alone.  
Neoliberalism in public transit 
Privatization of transit is not new. The development of the transit industry in the 
U.S. was led by streetcars, which were typically owned and operated by private investors 
or industry that wanted to facilitate real estate development further out from the city 
center (Schweitzer, 2017).  These private companies were able to leverage their 
investment in the capital costs of the infrastructure because they benefited from their 
other investments in real estate and retail along the streetcar lines. Eventually, 
competition from the bus and private automobile reduced ridership on streetcars and 
eventually buses as well, until the transit companies were taken over by public agencies 
because of the need for subsidies to continue their operation.  Neoliberal policies of the 
1980s repopularized the concept of private sector involvement in providing public transit, 
and some agencies began to outsource a portion of their services to private companies. 
Through neoliberal restructuring by the legislature beginning in 1988, Colorado now 
requires transit agencies to contract a minimum 35% of its operation to the private sector.  
Whereas privatization of service provision has become somewhat commonplace 
in transit, infrastructure provision is only recently taking advantage of private sector 
investment.  Financing infrastructure through private equity firms and global investment 
companies is one way that transit is being liberalized. Like toll roads, transit agencies are 
also experimenting with long-term operation and maintenance agreements with private 
companies as well. The Eagle P3 project in Denver is currently the only operating 
example of a private-public partnership in transit that includes private financing and a 
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long-term operations and maintenance concession agreement. The Federal Transit 
Administration’s (FTA) Penta-P program, which granted funds to the Regional 
Transportation District Eagle P-3 rail project, specifically rewarded transit infrastructure 
projects that utilized innovative financing with the private sector and encouraged 
agencies to explore both disadvantages and advantages of such partnerships. More transit 
agencies are exploring the benefits of PPPs and private financing of transit expansion 
projects. Innovative financing is necessary as neoliberal policies continue and the 
public’s tolerance for tax increases wanes.  
Increasingly, the private sector is seeing potential profit in a new market of transit 
and transportation service industry, especially as a new generation of young adults is 
more interested in alternative transport modes and living car-free. Although contracting 
by public transit agencies is not new, this arena is expanding as local transit agencies 
begin to look to the private sector to fulfill new transit demand through partnerships with 
transportation network companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft. Public-private 
partnerships in the building of transportation infrastructure as well as providing financing 
of infrastructure is becoming more common because of lack of federal and state funding 
and decreased local tax revenue.  
Methods 
Interviewing as a Methodology 
 The discipline of geography uses a wide range of methods to answer a wide range 
of research questions. Geographers’ research exists along a spectrum of methodologies 
utilizing qualitative and quantitative methods, often incorporating multiple or mixed-
method approaches. Geographic methods can also be divided into extensive and intensive 
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methods, the former focusing on breadth of material and subjects versus the latter 
focusing on depth. Qualitative methods are interdisciplinary and cannot be claimed by 
any one discipline, but are often used by the social sciences, including political science, 
sociology, and geography. Qualitative methods are useful for finding out what people 
think, know or feel (Secor, 2010) and to answer research questions about social structures 
and individual experiences (Winchester and Rofe, 2010). 
Interviewing is considered a qualitative and more intensive method because it 
involves direct interaction with the research participant (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies, 
2002). Interviews have generally been defined as a face-to-face exchange between the 
interviewer and informant, whereby the interviewer asks questions to seek out 
information or opinions from someone, although the face-to-face aspect is now not 
required as some research can be conducted through written email communication or a 
telephone interview. Dunn (2010) solved the face-to-face issue by defining interviewing 
as “a data-gathering method in which there is a spoken exchange of information” (p. 
101).   
Interviews are useful to fill a gap in knowledge, investigate complex behaviors 
and motivations, collect a diversity of opinion and experiences, and to show respect for 
and empower the informants (Dunn, 2010).  According to Hoggart et al. (2002), 
interviews are “appropriate when research seeks to unravel complicated relationships or 
slowly evolving events” (p. 205).  In order to reveal these relationships and experiences, 
interviewers ask open-ended questions to elucidate detailed descriptions and in-depth 
knowledge of the topic. Interviews are most appropriate for research questions that 
answer how rather than how many. Interviews can be divided into several types according 
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to Winchester and Rofe (2010) that include the unstructured, semi-structured, structured, 
and open-ended focus groups. I primarily use semi-structured interviews in my research, 
which allows me to develop open-ended, content-focused questions while still allowing 
for flexibility and change during the interview (Dunn, 2010).  
Conducting research with members of an elite class can provide unique 
opportunities as well as unique problems to consider when compared to interviewing 
members of the general population. Sometimes this type of research is also referred to as 
“studying up” or the corporate interview. Elites can be defined in several ways and the 
definitions vary based on the research arena, business sector, or corporation being 
studied. Harvey (2011) defines elites as occupying senior management positions and 
being influential decision makers in a company or business sector at the time of research. 
Rice (2010) was more practical about determining an elite for his research on urban 
regeneration, stating that an elite was someone that has the ability to answer his research 
questions.  Hunter (1995) uses the term “studying up” to describe the often elevated 
social status of elites. Literature exists on the specific nature of interviewing local elites, 
especially in policy research, which is what applies to this research (Lancaster, 2017; 
Cochrane, 1998; Ward and Jones, 1999; Sabot, 1999). Research utilizing local elites and 
policy elites often addresses local economic development and elites are the people who 
influence the local decision making processes. In my study, I see an elite as an expert on 
the research topic with intimate, local knowledge to answer my research questions.   
Recruiting and gaining access 
Recruiting participants for elite interviews provides another set of challenges that 
may not exist in non-elite research. Often elites can be hard to locate or establish a time 
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of communication. Harvey (2011) points out the need to identify gatekeepers to the elites.  
These gatekeepers may include important people such as personal or administrative 
assistants who keep the calendars of the elites. In other instances, it is useful to get the 
blessing of upper management or first interview the head of the company, which can cast 
the interviewer in a positive light to the underlings (Hoggart et al. 2002). Again, in some 
cases, it is useful to play up the insider role, while other times the outsider. As Sabot 
(1999) found, sometimes a foreign national is more likely to receive a response for an 
interview or be granted more access that a local researcher.  
Snowball sampling, whereby previous informants recommend potential 
interviewees, is often very effective when interviewing elites. It is especially helpful if an 
informant can vouch for the researcher by sending an email request to other potential 
interviewees. An experienced researcher who has conducted previous studies on a topic 
may begin to be seen as an insider by elites and has often developed their own network of 
informants to draw from, therefore researchers tend to conduct research where they are 
already considered an insider. This strategy can be useful to reduce the barriers to gaining 
access to elites. In interviewing local urban elites in politics, transportation, or economic 
development, geographers and social scientists work side by side with local elites on 
committees, research teams, or other affiliations which can ease access to informants.  
The literature does focus on the relative difficulty in accessing elites compared to 
the general populations. While it may be true that it is harder to identify people who 
would be able to answer a particular research question with a certain level of expertise, 
the barriers to access are often overstated in my opinion, especially when talking about 
local elites. In particular, politicians who want to show their expertise on a topic are 
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usually not hard to persuade to sit down to talk. On the other hand, if a politician thinks 
that your research could be controversial or he or she does not want to take a side, then 
the interview request can go unanswered. Most responsive are officials in public or civil 
service, especially those working in roles that use tax-payer funding. These officials often 
see it as their duty to respond to requests for interview or research and typically are 
transparent and open to academics in general. They can also be the most helpful in 
linking the researcher to other potential interviewees in other sectors. 
Interviewing and the theoretical framework  
I believe that no research, whether quantitative, qualitative, or a mixed-
methodology, can be declared objective or without bias. The researcher’s positionality 
influences the questions asked, methods used, and interpretation of the data. Choosing a 
particular method should not be based on the researcher’s affinity for a particular method, 
but because the method is the best one to answer the questions being asked. My research 
seeks to answer questions about the perceived success of transit operations and 
expansions, identify implications and impacts of policy decisions, and ascertain benefits 
and limitations of such policies. These questions can best be answered by using 
qualitative methods such as interviewing to delve deeper into people’s experiences with 
and knowledge of such partnerships. Interviews are not intended to generate a 
representative sample of the general population, but rather to explore the nuances and 
reasoning behind an informant’s responses and ideas. There is not one definition of 
success or a final determination of the winners and losers of public-private partnerships. 
We must be critical of such research that claims to provide the definitive answer to such 
nuanced questions. 
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The theoretical framework of the new mobilities paradigm supports the use of 
interviews because it stresses the fundamental concept that mobility and transportation 
studies must consider the socio-political context of transport systems. In-depth interviews 
also enable researchers to look beyond the typical economic cost-benefit analysis and 
ridership revenue to include evaluation of transportation infrastructure and service based 
on their impact on social equity, accessibility, and mobility, key concepts of the new 
mobilities paradigm.  As a relatively inexperienced researcher who did not have 
extensive shared affiliations or networks with the respondents, I relied more on 
colleagues’ networks and past research experiences to gain access to the elite informants.  
Interpretation of Data: Transcribing and Coding data 
Following the preparation and interviewing stage, I began analyzing the interview 
data. Most researchers agree about the benefits of recording interviews rather than relying 
solely on handwritten notes (which can, however, be an appropriate back-up method and 
additional data source). I was able to record all but one interview, since the respondent 
requested only notes be taken. Recording interviews allow the researcher to focus on the 
responses and engage in appropriate follow-up questions and prompting for more 
clarification or elaboration from the interviewee. A written record can be referred back to 
as often as needed, without the concern of a faulty memory or misremembering getting in 
the way of accuracy.  
I transcribed the interviews myself, which enabled me to experience and engage 
with data again (often at a slower speed), after the interview (Dunn, 2010). Verbal cues, 
silences, and other mannerisms are sometimes lost if a transcription service is used. The 
tone of a response, a pregnant pause, or a nervous laugh can sometimes tell a different 
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story than the written response would otherwise indicate (Dunn, 2010). On the other 
hand, if a larger number of interviews had been required or if I conducted each of the 
studies concurrently, a transcription service would have been vital and may be required 
on some studies. For example, the additional time it takes for the researchers to transcribe 
the interviews might cause her to reduce the number of interviews she is willing to 
conduct because of a research deadline.  But all things considered, the value of hearing 
the interviews again and revisiting the audio exchange far outweighs drawbacks of the 
time-consuming task of transcription.  
When presented with the vast amount of transcribed data, the researcher can 
sometimes be overwhelmed with words. Systematic coding of the responses allows the 
researcher to organize and interpret the data. Coding the responses involves labeling 
sentences or ideas using categories or labels, and usually common themes will emerge 
from the respondents’ answers. This type of coding can be done by hand, using 
highlighters, scissors, and tape for the more tactile learner, or using basic word 
processing software to copy, cut, paste, search, and highlight responses. Prior to the 
advent of powerful software such as NVIVO, most coding was done this way. NVivo is 
an example of a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). 
CAQDAS allows a researcher to import text and code sections of the text with multiple 
codes. I utilized word processing and “hands-on” coding. Cutting the coded transcript 
excerpts allowed me to experiment with different way to combine and frame excerpts and 
to see the interplay of the themes in new ways. Although I have utilized NVivo in past 
research, the pen and paper methods to sorting and coding the data worked well for this 
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project. The interview questions were fairly straightforward and the studying up 
interviews required less creative interpretation of the data.  
Dissertation Organization 
The following chapters consist of three distinct research projects regarding public-
private partnerships in the Denver, Colorado metropolitan area. Chapter 2 focuses on 
utilizing public-private partnerships for innovative funding and financing of transit 
infrastructure projects and is titled Innovative Approaches to Improved Intermodal 
Transit Infrastructure Funding and Financing through Public-Private Partnerships: A 
Denver Case Study. Chapter 3 looks at the partnerships between freight and passenger 
rail services, and is titled Passenger Rail and Freight Rail Partnerships: A Case Study in 
Denver, CO. Chapter 4 addresses emerging collaborations of local governments, transit 
agencies, and ride-sourcing transportation network companies (TNCs) and is titled: 
Public-private partnerships with public transit, local government agencies, and 
ridesourcing in Denver, CO. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the research projects and a 
conclusion about public-private partnerships in transportation in general.
 
 17 
Chapter Two: Innovative Approaches to Improved Transit Infrastructure Funding 
and Financing through Public-Private Partnerships: A Denver Case Study 
Introduction  
Cities across the United States are grappling with a looming transportation crisis 
as a result of ever-increasing passenger and freight transport demands and overburdened 
networks of aging infrastructure. All levels of government, but particularly state and local 
governments, need to develop innovative funding and financing mechanisms to maintain 
and enhance transportation infrastructure.  Public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s) have 
increasingly been utilized in a number of cases to help address ongoing shortfalls in 
public infrastructure funding, and to accelerate project build-out.    
This research analyzes the increasingly important role of PPPs in transit 
infrastructure provision in the Denver, Colorado, metropolitan region. It examines five 
PPP projects in the Regional Transportation District (RTD) voter-approved FasTracks 
program: Eagle P3 commuter rail; Denver Union Station redevelopment; U.S. 36 bus 
rapid transit; I-225 light rail; and North Metro commuter rail.  Each of these transit 
projects has employed some form of a public-private partnership to facilitate RTD’s 
transit expansion, and I discuss the nature of each P3 agreement. The Denver metro area 
is seen as a model for regional collaboration and innovation in transit funding and 
financing through public-private partnerships (Jonas, Goetz, Brady, 2019). The Regional 
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Transportation District in Denver is the first transit agency in the U.S. to use a full 
design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) P3 contract for transit infrastructure.   
Using in-depth interviews and surveys with key stakeholders and decision-
makers, I analyze the financial and social benefits of the projects for the public and 
private partners as well as the Denver community at large.  I examine the impact of P3s 
on regional collaboration and the delivery of public information.  I also discuss the 
benefits and shortcomings of using the P3 delivery method and the extent to which 
Denver’s use of PPPs can serve as a model for other transit agencies seeking alternative 
procurement methods.    
Research Questions   
• What is the role of public-private partnerships in transit infrastructure provision in 
Denver, CO?  
• To what degree have the transit PPPs in Denver been successful or not?  
• Could the Denver P3s serve as models for other agencies seeking to expand 
transit infrastructure?  
Literature Review 
Transport PPPs in the U.S.  
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been used widely throughout the world to 
deliver many types of infrastructure.  The United States (U.S.) has lagged behind the 
international community in its use of PPPs. Nevertheless PPPs are becoming increasingly 
popular in the U.S. as a tool for leveraging funds by cash-strapped state and local 
transportation agencies.  Between 1989 and 2011, 81% of the 104 transportation public-
private partnerships in the U.S. were for highways, bridges, and tunnels, and only 19% 
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of transport PPPs were for rail transit projects (Istrate and Puentes, 2011).  Most of the 
transit PPP research has focused on international transit projects (for a review of 
international light rail P30F1 projects, see Mandri-Perrott, 2009). The list of transit P3s in 
the U.S. is small but growing (see a summary of U.S. transit P3s in Thomas, 2014), and 
more transit and transportation agencies are interested in pursuing them to expand their 
transit infrastructure.  Papajohn et al. (p. 127, 2011) found that of the 32 U.S. states that 
responded to their survey, 25 had either experienced, were currently adopting or had 
plans to implement transportation PPPs in the future, while only 7 stated they do not plan 
to pursue them.  With the increasing interest in utilizing the private sector in transit 
infrastructure delivery, more research is needed on the implementation of transit-specific 
P3 projects in the U.S, especially long-term concessions (i.e., those typically covering 20 
or more years) that include a financing element.1F2    
PPPs are defined in different ways by different entities. Typically, PPPs are 
comprised of a consortium of private sector firms, which is under a contract with a public 
authority to deliver and/or finance the infrastructure in question.  The definition that most 
applies to transit PPPs discussed in this paper is from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (USDOT).  The USDOT defines PPPs as a form of procurement.  
According to the USDOT’s 2004 Report to Congress on Public-Private Partnerships 
(cited in FHWA, 2007) 
                                                 
1 I use the terms PPPs and P3s interchangeably throughout the chapter but they are referring to the same 
thing.   
2 DBOM and DBFO(M) contracts, as described in this section, typically include an operating and 
maintenance agreement of 25 years or more according to USDOT (2004).  O’Steen and Jenkins further 
describe DBOM contracts as averaging between 15-25 years and DBFO averaging about 20 years, with 
some as long as 50 years (for example the U.S. 36 toll lane project discussed here). 
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A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement formed between public 
and private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than is 
traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with 
a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a 
facility or system. 
 
Private sector financing does not have to be included as a component of the PPP, but 
innovative financing has become more prevalent in recent years. This research project 
looks at financing in particular as a component of PPPs in Denver.    
PPPs can take several forms and the most common in transit procurement are: 
design-build (DB) and design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) (Thomas, 2014).  In the 
U.S., design-build contracts made up 62% of the total transport PPPs from 1989-2011, 
and DB is also the most common for highway projects (Thomas, 2014).  These are 
considered “alternative methods” of project delivery because they differ significantly 
from the more traditional design-bid-build method of contracting (Thomas, 2014).  In a 
design-bid-build project, the public agency has more control over the design of the 
infrastructure.  The agency either designs it themselves or contracts out the design 
according to their precise specifications, then companies bid on the construction of that 
project.  In the DB and DBOM models, the public agency develops certain performance 
specifications for the project, and the detailed design is left up to the private groups who 
bid for it.  This allows more flexibility for the private sector to utilize efficiencies and 
develop innovative ways ideally to decrease the cost of the project.  DBOM then adds 
operations and maintenance responsibilities to the contract, which is usually for a longer-
term of 15 or more years.  One advantage of including operate and maintain (O&M) in 
the PPP is to incentivize the private sector to produce a high quality project because it 
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will also be paying for the operating and maintenance costs over time.  The Hudson-
Bergen light rail system in NJ is an example of the DBOM model.    
Financing can also be added to these alternative delivery methods whereby the 
private sector brings in equity or takes on some of the debt burden of the project.  The 
public entity will use revenue generated from the project (usually farebox or toll revenue) 
to pay the private sector or issue availability payments over the course of the O&M 
period.  A full design-build-finance-operate-maintain or DBFOM delivery method can 
further transfer financial risk to the private sector as well as generate life-cycle cost 
savings (Thomas, 2014).  The Denver Eagle P3 project is the first full transit DBFOM in 
the U.S. The Maryland Purple Line is being modeled after the Eagle P3 project and is in 
the early stages of development.  
The benefits of using P3s to procure new transportation infrastructure have been 
identified in several research articles and federal publications.  P3s are expected to 
deliver projects faster and at a lower price than traditional methods (see next section) 
(FHWA, 2007).  The on-budget on-time expectation was tested by the National Audit 
Office of the U.K. (NAO, 2003), which found that only 24% of PPP projects were 
delivered late compared to 70% of projects delivered by traditional methods.  The NAO 
(2003) study also found that budgets were exceeded in 22% of PPPs versus 73% of 
traditional procurements.    
Increased innovation and expertise from the private sector in the construction and 
operation phases is another benefit of PPPs. Proponents argue that innovation leads to a 
better quality product at a lower cost (Thomas, 2014 p. 6; Papajohn et al., 2011, p. 130-
131).  PPPs can also stretch limited capital funds of an agency by allowing it to finance a 
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project over a longer period of time, as well as utilize private financing and capital to 
build more transportation infrastructure than through public financing alone.  P3s also 
have the potential to allocate appropriately some risks to the private sector (FHWA, 
2007).  Interestingly, Papajohn, et al. (2011) found in their survey that 57% of U.S. states 
implemented PPPs because of financing reasons, while 21% used PPPs for cost-saving 
reasons.  None of the states identified risk transfer as the reason for setting up a PPP.  
Measuring and quantifying these benefits is not always easy, and the extent to which a 
state or agency realizes these benefits is project-specific.    
There are also potential drawbacks to consider when it comes to choosing to 
conduct a transportation project as a P3.  The initial costs at the bidding stage and other 
transaction costs are much higher for a P3 because of the need to hire experts in P3 
contracts (Valila, 2005; Vining et al., 2005).  Critics of P3s also have concerns about the 
loss of public accountability when the private sector takes over the operation of a public 
asset (Siemiatycki, 2006; Forrer et al., 2010).  Some people are concerned that profit 
maximization will come at the expense of the public good.  Siemiatycki (2006) analyzed 
the Canadian Richmond-Airport-Vancouver (RAV) urban rail line PPP and found that it 
did not deliver on expected benefits such as limiting cost escalations and producing 
technological innovation.  P3s are not a viable alternative of infrastructure delivery in all 
cases; a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to assess the viability of a project to be 
conducted as a P3 (Reinhardt and Utt, 2012).    
Much of the research on transport PPPs comes from the evaluation of 
international projects (e.g. Transport Reviews 2015 special issue on PPPs, Banister, 
2016).  Previous research on transport PPPs in the U.S. has focused mainly on toll roads 
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and highway infrastructure (e.g. Van der Hilst, 2012), which is where the majority of P3 
funds are spent (Istrate and Puentes, 2011).  These studies, however, are somewhat 
applicable to transit PPPs because the contracts are often modeled after toll road PPP 
contracts, according to our interviews.  Papajohn et al. (2011) stated that innovative 
financing is usually involved in P3s. According to our research, the experts tended to 
agree that a “full P3” has to include financing, and DB contracts are becoming the 
standard procurement method. More research is needed on transit-specific P3 projects in 
the U.S., especially those that include financing, such as the Eagle P3 transit project in 
Denver.  
Study area and background on Denver’s transit PPP projects   
In November 2004, voters in the Denver-Aurora and Boulder metropolitan areas 
approved a 0.4% increase in the regional sales tax to support the FasTracks rail transit 
program, which would add 122 miles of light and commuter rail transit to Denver’s 
existing 35-mile light rail system. FasTracks would expand rail transit into six new 
corridors, including a new link to Denver International Airport, extend three existing 
corridor lines, complete a bus rapid transit line to Boulder, and refurbish Denver Union 
Station into a multimodal transportation hub for intercity and regional rail and bus 
service.  At an initial cost of $4.7 billion, the FasTracks project was at the time one of the 
largest urban rail transit construction programs in the U.S. 
However, delays in construction soon led to an increase in the costs of the 
FasTracks projects. Between 2003 and 2008, construction material costs rose much faster 
than RTD had predicted. The global economic crisis of 2007-2008 greatly affected the 
regional economy in Denver, and sales tax revenues were not as large as originally 
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projected.  By 2012, the cost estimate for FasTracks completion rose to $7.4 billion. As 
regional officials looked to the federal government to cover the growing gap in funding, 
it was clear that further measures were required. In 2007, the FTA had launched its 
Public Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta P) to encourage transit agencies to 
explore how P3s could reduce risk on federally funded projects.  Denver RTD was one of 
three agencies selected for the program and the only one that continued with it. In May of 
2011, the FTA awarded a $1.03 billion fully-funded grant to the RTD for the completion 
of three major corridors in the FasTracks system. A key factor in the FTA’s decision was 
the RTD’s commitment to creating a new public-private partnership to deliver the project 
in a timely and cost effective fashion. In awarding the money to Denver, the head of the 
FTA, Peter Rogoff, praised the RTD’s plans as a “model of private-sector involvement in 
transportation” (cited in Lieb, 2011). The creation of a P3 having access to non-
traditional sources of capital was a centerpiece of the RTD’s plan.  
The successful completion of the FasTracks system is hindered only by the 
Northwest rail line. Because of the increased construction and right-of-way costs, 
decreased sales tax revenue, and lack of a federal funding, the Northwest commuter rail 
line to Boulder and Longmont was sacrificed to get the rest of the system built. The Eagle 
P3 agreement did enable the first six miles of the Northwest rail to be built to 
Westminster. RTD officials have put a date of 2042 on the completion of the Northwest 
rail line. They are legally bound by the FasTracks legislation to build the line, but they do 
not have the financial ability to pay for it without a tax increase2F3. This has caused some 
                                                 
3 For more information about the cost estimates and shared-use agreements for the Northwest rail corridor, 
see chapter 3.  
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tension between regional stakeholders in Boulder and Longmont who voted for the sales 
tax, but who are not getting their rail line. Improvements in the bus service along U.S. 36 
were implemented as part of the toll road P3 instead.  
Making a P3: The Eagle P3 Project 
An example of a new generation P3, the Eagle P3 project in Denver is described 
as “an innovative financing and project delivery method in which a public entity partners 
with the private sector on a public infrastructure project” (RTD, 2015a). Central to the 
Eagle P3 project is the delivery and completion of three key components of the FasTracks 
project (see Table 1), namely, the East Rail Line (now the A-line) and the Gold Line 
(now the G-line) (which together comprise the main East-West extension) and the first 
segment of the Northwest Rail Line (B Line), along with the Commuter Rail 
Maintenance Facility (a site for storing and maintaining the commuter rail vehicles that 
serve parts of the FasTracks system). These lines are significant because they connect 
downtown Denver to major urban edge developments, including Stapleton and Denver 
International Airport (DIA), as well as the cities of Aurora, Arvada, Wheat Ridge and 
South Westminster (Figure 1). They are integral to ongoing regional efforts to retrofit 
mass transit to the new metropolitan geography of urban development, to promote smart 




Figure 1: RTD map of Eagle P3 rail project. Author: S. Brady, Source: RTD FasTracks  
2015a.  
 
Table 1: Major transit corridors covered by the Eagle P3 PPP project (Source: RTD, 2015c) 
 
Corridor name Distance 
(miles) 
Corridor description Local jurisdictions and 
major developments served 
East Rail Line (A 
Line) 
22.8 Electric commuter rail linking 
Denver Union Station and Denver 
International Airport (DIA) 
City/County of Denver, 
downtown Denver, DIA 
Gold Line (G Line) 11.2 Electric commuter rail linking 
Denver Union Station and Wheat 
Ridge 
City/County of Denver, 
Adams County, Arvada, 
Wheat Ridge 
Northwest Line 
(first segment only) 
(B Line) 
6.2 Electric commuter rail linking 
Denver Union Station and 
Westminster 
City/County of Denver, 
Westminster 
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The Eagle P3 Project is described as a “Design, Build, Finance, Operation and 
Maintenance (DBFOM) project” (FasTracks 2015c), meaning it involves all stages from 
project construction to financing and maintenance.  Some $2.2 billion in capital has been 
committed to the project, which is comprised of $1.03 billion in grant funding from the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA), regional sales tax bonds, and private equity of at 
least $450 million raised by the private consortium, Denver Transit Partners [DTP] (see 
Table 2; RTD FasTracks, 2015a, 2015c). The RTD makes payments to the private 
partners over the lifetime of the project whilst retaining ownership of all assets relating to 
the FasTracks system. Phase 1 of the project began in August 2010. The remaining 
construction phase of the project (Phase 2) was completed in 2016. While the A-line 
portion of the project opened as scheduled in 2016 and the B Line in July of 2016, the G-
line was significantly delayed. The G-line was delayed for over 2 years, until April of 
2019, because of crossing-gate issues that also affected the A-line and B-line. DTP (the 
private consortium) will continue to operate the project thereafter and for the remainder 
of its contracted lifetime of 29 years. 
Who are the partners in the Eagle P3 project? DTP represents a consortium of 
private concessionaires, including Fluor Enterprises, Inc.,3F4 Denver Rail (Eagle) Holdings, 
which is a subdivision of John Laing PLC,4F5 and Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments, a 
                                                 
4 Fluor Corporation is a Fortune 500 global engineering and construction firm headquartered in Irving, 
Texas. In 2013, it employed more than 40,000 worldwide and earned revenues of $27.4 billion (Reuters, 
2015).   
5 John Laing PLC specializes in raising capital for transportation, renewable energy, and social infrastructure 
projects involving state-led PPPs in the UK, Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and North America (John Laing, 
2015). In the last 30 years, it has invested in more than 100 such projects worldwide, including most recently 
the I-4 Ultimate Highway project in Florida, which is financed by a combination of debt equity and a loan 
provided by the US Department of Transportation under its Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 
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unit of Aberdeen Global Infrastructure Partners LP (DTP, 2015).5F6 John Laing and 
Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments are the majority partners in DTP, each with a 45% 
interest (John Laing, 2015).6F7 Concessionaire arrangements legally bind together the Eagle 
P3 project into a consortium, but it is important to note that this arrangement has already 
undergone some significant changes over the course of the project.  
Funding source Amount ($US millions) 
Regional: RTD funds including bonds raised against 
regional sales tax revenue 
684 
Federal: Federal Transit Administration Grant 1,030 
Global: private equities and revenue bonds 486 
Total investment in Eagle P3 project 2,200 
Table 2: Sources of capital funding for Eagle P3 (data sources: various including RTD 
FasTracks, 2015a, 2015c). 
 
Other P3 FasTracks Projects 
Besides Eagle P3, the FasTracks program is being delivered through four other 
types of P3 arrangements. I describe and discuss each of these arrangements in turn 
below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Innovation Act (TIFIA) program (see http://www.laing.com/project_portfolio/109/145/i-4-ultimate-
highway-project-florida-us.html).  
6 Aberdeen Global Infrastructure Partners LP is a collective investment scheme registered in the island of 
Guernsey, a recognized tax haven for UK-based investors. Aberdeen invests in global infrastructure projects, 
which are underpinned by long term secure government contracts that generate stable cash flows (The 
Hedge Fund Journal, 2014).  
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Table 3: Overview of P3 projects in the FasTracks program (sources: RTD 2016 a,b,c,d; 
FHWA 2014, n.d.; CDOT 2012, 2014; Khorkhyrahova 2013; Lien 2014; USDOT 2016) 
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Denver Union Station   
Denver Union Station (DUS) is different from the other FasTrack transit P3 
projects because it utilized innovative financing through real estate and development 
value.  The DUS public-private partnership included four public agencies, RTD, 
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), Denver Regional Council of 
Governments (DRCOG), the City and County of Denver, and one private group, Union 
Station Neighborhood Company (USNC), a joint venture of Continuum and East West 
Partners.  The private sector was engaged in the project as a “master developer.”  DUS is 
the intermodal hub of the RTD transit network, where light rail, commuter rail, bus 
operations, and Amtrak service all converge.  In addition, the historic union station 
building and great hall were refurbished, and now house a boutique hotel and very 
popular retail and dining options.   
The financing of DUS came from several sources including federal and state 
grants, property sale proceeds, and federal TIFIA and Railroad Rehabilitation and 
Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans.  The money to repay these loans came from 
FasTracks sales tax revenue and TIF revenue.  DUS opened the light rail facilities in 








Funding source Amount ($US 
millions) 
Federal: Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan 155 
Federal: TIFIA loan 145 
Federal: FHWA grant (CDOT) 50 
Federal: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds (ARRA) (DRCOG and 
RTD) 
28.6 
Federal: Federal Transit Administration Grant 9.6 
Federal: Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds (DRCOG and RTD) 2.5 
State: Senate Bill 1 (CO) 18.6 
Regional: Property sale proceeds (RTD) 37.4 
Total investment in Union Station project 446 
Table 4: Sources of capital funding sources for Denver Union Station (data sources: FHWA 
n.d.; Khokhryahova 2013; Lien 2014; USDOT 2016; RTD 2016a). 
 
U.S. 36 Bus Rapid Transit   
Also known as the Flatiron Flyer, the bus rapid transit service operated by RTD 
runs 18 miles between Boulder and Denver Union Station.  In conjunction with the BRT 
expansion, CDOT entered into a PPP agreement with Plenary Roads and the High-
Performance Transportation Enterprise7F8 (HPTE) within CDOT to expand highway 
capacity on U.S. 36 by building High-Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes.  The BRT service 
was included in the original FasTracks plan in conjunction with CDOT’s highway 
improvements.  The BRT and toll lanes began service in 2016.   
                                                 
8 The High-Performance Transportation Enterprise is a government-owned business within CDOT that was 
formed to pursue innovative means of more efficiently financing important surface transportation 
infrastructure projects.   
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Funding source Amount ($US millions) 
Federal: TIGER Grant 4.8 
Federal: TIFIA Loan 54  
State: CDOT Bridge Enterprise 41.5 
State: CDOT federal/ state grant 41.4 
Regional: DRCOG federal funds 46.6 
Regional: RTD funds  112.1 
Local funds and other 12 
Total investment in U.S. 36 improvements 312.4 
Table 5: Sources of capital funding for U.S. 36 improvements (data sources: FHWA 2014, 
CDOT 2012, CDOT 2014, RTD 2016d). 
 
I-225 light rail line (R-line)  
The I-225 light rail line is 10.5 miles and connects the Southeast and East (A-line) 
rail lines through Aurora, Colorado.  It was built as a design-build agreement with 
Kiewit, who put in an unsolicited bid in 2012.  Kiewit is the same contractor who 
completed in 2006 the Southeast Corridor light rail line along I-25 and I-225 (up to 
Parker Road) as part of the $1.7 billion TRansportation EXpansion (T-REX) design-build 
project that also widened those highways.  Because Kiewit had previous experience with 
building light rail in the same corridor, it was able to generate a bid that was lower than 
RTD cost estimates for that corridor.  The I-225 line opened in 2017. 
North Metro commuter rail line (N-line) 
The North Metro (N Line) electric commuter rail project is a proposed 18.5 mile 
line from Denver Union Station to Thornton, Colorado, with 13 miles currently under 
construction and due to begin service in the early 2020s.  In 2013, RTD received an 
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unsolicited proposal to construct the line, then opened a competitive bidding process and 
awarded a design-build contract to Regional Rail Partners (RRP) (RTD, 2016b).  The 
private group is a Joint Venture of Graham and Balfour Beatty Rail.  
Research methods   
This research utilizes multiple methods to accomplish the principal objectives of 
the study.  First, I conducted a desktop analysis of transportation and transit public-
private partnerships in the U.S. Second, I conducted a survey and a sample of face-to-
face interviews with at least twenty strategic actors and policymakers in Denver to elicit 
their views on the structure and nature of the transit PPPs in the region.  I conducted the 
surveys face-to-face to control its dissemination and preserve the quality of the data.  
Interviewees were identified through personal knowledge and snowball sampling.  
I sought to gather a variety of perspectives in the interviews, with responses from 
members of the business community, local, state, and federal government, community 
and advocacy groups, transit agency representatives, and private contractors.    
I then input the survey responses into survey analysis software called Qualtrics.  I 
used this software to analyze the survey data and generate summary statistics for the 
close-ended survey questions.  The survey used a Likert-type scale for close-ended 
questions, and the survey also included several open-ended questions.  I report the 
descriptive statistics, such as mean, maximum, and minimum values on a Likert scale, 
and the percentage of responses for each choice.  I audio recorded, transcribed, and 
coded the interview responses to identify common themes.  The methods and the survey 
are approved by the University of Denver’s Institutional Research Board.   
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Discussion of Results 
Measuring the success of P3 projects in Denver  
This section assessed the success of P3 projects in Denver, drawing on the results 
of the survey and interviews with key stakeholders. I have included brief quotes by 
interviewees in a fashion that respects the anonymity of respondents.   
Effectiveness in addressing transportation needs in the Denver region.  
Respondents rated Denver Union Station, US 36 BRT, and the Eagle P-3 projects 
as the most effective at addressing transportation needs in the region.  One interviewee 
responded that there should be a category for “beyond extremely favorable” for Denver 
Union Station because of the incredible transformation that has taken place in Lower 
Downtown around the station.  DUS is the multimodal hub of the RTD transit network, 
with connections to bus, light rail, commuter rail, Amtrak, taxis, and bike and pedestrian 
routes.  The Eagle P-3 is also highly ranked, but with three corridors included in the 
project, some are better at meeting transportation needs than others.  The A-line to 
Denver International Airport is seen as the most effective line in the Eagle project 
because of its access to the airport and the ability to bring in economic benefits. US 36 
was previously a widely used transit corridor, and the BRT and lane improvements have 
already produced increases in ridership and reduced travel time along the corridor for 
both drivers and transit users.    
I-225 (R Line) and the North Metro Line (N Line) were also expected to meet 
transportation needs effectively, but to a lesser degree.  Both lines will increase 
connectivity in the region, however, the I-225 line deviates from a straight alignment 
with the interstate to serve areas in Aurora’s downtown and the Fitzsimmons Medical 
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Center.  These alignment issues will result in increased travel time on the rail, making it 
tougher to compete with the automobile.  The North Metro line is expected to have lower 
ridership than other corridors with less frequent service, but it will fill a void in the 
system because there is currently no alternative for people traveling on I-25 to the north.  
The rail line is also competing with the exclusive bus and HOT lane on I-25, so it may be 
less effective than that option at meeting transportation needs.   
Financial benefit to involved parties   
Financial benefit to RTD.   The respondents were careful to point out that as a 
transit agency, RTD does not financially profit from running their services.  The financial 
benefit of a P3 comes in the way of “bang for the buck” in spending on transit projects.  
All of the P3 projects came in under the internal cost estimates for RTD to complete the 
projects themselves so they are mostly viewed as financially favorable for RTD.  The 
projects with a full P3 financing structure are viewed as providing the most financial 
benefit for RTD.  The Eagle P3 project came in $300 million below internal cost 
estimates, and that savings was redirected to other projects, including the I-225 and North 
Metro lines.  The actual debt rates for the private financing were higher than RTD could 
have raised itself, but the projected savings and benefit come from financing over a 
longer timeframe, which again allows RTD to fund more projects and accelerate the 
delivery of the FasTracks program.  In addition, the private equity that was used to 
finance a quarter of the Eagle project reduced the debt burden of RTD so they can 
complete the other projects.  The FTA full-funding grant agreement awarded points for 
cost effectiveness or "bang-for-buck" efficiency, and the P3 financing structure helped 
RTD score well on that part of FTA’s assessment for federal funding.    
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Denver Union Station produced the highest return on RTD’s investment 
according to some experts because RTD ended up getting a half a billion-dollar project 
for half the cost.  RTD was able to make use of the real estate value of their property 
surrounding the station to fund DUS and also make use of federal loans and private sector 
investment.  Therefore RTD had to invest less upfront cash to complete the project.  The 
revenue from DUS tax increment financing (TIF) is already ahead of performance 
schedule to pay back the TIFIA loans.   
A few people saw the US BRT project as financially unfavorable for RTD 
because it did not add much to the service while sacrificing a lot of political goodwill.  
Most people, however, recognized its benefit to RTD as favorable because they were able 
to leverage about $200 million in investments to get $500 million in improvements 
through the P3.  Several interviewees stated that they would not have been able to do the 
BRT without partnering with CDOT and the private partners.  One even saw this as the 
best financial deal for RTD because of the comparatively low investment in exchange for 
high quality of service improvements on a much faster timetable than without the P3.    
While the I-225 and North Metro lines were not viewed as favorably as the others, 
they still came in below internal costs through unsolicited bids.  The I-225 bid was over 
$90 million below cost estimates.  Any time the transit agency works with the private 
sector, even on a design-build contract, they should see cost benefits because the private 
sector is motivated by profits to save money.   
Financial benefit to the private consortium.  Overall, the financial benefit for the 
private consortium involved in the P3 projects is generally favorable.  Respondents were 
more conservative in their assessment of the concessionaire’s finances because most 
38 
respondents (except for representatives from the private consortium) have no real way to 
know if they are making money, but the general consensus is that they are.  The global 
investment firms involved in the Eagle P3 have experience with these types of long-term 
infrastructure projects and are looking for a “steady, long stream revenue source with 
fairly predictable and manageable risk” for investors like the California school board 
retirement group and the Australia Teachers Union.  The consensus is that DTP got “a 
good deal, but not a smoking deal,” and “nobody is walking away broke,” even with 
significant unexpected expenses for the private sector, such as having to rebuild the 
Jersey Cutoff bridge in the Eagle P3 project at the cost of $10 million.8F9   
The most important factor for DTP to make money on the Eagle project was to 
complete the project on time in order to begin receiving availability payments to service 
their debt. Although construction was completed on time, all lines were not in service 
according to the anticipated schedule. Since the interviews for this research were 
conducted before all of the Eagle P3 lines entered into revenue service, the responses 
were colored by the assumption that the lines would open on-time. There have since been 
several battles of the contract agreement and payments because of several issues relating 
to increased costs of operation and delayed opening of the G line. The A-line and B-line 
opened on-time in April of 2016 and July of 2016 respectively, but the lines were 
operating under a waiver from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for safety 
issues with the crossing gates. The Eagle P3 lines were the first rail transit lines to 
                                                 
9 This bridge goes over the BNSF railway tracks just south of I-70 along the Gold line/ Northwest line 





implement wireless signaling to the crossing gates, and it was integrated with the 
federally mandated positive train control (PTC) technology9F10. As a first of its kind 
system, there have been glitches. According to the FRA, the crossing arms were going 
down too soon and staying down too long. The waiver from the FRA requires DTP to 
station human flaggers at every grade crossing, and DTP has continued to do so on and 
off for over three years.  While the exact cost to station flaggers at road crossings for 
nearly 24 hours a day for three years is not known, it is estimated that tens of millions of 
dollars have been spent by DTP to keep the A-line in operation.  In addition, RTD has 
withheld over six million dollars from the availability payments to DTP for failure to 
meet contract terms in getting the G line open.   Because of the issues at the crossing 
gates, the G line opening was delayed until April of 2019, and it is also operating with 
flaggers under the FRA waiver. In the fall of 2018, DTP sued RTD for $80 million 
dollars for reimbursement of the costs of the flaggers and withheld payments, arguing 
that federal regulations changed, and they should not be liable for the additional costs due 
to FRA’s decision (Minor, 2019). RTD has threatened to end its contract with DTP and 
countersued DTP for millions of dollars, claiming they have defaulted on their contract 
and rushed the testing phase of operation. The net effect on the private sector partner’s 
finances is not known, but it is clear that their operation costs have increased and the 
delayed opening of the G-line has affected their access to the availability payments from 
RTD, enough to warrant a lawsuit.  
                                                 
10 Positive Train Control was mandated by Congress in the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement Act. The 
technology is designed to automatically stop a train to avoid accidents. For more information see: 
https://www.aar.org/campaigns/ptc/ 
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 Denver Union Station was assessed somewhat more favorably for the financial 
benefit of the private sector because the property values of the real estate that was sold 
around the station is publicly known and published in the newspapers.  The successful 
and explosive redevelopment of Lower Downtown (LoDo) is evident to everyone.  A 
representative of the private master developer, however, did comment that while the 
private group ended up averaging out to make a profit, it was only due to market 
conditions and not from any money that RTD was paying them.  The real estate 
developers had a difficult time early on when the real estate market was still recovering 
from the 2007-8 financial crisis, and they had to wait until the end of the deal to realize 
any profits.  They assumed a lot of risk, but ended up making money with a combination 
of historical luck and effective solutions of the transit hub problem.  
The US 36 toll lane project financials remain to be seen, and it is really too early 
to tell what toll revenues will be.  Many respondents think this will be one of the last toll 
road projects that transfers the toll revenue risk to the private sector because toll project 
revenue projections can be “wildly inaccurate.” Recently, several large U.S. toll road 
projects have gone bankrupt, notably the Indiana Toll Road in 2014 and the Texas Toll 
Road/ SH 130 in 2016.  The private sector is increasingly less likely to bear the toll 
revenue risk in these arrangements.  The I-225 and North Metro lines were seen as typical 
design-build contracts where the contractor will likely make money as long as they work 
within their budgets.    
Financial and social benefits for the Denver community at-
large.  The interviewees agree that PPP projects benefit the Denver community 
financially and socially. Generally speaking, all of the transit projects deliver the social 
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benefit of providing an alternative to the car and getting drivers off the road.  This is truly 
the mission of transit.  The projects facilitate cost-effective mobility and livability in the 
region.  The P3 delivery model has enabled more transit to get built faster, without 
having to go back to the taxpayers after the funding shortfall.  The consensus is that 
taxpayers are getting a good deal with these P3s and seeing value for their tax dollars.  
Most people stated that they expect the region as a whole to benefit from future economic 
development due to investment in transit infrastructure in Denver.  The projects for which 
respondents expected to see the most economic development and financial benefits are 
the Eagle P3 and Denver Union Station.   
The Eagle P3 project is economically important to the region because of the 
access it provides to the airport.  Interstate 70 east of downtown is the major thoroughfare 
that most travelers use to access the airport, but that highway has been experiencing 
crippling levels of traffic congestion and substantially increased travel times especially 
during peak hours.  Everyone agreed that the “train to the plane” will bring economic 
development opportunities to the Denver region, and it has already brought in industry 
along its corridor, including Panasonic.  The A-line provides a certainty of travel time as 
a social benefit to citizens. Moreover, the “aerotropolis” concept is something that 
Denver and Adams County hope to further capitalize on to bring more jobs to the 
region.10F11   The cost of the crossing gate flaggers and the delay of the G line revenue 
service has been born thus far by the private contractor, DTP, but they are suing RTD for 
                                                 
11 Denver’s current mayor, Michael Hancock, has expressed an interest in developing the land around DIA 
and along the A-line corridor into an ‘aerotropolis’ or airport city as an engine for regional economic 
development. The Aerotropolis Regional Transportation Authority (ARTA) has been established to oversee 
future development and infrastructure improvements on the land surrounding DIA (see 
https://aerotropolisrta.org/).   
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reimbursement of these costs and withheld availability payments. This could be 
considered a financial benefit to the public, since a major benefit of a P3 is shifting some 
of the financial risk to the private sector. However, RTD is having to expend legal fees to 
fight and file the lawsuits and may end up paying for some of the expenses, so the true 
cost of these issues are likely being felt by both the public and private partners.   
Redevelopment of Denver Union Station is also credited with the relocation of 
several national firms’ headquarters to downtown Denver.  Many companies cite access 
to transportation options as an amenity they hope to provide their employees. DUS has 
also reinvigorated the LoDo neighborhood and facilitated higher real estate values in the 
area. The tax revenues from the redevelopment around the station has been triple the 
original projections. RTD and the City and County of Denver were able to refinance $300 
million in loans, which will enable Denver to pay off their debt in just over eight years 
while saving over $10 million, and RTD will save up to $134 million over the life of the 
loan through 2040 (Murray, 2017).  
The BRT and HOT lanes on US 36 provide transportation choices in an important 
highway corridor.  The improvements have provided more reliable and faster travel times 
for the community, and the P3 delivered an “autobahn-like system” decades before it 
otherwise could have. 
Public accountability of P3s  
Since P3s are relatively new in both the U.S. and Denver contexts, questions have 
been raised about matters of public accountability and access to information. Regardless 
of how much information an agency feels they provide to the public, they know that what 
matters is how the public views projects like P3s.  The agencies most heavily involved in 
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these projects, namely RTD and CDOT, both felt that they did a good job informing 
citizens of the impacts of their projects.  However, the public did not always agree.  
RTD’s projects in general received higher marks for public information than the CDOT 
project.  Transit agency respondents also gave themselves high marks for public 
information, citing RTD’s philosophy of active transparency.    
Every RTD project has a public information team that is responsible for engaging 
with the community and local stakeholders. For the Eagle P3 project, RTD held a public 
meeting in a large auditorium downtown for the public to hear presentations from the 
private groups competing for the contract.  People were interested in the high profile A-
line to the airport, and the public could see it being built along the airport boulevard.  
Moreover, quite detailed information about the project and the concessionaire 
is accessible on RTD and other websites. Nevertheless, the public and even some elected 
officials still do not know many details about the projects, including the procurement 
model or even the differences between light rail and commuter rail.   
Denver Union Station was seen as "a different animal" because the P3 was more 
real estate driven.  The project had more scrutiny by more people, according to 
individuals involved in the station redevelopment.   The project has had multiple public 
and private stakeholders involved, so they felt they were always out there explaining the 
project- to CDOT, RTD, Lower Downtown neighborhood groups, etc.  The project also 
had a citizens group, Union Station Alliance, which has had input into what type of 
tenants they wanted to see in the station.  Although Eagle P3 and Denver Union Station 
were seen as providing more information to the public, some people were quick to point 
out that these projects were not controversial.  In the end, the public was mostly just glad 
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the projects were being built, and there was little opposition to them.  People were not as 
concerned about the P3 delivery model being used in transit projects as they were with 
the highways.    
Toll lanes are inherently more controversial according to some interviewees.  
With the US 36 project, some of the public got the wrong impression that they were 
going to have to pay to drive on all the lanes on U.S. 36.  People were also confusing 
CDOT and RTD, thinking that RTD was building toll lanes.  Some interviewees also 
attributed the backlash against the US 36 toll lanes and BRT to the failure of the 
Northwest rail line to get built.  People felt they had voted for rail and now all they were 
getting were buses, even though the BRT had always been a part of the FasTracks plan.  
The project turned political, and state legislators stepped in questioning the P3 contract 
with the Plenary Roads group.  Some elected officials interviewed cited a “total lack of 
transparency” from CDOT, stating that the “agreement was negotiated behind closed 
doors, nobody including legislators, got to see the agreement until it was signed.”    
An audit of the US 36 project found that CDOT failed to provide enough 
information to the public, “even though all [of the RTD transit projects] provided much 
less information- a lot less,” according to one interviewee.  As a result, a few state 
legislators sponsored a bill to restrict PPPs for CDOT in the future, but the governor 
vetoed the bill.  The public outreach part of the bill was kept, requiring at least two public 
meetings if a project is delivered using a P3.  In hindsight, a few respondents felt that the 
private and public partners failed to reach out to key stakeholders, including state 
legislators, to make sure they understood the procurement process and key contract 
terms.  Interviewees did feel that it is important for the public to understand and be 
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involved in P3s, but because they are “complex and opaque transactions that are difficult 
to explain and communicate,” it is hard to know how much the public really wants to 
know.    
Regional collaboration  
Over the past few decades, the Denver metropolitan region has become known for 
its strong model of regional collaboration (Jonas, Goetz, and Bhattacharjee, 2014).  Most 
of the interviewees credited regionalism created through the Metro Mayors Caucus, the 
Metro Denver Chamber of Commerce, and other regional organizations with getting the 
initial FasTracks ballot initiative passed in 2004.  The Metro Mayors Caucus is an 
informal collaboration between Denver metro area mayors to address issues that cross 
jurisdictions such as transportation.  Denver’s mayor at the time, John Hickenlooper, was 
also a strong regionalist.    
After the funding shortfall was discovered, it became evident that not all the rail 
lines would be built, and there was potential for the strong regional collaboration to 
become fragmented based on which corridors would move forward.  Choices had to be 
made; however, the decisions were not political, but based on the availability of federal 
funding and private sector interest in the projects.  The lines eligible for federal funding 
in the PentaP project, the Gold Line, the B line, and the A line, were packaged together as 
the Eagle P3.  After the Eagle P3 project came together, there were some negative 
sentiments expressed against the core city (Denver), but most people supported the 
airport line getting built as a benefit to the region.  The Eagle P3 also enabled part of the 
Northwest rail line to get built to Westminster.  Communities to the northwest, however, 
were unhappy that their corridor was not being built. RTD’s ability to get the I-225 and 
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North Metro lines built with savings from Eagle P3 was “brilliant” because it showed a 
good faith effort to get something built for Adams County and Aurora.    
Denver Union Station and the Eagle P3 rated the highest for contributing to 
stronger regional collaboration.  These projects met little opposition, and it was hard to 
argue that the transit hub and the airport line were not good for the region.  Everyone in 
the region supported the projects, but DUS did not have to deal with multiple 
jurisdictions- it is located only in the City and County of Denver.  The US 36 BRT 
project required collaboration between CDOT, RTD, and local communities, and 
ironically the backlash against CDOT and the toll lanes coalesced the region.    
The opinions of the P3 contribution to regional collaboration varied.  Some 
experts either thought that the P3 delivery model itself did not hurt regional collaboration 
or it did not affect it much at all.  Others, however, said that a P3 is the very definition of 
collaboration.  It requires government to be more proactive with regional partners and to 
think about the regional benefit of the transit lines rather than what a certain jurisdiction 
wants.  Another pointed out that RTD is regional by definition and requires strong 
collaboration between many different government entities.  Another felt that the mayors 
stood by one another and supported each other’s projects, not just their own.  One 
respondent spoke about the importance of local match grants in the Southeast corridor, 
where local government and private groups collaborated to provide matching funds to get 
the Southeast light rail extension back on the table.   
There were a few people who felt that regional collaboration has suffered more 
recently because of the ‘corridor versus corridor’ mentality, with the south metro 
arguably getting everything, or so it has been claimed.  The fact that the Northwest rail 
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project to Boulder and Longmont was being pushed beyond 2042 contributed to this 
“Mason-Dixon type line.” The FasTracks plan was supposed to be funded as a regional 
system, but instead was being funded, through FTA funding and private money, corridor 
by corridor.   
 Overall success of the projects  
Denver Union Station stands out among these projects, with 100% of survey 
respondents rating the success extremely favorable.  DUS was assessed by some 
respondents as “beyond extremely favorable” and an “unmitigated, outstanding super 
success.” It is “hard to find a problem” with the project, and the region and public is 
already seeing economic and social benefits from it.   
Eagle P3 was also highly rated, either extremely favorable or generally favorable 
by all respondents, because of the economic development and connectivity it will bring to 
the region.  Ridership on the A-line has exceeded expectations, and new cars are being 
added to the service in 2019 to meet demand (Tinsley, 2018). The ridership has continued 
to increase since 2016, from 4.1 million boardings in 2016 (from April through 
December) to 6.6 million in 2017 to 7 million in 2018 (Bosselman, 2019). As of 
December 2018, total ridership had reached 16 million, which RTD officials did not 
expect to reach until 2020 (Tinsley, 2018). RTD has expressed their satisfaction with the 
ridership numbers, as well as their on-time percentage for the A-line of 97%.  
The success of the other projects was also favorable.  The success of the BRT is 
attributed to the high ridership and improved travel time in the corridor. In the interviews, 
the North Metro (N Line) is expected to be successful because it is anticipated to be on-
time, on-budget and provide high quality service to customers. The first segment of the 
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Northwest rail (B line) was completed on-time in July of 2016 and on budget, and it has 
achieved its expected ridership. The B line is nearing 160 boardings per hour. The R-line 
along I-225 was stalled for a few months by equipment issues, but opened in February 
2017, and it has thus far been the lowest performing FasTracks line. The R line had less 
than 40 boarding per hour in 2017, well below the next lowest line at 140 boardings per 
hour (Sachs, 2017). The R line makes significant detours from the most efficient route in 
order to service the Aurora town center and is not well integrated into the large 
employment center of the CU Anschutz Medical Campus. The transit oriented 
development along the R line has also been slow to develop thus far. After considering all 
of the measures of success, meeting transportation needs, financial success, and public 
information, the P3 projects overall get high marks from interviewees.    
Major Benefits of Private-Public Partnerships  
Most of the benefits cited by respondents apply to a full P3, with DBFOM 
aspects.  The two most important and most cited benefits of these PPPs were accelerated 
delivery of the projects and appropriate allocation of risk.  RTD was able to deliver more 
infrastructure sooner than it could have with traditional revenue streams.  The private 
sector has a better ability to deliver multiple projects on-time and on-budget because of 
incentives such as availability payments that take effect when the project is complete.  
Most of the interviewees believe that the private sector is “faster, smarter, and better”, 
and through their operating efficiencies plus incentives for profit, they can complete 
projects faster than the transit agency alone.  Even a design-build project, without the 
financing, operating, and maintenance agreements, gets built faster than a traditional 
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design-bid-build because of private sector efficiencies, such as utilizing the connection 
between the designer and the contractor for smoother and faster implementation.   
A few people named allocation of risk as the primary reason to conduct a project 
as a P3.  The risks must be shifted appropriately, with the private concessionaire (and its 
constituent firms) assuming those risks that they can manage better and cheaper than 
RTD.  For example, the private sector is much more equipped to assume construction risk 
or interest rate risk, while the public sector is better equipped to handle risks such as 
environmental hazards and public utilities.  Shifting some of the risk to the private sector 
is a significant financial advantage in a P3 contract. However, the distribution and 
allocation of risk should not undermine control of public assets. Most respondents felt 
that the contracts negotiated in several of the P3s had provisions that allowed the regional 
public agency to retain or reassume control of strategic assets should the private sector 
fail to deliver. These provisions are discussed further in section five: the role of the 
regional transit agency.  
A P3 can reduce some costs, as evidenced by the lower cost estimates that came 
in for all of the projects discussed in this report.  For the Eagle project the cost estimate 
came in $300 million under initial internal projections.  This freed up more money for 
other transit projects, but it is not always cheaper to do a P3 in the long-term.  The ability 
to finance over time gets more infrastructure built faster, but it would have been cheaper 
for RTD as a government agency to finance the debt than the private sector assuming that 
bond ratings were strong.  There is not really a cost savings through private financing, but 
if the public sector needs capital from elsewhere because they have reached their debt 
capacity, as was the case with RTD, then the financing element is a very important 
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benefit. The financing element is also important because it gives the private sector “skin 
in the game.” For the Eagle P3, the private consortia contributed $54 million to the 
funding of the infrastructure.  If they walk away, they lose the equity they have 
contributed.  One person noted that the financing element of the P3 is overrated, and “if 
you (the transit agency) are doing it for money, you are doing it for the wrong reasons.”  
Benefits such as allocation of risks and accelerated delivery are the primary reasons for 
doing a P3 in this respondent’s opinion.   
Another key to realizing all of the benefits of a P3 is to include financing, 
operations, and maintenance in the partnership.  The public sector benefits by being able 
to pay for the full life-cycle cost of operations and maintenance.  In a DB contract, some 
construction savings may be reaped but possibly at the expense of operations and 
maintenance. With a full DBFOM contract, the private sector is incentivized to build a 
better product that will require less maintenance to increase their profit over the long-
term concession lease.  There is also a guaranteed condition of the asset in the Eagle P3 
that requires the infrastructure to be returned to the agency in a certain condition after the 
30 year O&M period.  Instead of building a system to last 50 years and using it and 
abusing it, this contract funds a mid-life overhaul of the system.    
Another way the public sector benefits from partnering with the private sector is 
the expertise that hired consultants and the private consortia bring to the table.  These 
specialized individuals and companies are better at executing projects at a higher level of 
skill and reliability.  The public sector does not have the expertise or experience to 
negotiate these contracts, so they bring together a group of very sharp legal and financial 
minds to represent them, resulting in a better deal for the agency.  In addition, the 
51 
knowledgeable resources that the private consortia contribute during the design, 
construction, and operation phases also results in a better overall team overseeing the 
project.     
Bringing in the private sector results in more innovation.  According to some 
respondents, the public sector is used to doing things in a certain way, with a “this is the 
way we have always done it” mentality.  A P3 helps “get the bureaucratic bologna out of 
the way.”  The public sector provides robust design criteria for the transit infrastructure, 
but the P3 model provides flexibility for the private sector to find efficiencies and cost 
savings by building things the way they know how or by coming up with innovative 
solutions to design or construction issues.  In this way they are not hamstrung by the 
agency’s design.   One example of an innovation from the private partner in the Eagle P3 
was including wireless signaling technology with positive train control. However, in this 
instance, the innovation has resulted in additional regulatory problems and costs since the 
technology was relatively untested prior to the opening of the Eagle P3 lines. Neither the 
public nor private partner has been able to adequately address the technical issues with 
the crossing gate software.   
 Major Shortcomings of Public-Private Partnerships   
The nature of P3s, at least in the U.S., is that they are “complex and opaque,” and 
difficult to explain to the public because PPPs are misunderstood, unfamiliar, and still 
novel.  From the public perspective, and as evidenced here by reactions to the U.S. 36 
project, there is a lack of transparency in P3 agreements and negotiations.  The public and 
private entities must spend a lot of time on public information, in order to ease the 
increased public suspicion of corruption and uneasiness of the private sector taking over 
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public assets.  Keeping the public informed is even harder with a P3 than with traditional 
projects because everything moves so much faster.    
Changes can also be difficult in a P3.  The public agency loses some flexibility 
and ability to request changes from their original design.  For example, the City of 
Denver and RTD wanted to add another station at 61st and Pena on the A-line to the 
airport very late in the construction phase.  While some change orders can be done, it is 
not usually in the best interest of the private sector.  In this instance, the private side was 
able to add the station, but everything comes at a cost.  Some people view some loss of 
control by the agency as a shortcoming.  The public entity has less control of the design 
and building specifications compared to a design-bid-build contract, but one response 
from RTD was “we have plenty of control over what we should worry about.”  RTD does 
not need to be concerned about the specific way the contractor builds a bridge or station 
platform, as long as it is safe, reliable, and produces quality transit service.     
The expense to hire private expertise in the negotiation phase can cost millions in 
upfront soft costs.  The public sector does not have the skills to negotiate these complex 
deals themselves.  The risk of ending up with a bad contract is more expensive than the 
cost of hiring the experts, but there is also a risk that the project will never get to the bid 
phase and the agency will have spent millions of dollars on lawyers, designers, bankers, 
consultants, and other experts.  There is no standardization of contracts for full DBFOM 
agreements, so for the Eagle P3, financial and legal experts from Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, and Freshfields were required to ensure that the public entity was adequately 
prepared to enter into the P3 arena.    
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There is also the issue of cost.  It is complicated to precisely identify whether P3s 
provide a cost savings or not.  As discussed in the benefit section, P3s can result in a cost 
savings in the short term and allow projects to get completed that may have had funding 
issues.  However, over the longer term, the agency will end up paying more for a P3 
project because they are paying a higher debt rate through the private sector financing.  
As one expert put it, rarely will the agency’s “green-visored accountant” in the back 
room look at the spreadsheets and say that a P3 makes financial sense, because the 
agency will pay more over time.  But the agency should take into account all of the other 
benefits of a P3, especially the transfer of risk, which also adds to the increased cost.  
Experts agreed, financing is not funding, and P3s are not a magic bullet to address the 
lack of transportation funding in U.S. states and cities.   
Using Denver P3s as a Model  
Many people stated that the Eagle and Denver Union Station P3s could serve as 
models for other cities and regions looking to expand their transit infrastructure, 
especially for transit agencies with constrained revenue streams.  In fact, these projects 
already are serving as models for projects such as the Maryland Purple Line, outside of 
Washington D.C.  RTD has hosted numerous cities that have visited Denver to see how 
they were able to get these projects done. RTD also produced a “Lessons Learned” 
document after the procurement phase of Eagle P3 and hope to produce another one after 
the transition to O&M11F12.  They have shared their experiences with others at conferences 
and shared transit exchanges as well.    




The Eagle P3 is considered a good model contractually and financially.  The 
contract was based on toll road and international deals, and the “risk transfer was nearly 
perfect,” according to one expert.  The way these projects were financed is also 
considered a model for future transit PPPs.  Denver and RTD were able to maximize all 
sources of funding including federal funding and grants as well as private equity.  Cities 
looking to replicate Denver Union Station’s success are especially interested in how to 
use TIFIA loans and Certificates of Participation (COPs) to leverage economic 
development dollars.   The Eagle P3 and DUS project are also models of 
intergovernmental cooperation and regional collaboration.  Part of the model of Denver’s 
success is the strong regionalism that has characterized regional governance and 
economic development for several decades. For instance, the Denver model was cited in 
an important national study of metro regionalism published by the Brookings Institution 
(Katz and Bradley, 2013)12F13 
The most repeated answer to whether Denver can serve as a model was “yes, 
but…” Respondents cautioned that Denver and RTD had a special set of circumstances 
with the Eagle P3 and DUS that might not be replicable in other situations.  They stressed 
that every P3 deal is different, and as former general manager Phil Washington was prone 
to say, “If you have done one P3, you have done one P3.”  Perhaps it would be better to 
call Denver an example, as suggested by some interviewees.  As the first full-scale transit 
PPP (DBFOM) in the United States, the Eagle P3 can serve as a useful example of how a 
transit PPP can be done. The federal PentaP program was one of a kind, and while other 
                                                 
13 The Brookings study did discuss the FasTracks vote, but it did not assess the role of P3s in regional 
collaboration. 
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agencies can learn from RTD by leveraging as much federal funding as possible, they 
may not be able to replicate the exact circumstances and funding sources.  RTD has 
produced a checklist of things to address in P3 contracts, but not every agency will have 
to address the issues in the same way as RTD.  No one can pick up RTD’s contract and 
say, in effect, “now we do not have to draft our own”.  Transit agencies interested in P3s 
can also learn from Denver how transit can court private investment.  Prior to entering 
into the Eagle P3 agreement, the private sector already viewed RTD as a good business 
partner based on their experience with DB contracts and contracting out 
some paratransit and bus operations.    
Other regions should consider whether a P3 is even the right delivery model for 
them.  Not every transit agency needs to do their project as a P3.  Because of the 
Colorado Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) law that requires all new tax requests to go 
to the voters for approval and revenue shortfalls, RTD had to be innovative with their 
financing structure.  Cities looking to Denver as a P3 model must understand that 
financing is not funding, and it is not a magic bullet.   
The Role of the Regional Transit Agency  
The transit agency interviewees were asked additional questions regarding their 
preference for P3s, the protection of public interests and potential for default from the 
private sector.  These questions address concerns from some legislators and the public 
about private operators defaulting on public assets.   
Should projects be conducted as a P3 or by transit agency alone.    
Transit agency representatives were asked if they could choose whether these 
projects would be conducted as PPPs or conducted by the transit agency alone, which 
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they would choose.  There were two schools of thought.  Some people would prefer the 
transit agency to conduct the projects as design-bid-build because the agency would have 
more control and involvement over the project, and the agency’s ability to control costs is 
better.  Most people, however, said it depends on the project and the circumstances 
surrounding it.  For example, for the Eagle P3, it made sense to do a DBFOM P3 because 
the agency was short on funding, and electrified commuter rail was a new technology that 
required coordination with the FRA, which RTD did not have experience operating.  
Despite the benefit of the private sector’s experience with electrified commuter rail, the 
commuter lines have not been immune to technical issues with the crossing gates and 
other unlucky events including lightning strikes and power outages.  Furthermore, RTD 
has stated its intention to operate and maintain the yet to be opened North Metro line (N 
line) itself, rather than use DTP which operates the other commuter lines (Minor, 2019). 
The I-225 line (R line), however, would not have made sense to do with an operate and 
maintain component because it is light rail technology, which RTD already runs in 
several corridors.  The takeaway was that each project should be analyzed, and using a P3 
as the delivery model should be considered as a part of the cost/ benefit analysis, and if it 
makes sense, then do it.  Construction on toll lanes in the C-470 highway corridor is 
another example where CDOT decided after analyzing the options, that it would make 
more sense for the agency to build and operate the lanes rather than a private entity.  A 
full DBFOM agreement does not make sense in every case, but DB agreements also 
allow the agency to benefit from bringing in the private sector through risk transference, 
efficiencies, lower cost, and the ability to complete multiple projects at the same time.    
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Assurances that the public interests are being protected.    
I also asked the agency respondents what elements of the PPP contracts provide 
assurances that the greater public interest is being protected.  It all comes down to the 
contract, according to RTD representatives.  The Eagle P3 contract has robust 
requirements with default provisions and tender provisions should something happen 
with the private sector’s ability to pay for or run the service.  The quality of service is 
also specified in the contract, with penalties that apply if the service is not performing up 
to required levels. The contract was negotiated by leading financial and legal experts that 
RTD hired, so the transit agency felt that the contract fully protected the public interests.  
On the Eagle project, RTD also had an oversight team of more than 60 people overseeing 
DTP and conducting QA/ QC, as well as four inspectors in the field.    
The potential for the PPP being deliberately bankrupted   
The transit agency was not concerned about the concessionaire defaulting because 
of the numerous levels of protection in the contract.  First, it would be incredibly unlikely 
that the private consortium would intentionally bankrupt the project because of the 
repercussions to the private firm and its parent company, Fluor.  If Fluor (or the other 
partners) were to walk away from the debt of over $400 million in private activity bonds, 
they would never be allowed to work on a federal contract for the next ten years or 
borrow money from anyone.  In addition, they would lose the equity they previously 
invested in the project.  Secondly, the contract and financing agreement do not allow the 
private group to foist its project debt on the transit agency.  The bonds specifically state 
that RTD is not responsible for repayment on the offering statement; all of the debt is 
with the private sector.  Thirdly, even in the worst-case scenario, if the private 
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concessionaire did default or they do not perform up to contract requirements, RTD 
retains ownership of the infrastructure asset.  If they fire the private concessionaire or the 
private group defaults, RTD has the right to re-tender and sell the lease to someone else 
or operate the service itself.  This is the scenario that would develop if RTD follows 
through with their threat to terminate its contract with DTP, albeit not without extensive 
legal wrangling in the courts. The most damaging consequence of such default to the 
public would be that the trains would not run until RTD or another operator could take 
over the service.  There is really no additional risk to the public compared to the case if 
RTD owned the bonds.   
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 Public-private partnerships have been utilized for public infrastructure projects 
throughout the world, but they are relatively underutilized in the United States. Interest in 
P3s is increasing in the U.S., especially in the transportation sector due to lack of federal, 
state, and local funding. Denver’s RTD agency used P3s to deliver several of their 
FasTracks projects. FasTracks was a 2004 voter approved ballot measure to increase the 
regional sales tax by 0.4% to fund a regional light rail and commuter rail system 
alongside a bus rapid transit system and the redevelopment of Union Station as a transit 
hub connecting the transit network. FasTracks has thus far cost over $5 billion dollars, 
and the system has not yet been fully built-out. After a funding shortfall following the 
wake of the global financial crisis and increasing construction costs, partnering with the 
private sector to use innovative procurement methods allowed the agency to deliver 
several of the rail lines that were in jeopardy of not getting built. The Eagle P3 project 
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included the region’s first commuter rail service and was the nation’s first full DBFOM 
transit P3.  
 This research sought to outline the different transit P3 that were a part of 
FasTracks and analyze their successes. The research also aimed to answer whether or not 
the Denver region’s approach to P3s and regional collaboration could be seen as a model 
for other public agencies seeking to use P3s to build transportation infrastructure. The 
research utilized semi-structured interviews with public and private stakeholders and 
media and document analysis to answer these questions. This research contributes to the 
literature by filling in the research gap of transit P3s in the U.S. and provide public 
agencies interested in implementing P3s with information from a case study about 
benefits and drawbacks of the P3 approach.   
Denver’s five PPP projects were rated favorably by nearly all the respondents.  
Denver Union Station in particular has exceeded expectations in several areas, notably 
economic development for the city and financial benefit to the private and public 
partners. Respondents identified the most important benefits of utilizing a P3 delivery 
model as accelerated delivery of a project and appropriate allocation of risk.  In addition, 
the projects were also able to be delivered at a lower cost than if the transit agency alone 
had completed them. The incentives for on-time project delivery facilitated faster 
completion by the private sector. The allocation of risk for maintenance and operations 
through the use of availability payments incentivized the private partner to build a better, 
longer-lasting product. The main shortcoming is that P3s can be complex and opaque, 
especially to the general public.  Public accountability and transparency were found to be 
lacking in the U.S. 36 toll lane and BRT project. Overall, the Denver P3s, especially the 
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Eagle P-3, can serve as a useful model for other transit agencies seeking to expand their 
transit infrastructure.  
The interests in P3s for transit agencies is growing because of the continuing 
funding and financing problems that face transit agencies and state DOTs. For public 
agencies interested in following Denver’s P3 example, the Denver P3s can serve as a 
useful model.  Recommendations for future P3s in transit include investing in specialized 
legal and financial expertise to ensure the inclusion of appropriate safeguards for project 
quality and to protect the public interest.  Agencies should do so in a way that fully 
integrates P3s within existing structures of regional collaboration. 
This research focused on the development of public-private partnerships and their 
success thus far. This research was limited in scope by the level of completion for each of 
the P3 projects at the time of the data collection in 2016. In some cases, interviews and 
surveys were conducted before some of the lines went into service, so the long-term 
benefits and success cannot be pinpointed from this study. The success of the FasTrack 
lines were determined in the context of the design-build-finance phases of the 
partnerships, but the success of the operate-maintain phases is yet to be seen. Recent 
issues surrounding the contractual agreement and obligations of the public agency and 
private partner in the Eagle P3 suggest that these partnerships need to continue to be 
studied over the long-term.  Future studies should explore the long-term effects of the 
Eagle P3 and U.S. 36 toll road project since they are long-term concession agreements 
that stretch over several decades, and the financial benefit of the partnerships may not be 




Chapter Three: Passenger Rail and Freight Rail Partnerships: A Case Study in 
Denver, CO 
Introduction  
In the U.S., the demand for increased commuter and intercity passenger rail 
service is increasing due to population growth and traffic congestion.  Amtrak service is 
growing and high-speed rail service is planned in a few major corridors.  Locally, transit 
agencies are looking to expand their light rail and heavy rail service to meet the 
transportation needs of their region.  Because the railroad networks are already built out 
through densely populated cities, most experts agree that sharing freight rail corridors is 
one of the least environmentally and socially impactful ways to expand passenger rail 
services across the country.  As plans for shared-use railroad corridors increase, more 
research is needed to improve, encourage, and sustain the cooperation between freight 
and passenger rail.  
This research examines the use of public-private rail partnerships across the 
country by identifying and describing existing relationships between freight and 
passenger rail, analyzing elements of good agreements and bad agreements, and 
developing best practices in corridor sharing.  Commuter rail and Amtrak operations in 
Colorado and the Denver metropolitan region are also examined in detail.  Amtrak, 
regional and state transit and transportation authorities, and local governments in Denver 
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have had experience in conducting negotiations with freight railroads concerning the 
acquisition or use of rail corridors, rights-of-way, or tracks.  It is important for public 
transportation agencies and authorities at all levels—federal, regional, state, and local—
as well as the private railroads to learn from these cases and to develop more effective 
partnerships.  In-depth interviews with key participants and stakeholders from the freight 
and passenger rail industry at the national and local levels yield useful examples of both 
positive and negative experiences, and best practices in freight and passenger rail 
partnerships.   
Research questions 
This research intends to identify, describe, and analyze existing relationships 
between freight railroads and passenger rail operators in Denver, CO for the purpose of 
facilitating future public-private partnerships in rail corridor capacity expansion and 
gaining a better understanding of this major intermodal transportation issue.  Building 
upon the research conducted by Bing et al (2010) in a National Cooperative Highway 
Research Program (NCHRP) report, this research will use a case study approach to 
answer the following questions:  
• What is the current status of rail corridors in Denver and how have public 
agencies acquired and/ or shared use of rail corridors with freight railroads? 
• How do shared-use rail corridors in Denver impact economic competitiveness for 
both freight and passenger rail service? 
• What are best practices for future shared-use rail agreements? 
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Background in shared use rail corridors 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) provides definitions of different 
categories of shared-use partnerships between freight railroads and passenger rail 
agencies (Resor 2003). A shared track is rail line track on which both commuter rail or 
light rail vehicles and freight railcars operate. A shared right of way (ROW) utilizes 
different tracks for transit and freight rail, but they both operate within the same 25 foot 
right of way. In other words, the centerline of the freight and passenger rail tracks is less 
than 25 feet apart. In a shared corridor, transit and freight rail operate on their own tracks 
separated by a distance of greater than 25 feet but less than 200 feet.  As a federally 
operated and subsidized service, Amtrak is the only operator that has a statutory right to 
operate on private railroad property. Amtrak does have to compensate freight railroads 
for incremental costs associated with operating on freight tracks. 
Several key academic papers and industry reports have been published discussing 
the technical and policy-related issues of shared-use rail corridors. Bing et al. (2010) is 
the most recent, most comprehensive guidebook for implementing public-private 
partnerships between freight companies and passenger rail agencies.  It describes the 
present situation of rail corridor sharing in the U.S., the process of negotiations with 
private freight rail companies, analysis and modeling of cost sharing, and content of 
operations and maintenance agreements.  The guidebook also includes several case 
studies of implemented shared-use corridor agreements and best practices in negotiations 
and approaches to fees and incentives. This research will follow-up and update the 
findings in the guidebook.   
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From a review of numerous relevant papers and reports, several issue areas 
emerge as concerns for future shared-use rail agreements: capacity, liability, cost-sharing, 
and capital constraints. (Bing et al., 2010; FRA 2005; Resor 2003; Prozzi 2006; Dolata et 
al. 2005; GAO 2004).  Preserving capacity for freight rail is a primary concern of private 
railroads and can be a source of contention in shared-use negotiations. Passenger rail 
service will not be run at the risk of harming current or future private freight business 
(Mitchell, 2006).  Liability continues to be a concern for freight railroads when entering 
into shared-use agreements.  The $200 million cap on liability for passenger rail operators 
may not be extended to host freight railroads, so often the host railroads ask passenger 
agencies to procure at least $500 million in liability insurance. This can greatly raise the 
cost of transit operation in a corridor.  
Cost-sharing is another issue that must be addressed in negotiations.  How much 
the passenger agency is required to pay for the right to run on the private railroad tracks, 
ROW, or corridor can be especially contentious.  Capital constraints are also a concern. 
Passenger agencies should come to the table with money, since as a private company 
usually beholden to stockholders, freight railroads are not apt to subsidize public or 
private passenger rail (Mitchell, 2006).  General best practices for agencies entering into 
shared-use corridor agreements or negotiations are to recognize that each situation is 
different, the importance of trust and bargaining, and coming to the table with 
experienced negotiators with a background in passenger and freight rail issues. 
A case study approach to studying shared-use rail agreements is found to be 
effective, since several reports have found that there is no silver bullet or one-size fits all 
approach to shared-use agreements (Wilcock & Stoetzel 2009; GAO 2004; Prozzi 2006).  
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Recent economic environments have changed since the reviewed literature was written, 
such as an increase in freight rail traffic, growth in demand for passenger rail service, and 
growing interest in expanding mobility options.  Adding a Denver case study, which is 
one of the most recent shared-use agreements between public transit and freight rail, will 
contribute to the literature informing future shared-use agreements. 
Study Area and background 
Colorado has a rich history of freight and passenger rail operations. At its peak in 
the 1930s and 1940s, Denver’s Union Station served up to 80 trains a day. The private 
railroad industry began to drop its less lucrative passenger rail service after competition 
from air and car travel increased. With the formation of Amtrak in 1971, passenger rail 
service decreased significantly in the state. Colorado currently has two long distance, 
intercity passenger rail services operated by Amtrak: the California Zephyr and the 
Southwest Chief routes. The services operate on shared track with both Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP) railroads.  This research will focus on 
the recent negotiations between BNSF and Amtrak to continue the Southwest Chief 
service in Colorado.  
 After private railroad companies stopped operating passenger rail services in 
Denver, only Amtrak utilized shared use rail corridors, and regional commuter rail 
service did not exist until a recent rail proposal from Denver’s transit agency.  The 
Regional Transportation District (RTD) is the transit agency for the Denver metropolitan 
area, and in 2004, passed a new regional rail transit system plan called FasTracks. Voters 
approved the FasTracks plan which proposed six new rail lines in the Denver area, five of 
which were proposed to be built at least partly within freight rail corridors, with funding 
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from an increase in sales tax. Most of the FasTracks rail lines have already been built or 
will open by the early 2020s except the full Northwest rail line13F14. This research will 
analyze the nature of the FasTracks sharing agreements and acquisitions as well as the 
major impediments to reaching a public-private rail partnership agreement on the 
Northwest line.  
Research methods 
The research utilizes multiple methods to answer the research questions of the 
study.  First, literature on public-private partnerships between freight rail and passenger 
rail operators across the US was collected and analyzed.  The literature review includes 
public and private reports as well as scholarly articles.  The 2010 TRB Guidebook for 
Implementing Passenger Rail Service on Shared Passenger and Freight Corridors (Bing 
et al 2010) provided an excellent background into the many issues related to public-
private rail partnerships.  It has appendices on applicable acts of congress and federal 
government regulations, capacity and cost analyses, legal and institutional arrangements, 
safety regulations, and an appendix with several limited case study descriptions of 
passenger rail development on freight lines. 
Secondly, an in-depth case study of public-private rail partnerships in the Denver 
metropolitan area was developed.  Key decision-makers and policy officials for both the 
freight railroads and the public agencies that operate rail transportation services in 
Denver were identified through personal knowledge and snowball sampling.  Face-to-
face, in-depth interviews were conducted with these key participants and stakeholders in 
order to elicit their perspectives and viewpoints concerning the nature of these public-
                                                 
14 Find more information at www.rtd-fastracks.com. 
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private rail partnerships.  Interviewees include representatives from transit agencies, state 
DOTs, passenger rail advocates, freight rail representatives, consultants, and local 
officials who have experience concerning the acquisition or use of rail corridors, rights-
of-way, or tracks. The case study interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded 
to reveal common themes from the interview questions. 
The Denver metropolitan region was chosen as a case study due to its long and 
significant history of railroads, and its current effort to build a regional rail transit system 
through its 2004 FasTracks transit and land use plan.  Of the six new rail lines proposed 
in the FasTracks plan, five were scheduled to be built at least partly within freight rail 
corridors.  While access to the rail corridors has been acquired on four of these lines, 
negotiations over the proposed Northwest Corridor line have stalled, thus placing that 
line’s completion in serious jeopardy. It is especially important to analyze the major 
impediments to a public-private rail partnership in this case. 
Denver Case Study 
Amtrak 
Amtrak operates along two routes in Colorado: The California Zephyr, connecting 
Chicago and San Francisco, and the Southwest Chief, connecting Chicago and Los 
Angeles.  The California Zephyr operates along shared tracks with BNSF and UP from 
the northeast into Denver, and along the Union Pacific tracks west of Denver to Salt Lake 
City.  The Southwest Chief operates primarily over BNSF track in the southeast corner of 
Colorado.  Although Amtrak has legal right to operate over any freight or passenger rail 
track and priority is given to Amtrak trains by law, as one interviewee put it, “whoever 
controls the switches, controls the railroad; the reality is [Amtrak] can’t move until 
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whoever owns the switches gives them permission.”  This reality can lead to contentious 
agreement negotiations and ongoing operations if there is not a partnership mindset 
between the parties.  
Figure 3: Amtrak routes and stations (Amtrak 2015) 
In 2010, the future of the Southwest Chief in Colorado seemed to be in jeopardy.  
According to the Colorado State Freight and Passenger Rail plan (CDOT 2012), BNSF 
announced to Amtrak that it would no longer maintain the tracks between Hutchison, KS 
and La Junta, CO to speeds of 79 mph, and if Amtrak wanted to run its trains at speeds 
higher than 60 mph, Amtrak would have to pay for the increased maintenance cost.  
BNSF also stated that Amtrak would be responsible for all maintenance costs for the 
track between La Junta, CO and Lamy, NM.  Amtrak continued to run the service and 
bear the additional maintenance costs for several years. Later, BNSF further reduced the 
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speed to 30 mph for safety on some segments of track because of the track’s poor 
condition, and their argument was since their freight does not need to run at higher than 
30 mph, Amtrak should pay to run at a higher speed.  Amtrak and BNSF had discussions 
about rerouting the Southwest Chief out of Colorado altogether through Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico, but several communities in Southeast Colorado that 
would lose Amtrak service banded together to “Save the Chief.” 
The response to the efforts to continue the Southwest Chief service in Colorado is 
a good example of cooperation and partnerships.  The process of renegotiating Amtrak’s 
contract with BNSF started off as contentious, with BNSF levying demands.  Amtrak 
alone did not have the funds to continue to pay additional maintenance costs or to 
improve the track.  Through a partnership of federal Transportation Investment 
Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants and matching funds from state and local 
governments, BNSF, and Amtrak, an agreement was reached that benefited all the 
stakeholders.  In total, TIGER grants of over 48 million dollars were awarded to allow 
Amtrak to maintain the line as well as replace decaying tracks.  BNSF has pledged to 
pick up the cost to maintain any portions of the track that are improved for the next 20 
years.  The value of BNSF’s contribution is over 111 million dollars over the 20 years, 
saving Amtrak and the states future maintenance costs.  The funding package reflects 
cooperation amongst the BNSF, Amtrak, local communities, and state governments. 
Since improving the line, Amtrak has improved their on-time performance and improved 
the run time by over 90 minutes along this segment.  BNSF has also experienced 
improved quality of service.  
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Regional Transportation District (RTD) 
The first RTD rail line to use a shared freight corridor was the Southwest light 
rail. This line was built in 2000 and shares 11.8 miles of right of way (ROW) with both 
BNSF and the UP railroads in their consolidated main line corridor. This is a true shared 
corridor where BNSF, UP, and RTD own different portions of the corridor, and everyone 
has tracks on each other’s property. RTD bought fee interest from Denver Rio Grande, 
which after multiple mergers in the 1990s, became Union Pacific by the time of closing. 
On BNSF property, RTD purchased a passenger easement.  
The West rail line was the first FasTracks line to be opened in 2013 and operates 
light rail within an abandoned consolidated freight rail corridor that RTD acquired 
through an outright purchase in the 1980s from the Colorado and Southern, a predecessor 
to Burlington Northern. Freight no longer operates in this corridor.  
The Gold line (G line) corridor is an electrified commuter rail line that opened in 
2019 and includes two sections of shared corridor. From Pecos Street to Sheridan 
Boulevard, RTD bought two miles of forty foot wide right of way from Union Pacific, 
and from Sheridan Blvd to Golden and the Coors property, RTD owns the entire corridor 
and grants an operating easement to BNSF. The current Gold line does not run all the 
way to Golden, but there is potential for future expansion because of the purchase of the 
additional property.   
In the summer of 2016, the B line opened as an electrified commuter rail line and 
is the first six miles of the Northwest Rail line. It currently runs on portions of right of 
way purchased from BNSF from Pecos Junction to Westminster Station.  
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The North Metro line is an electrified commuter rail along the Boulder Industrial 
Lead (BIL), which is former UP right of way. RTD purchased the entire corridor right of 
way, which extends 33 miles north to Erie, although only the first 13 mile segment of the 
proposed 18.5 mile line identified in FasTracks is currently under construction. The 
Union Pacific no longer operates in this corridor. The 13-mile North Metro line is 
scheduled to be opened in the early 2020s.  
The A-line along the east corridor to Denver International Airport is one of the 
more complicated shared corridors. From Denver Union Station to York St., RTD bought 
all required right of way adjacent to either the BNSF or UP. From York to Airport Blvd, 
RTD bought a forty-foot wide right of way from UP. In practice, the UP and RTD 
operations exist as independent corridors because the UP operates on their own property 
while RTD operates on their own property, but in reality, they are only separated by a 
fence so it is a shared corridor in practice.  
Northwest rail line is the only one of the FasTracks lines where the freight 
railroad and transit agency could not reach an agreement for shared use, although that is 
not the only reason the line is stalled. Lack of funding for RTD was a major issue that 
required the agency to prioritize the FasTracks build out based on availability of federal 
funds, cost, and ridership benefits. The proposed commuter rail line would go over BNSF 
right of way, and it is the only RTD rail line that would involve shared track for portions 




Figure 4: FasTracks corridors (CDOT 2012) 
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Agreements and corridor sharing development process 
Recent FasTracks corridor sharing deals involved three basic parts: (1) purchase 
of the real estate interest, (2) relocation of freight rail and construction of passenger line, 
and (3) ongoing operation and maintenance and shared corridor use agreements.   
Real estate interests   
The process of developing a corridor sharing agreement begins by approaching 
the freight railroad with a general plan for rail development to see if the railroad would be 
willing to sell or share part of their right of way, corridor, or track.  These “feasibility 
discussions” for the FasTracks plan with BNSF and UP took place prior to the 2004 vote 
on the sales tax increase.  These discussions are very general and meant to determine 
whether or not the freight railroads would be willing to participate in further negotiations, 
and if there is even a right of way or corridor that could be shared.  The freight railroads 
will not engage in detailed engineering until there is a sure source of funding and detailed 
plans from the transit agency emerge.  When RTD approached the railroads about options 
for corridor sharing, it became clear early on that shared track would not work in most 
cases because of the time sensitive nature of the passenger rail service that RTD and the 
community desired.  
In addition, for the transit agency to receive federal funding for a project, the 
agency is not allowed to enter into a legal contract to purchase or share the rail corridor 
until the federal environmental impact assessment (EIA) is completed.  The 
environmental process for some of the corridors began prior to the 2004 vote and others 
after, and the process is meant to rule out other alternatives to the planned construction in 
the rail corridors.  Before and during the environmental process, the transit agency is not 
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able to engage with interested third parties or private property owners such as the 
railroads, other than basic feasibility discussions.  After the EIA, plans for construction 
and realignment may change based on community input and environmental factors, and 
the best situation/ alternative is chosen.  The environmental impact statement (EIS) is 
then publicly available for everyone, including the freight railroads, to view, and only 
then can the right of way be purchased with funds designated under the plan.  A transit 
agency could, however, use other funds proactively to secure access to freight rail 
corridors for proposed passenger operations as part of a "landbanking" strategy.         
The limitations on private railroad involvement prior to environmental 
assessment have a significant impact on the ability of the freight railroads and the transit 
agency to reach an agreement.  It makes it very hard to negotiate with the railroads when 
there is a document stating what type of service the transit agency has decided to 
provide.  One respondent said that RTD would have been able to negotiate better 
agreements if they had not had a document that already identified their intended plans to 
the railroads. The railroads knew that RTD had committed the rail lines to the voters, and 
that they intended to build in the freight right of way, thus providing the railroads with 
the upper hand in negotiations.  An alternative approach would be to amend the 
environmental process to allow the freight railroad to be a participant from the 
beginning, to allow negotiations and establish realistic cost estimates for access to the 
right of way first, and then continue with the environmental assessment process.   
In recognition of the unfortunate paradox that often exists in the timing of 
cooperation, some flexibility in implementing regulations for NEPA has been introduced.  
Implementing regulations allow for ‘categorical exclusions,' i.e. actions that have been 
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presumed, based on history and frequency of occurrence, to have no significant impact on 
the environment. Furthermore, in 2012 the FTA introduced a change in their 
implementing legislation that provides for corridor preservation before completion of 
NEPA.  Specifically, 49 USC 5323 states:  
(q) Corridor preservation.-- 
(1) In general.--The Secretary may assist a recipient in acquiring right-of-
way before the completion of the environmental reviews for any project 
that may use the right-of-way if the acquisition is otherwise permitted 
under Federal law. 
(2) Environmental reviews.--Right-of-way acquired under this subsection 
may not be developed in anticipation of the project until all required 
environmental reviews for the project have been completed. 
Passenger agencies should always seek the advice of their regional FTA, FRA, 
and/or other relevant federal offices before pursuing this course of action.  There 
can be no development of the corridor property, only the acquisition.  Compliance 
with NEPA is paramount and non-compliance could kill a project, so passenger 
agencies must be careful in how they proceed with corridor preservation.  
Nevertheless, these approaches can be useful in addressing corridor access issues. 
There are a few corridors where RTD was able to buy the right of way or corridor 
prior to construction and the environmental process. The West line was purchased during 
the 1980s as corridor preservation, but it was bought from base RTD funds. The Gold 
line runs from Denver Union Station to Wheat Ridge at Ward Road.  RTD was able to 
purchase an additional six-mile long property along the BNSF corridor beyond Ward 
Road all the way to Golden at the Coors Brewery. In addition, RTD is only building the 
first 13 miles along the UP corridor of the North Metro line, but purchased 33 miles of 
the corridor up to Erie. These landbanking acquisitions will enable RTD to expand the 
lines in the future if population growth demands it. In the future, corridor preservation 
purchases would make sense and prevent negotiations with railroads from stalling rail 
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lines, but the funding issues are the problem.  Future sales tax revenue from the 
FasTracks funds cannot be used to purchase property not included in the FasTracks plan, 
and federal funds cannot be used to purchase corridor property unless the federal 
environmental review process is followed.  
Relocation and construction.   
The freight railroad and the transit agency must also reach agreement on where 
and how some of the freight facilities will be relocated.  The original plan for the A-line 
to the airport was to relocate UP totally out of the corridor that RTD purchased, but after 
the EIS, it became cost-prohibitive to rebuild facilities up to new code and technologies. 
RTD and the Union Pacific reexamined the design and ended up with a different 
alignment that still worked.  The needs of both the freight and passenger agencies must 
be taken into consideration for relocation and during construction, and everything comes 
at a price.  
Operation and maintenance agreements   
The BNSF calls these agreements “joint corridor agreements” and the Union 
Pacific calls them “O & M agreements,” and both provide for ongoing operations and 
maintenance issues that arise such as insurance, drainage, indemnity, emergency 
coordinations, and the construction of future additional facilities in the right of way. 
Previous agreements or acquisitions made in the 1990s did not involve all of these 
elements.  Operations and maintenance were not discussed with Union Pacific in the 
Southwest light rail corridor deal.  It was a “we take care of ours, you take care of yours” 
situation that was not formally agreed to in a contract. At the time, there were not as 
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many freight and passenger rail shared use agreements, but today, the freight railroads 
have seen the value of including operations and maintenance terms in their agreements.  
The Contentious Process of Developing a Shared-Use Agreement   
When asked whether the development of corridor sharing agreements were 
contentious, the general consensus was yes, all agreements were contentious but most 
were ultimately successful.  None of the corridors were described as easy negotiations 
where everything fell into place, but agreements were reached in all corridors except the 
Northwest, which had a variety of issues that prevented the passenger rail from being 
implemented. In order to be successful in negotiating an agreement, the transit agency 
needs staff members who understand the operations and infrastructure requirements of 
freight rail.  The passenger agency lays out the plan for what they want to do in the 
freight corridor, shows how it will not affect the freight and if it does, how to mitigate the 
impact on them.  Having someone at the table that speaks the railroad’s language, knows 
the business, and realizes that the freight railroad is there to make money will create a 
more cooperative relationship.  Dealing with freight in an honest, one-on-one basis with 
good interpersonal skills makes a big difference in reaching an agreement.  
Cost is generally the main sticking point in negotiations. Everyone comes to the 
table needing things, RTD has a limited amount of funds, and the goal is to reach a deal.  
Prior to the 2004 FasTracks vote, RTD generated a cost estimate for all the corridors 
based on preliminary design plans and a rough 10-20% estimate, usually a gross cost per 
mile.  Prior to meeting with freight railroads to negotiate a price for property acquisitions, 
the agency only knows the cost of their own facilities, but not of relocating freight 
facilities, upgrading technology or track that must be moved.  The price of the real estate 
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can be determined, but other factors can affect the cost that RTD originally estimates for 
a corridor or for an acquisition.  Another contentious issue in agreement negotiations is 
how to preserve service to local freight rail customers.  This is sometimes done by 
relocating the customer, building a flyover to retain freight access, or other creative 
solutions, but it must be addressed and paid for in the negotiations. 
Northwest rail line 
The public saw the Northwest rail line negotiations as especially contentious 
because of rising cost estimates for sharing the corridor, but RTD points out that cost 
changes came about on their side of the negotiations as well. The Northwest rail line is 
proposed to run from Denver Union Station to Boulder and Longmont northwest of 
Denver along a BNSF freight corridor.  The line was included in the FasTracks plan, 
some argue, to get the votes needed in the jurisdictions to the north to pass FasTracks.  
Even before the recession of 2008, several factors affected the cost estimates and funding 
sources for the Northwest rail.  A combination of a shortfall in sales tax revenue and 
increased costs for construction commodities jeopardized all of the proposed FasTracks 
lines, but innovative financing structures through public-private partnerships and federal 
funding enabled the other lines to move forward. The ridership in the Northwest corridor 
was always projected to be low, and because of the low ridership, low population density, 
and competition from RTD’s bus rapid transit (BRT) service to Boulder, the line was not 
eligible for federal funding.  This left some people in the northern communities to feel 
that they were paying for FasTracks, but getting no rail in return.   
RTD approached BNSF to design a system that could handle projected RTD 
operations in the BNSF corridor.  Unlike other corridors in the FasTracks plan, RTD 
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could not acquire the entire right of way or corridor because there is barely room for two 
tracks, and BNSF still needed to move freight in the corridor.  RTD was negotiating for 
time slots on the freight tracks where the railroad would retain the infrastructure and 
guarantee RTD could move their trains.  RTD says that BNSF came back with a fair 
number, but that the number kept changing over time.  Some of the cost increases came 
from changes requested by RTD in the original design after the 2004 vote and after the 
EIS.  Communities wanted more stations, quiet zones, grade separations, and bigger Park 
and Rides, and the level of service was changed to 55 trains a day.  The equipment was 
changed from diesel locomotive-hauled coaches to electrified commuter rail, which also 
required a different type of maintenance facility.   
In addition, the freight traffic on the line had nearly doubled since 2004, so 
additional capacity improvements that the freight railroad needed would cost much more 
than RTD had anticipated.  Additional right of way would be needed for more sidings and 
more overpasses to maintain capacity for freight trains that were as long as two miles.  
Positive train control (PTC) was a new safety technology that needed to be implemented 
but was not previously figured into the cost estimates.  When original estimates were 
derived more than five years before, there were different economic conditions, different 
capacity needs for the freight, technology changes, and operational changes. All of this 
contributed to rising costs in the corridor.   
RTD says the biggest challenge with this corridor is its length.  The Northwest 
corridor is over 40 miles long, much longer than most of the other corridors, and an 
increase in the cost per mile is compounded over 40 miles of track.  In 2004 RTD initially 
budgeted $66 million for access to the corridor, but by 2012 BNSF announced that it 
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would cost $535 million. With other operational and technology changes, the total cost 
for the Northwest rail line jumped from $461 million in 2004 to $1.7 billion by 2012 
(Migoya 2012).  A railroad representative stated that their cost estimates for sharing 
corridors are generally good for only one year, and after that, new costs need to be 
determined in order to reflect changes in capacity, freight flows, and other economic 
determinants.  In order to reach a successful agreement, the railroads need to know that 
the transit agency has a committed, reliable source of funding.  When the sales tax 
revenue fell short of projection, RTD was uncertain of the time frame in which the 
Northwest line would be built.  RTD says it needed to know the costs from the railroads 
before it could determine when the line can be built and if it had funding.  BNSF said that 
they could not produce detailed engineering plans and negotiate an agreement until RTD 
had certainty in funding and a short to medium time frame to ensure that the railroad 
protected its interests for future capacity needs.  RTD blamed BNSF and BNSF blamed 
RTD, and they went in circles.  This then spilled over into the newspapers, where the 
“dirty laundry” from the discussions was aired out in public.  When parties do not protect 
each other’s reputations in the media, it hurts future negotiations and ends the partnership 
mentality of agreement discussions.   
To add to the situation, the communities along the corridor could not agree on 
what made sense in the corridor. Some of the mayors and elected officials were 
committed to BRT rather than rail, while other communities dug in their heels for a rail 
line.  One elected official in the corridor stated that he felt BNSF could see the 
disagreement among local governments, and that Boulder, the largest city in the corridor, 
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was not really interested in completing the Northwest line, so they determined there was 
not really a serious effort to complete the rail line.  
Economic competitiveness 
Nearly everyone agreed that bringing passenger rail to the Denver metropolitan 
region keeps Denver economically competitive with other cities.  They believe that it 
brings development and employers to the region, citing the relocation of several national 
headquarters of companies to downtown Denver near the Denver Union Station transit 
hub and DIA.  The value of fewer people on the highways and less congestion also 
increases economic productivity and competitiveness for the region.  One passenger rail 
advocate even stated that freight rail does not drive economic development, it is 
passengers that do, and the service must be at least every fifteen minutes for economic 
development to occur.  
The interviewees did not think that sharing rail corridors has a negative effect on 
freight railroads.  By law, Amtrak is not allowed to impede freight traffic, and if it does, 
railroads can petition the Surface Transportation Board.  The consensus is that when 
negotiating agreements with passenger rail agencies, the freight railroads look out for 
their core business, moving freight, and they will not do anything that will detrimentally 
affect their ability to serve their customers.  While some relocation or buy out of 
customers is necessary during relocation or construction, it is up to the railroads to ensure 
that their ability to run their service is not reduced.  For example, in the east corridor of 
FasTracks, when RTD tracks went in on the south side of the corridor, it blocked access 
to a few direct freight shippers who had to make alternative transportation arrangements 
or use relocation money to relocate elsewhere along the railroad.  However, it was 
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stressed that the railroads would not have agreed to these terms if they thought it would 
make them suffer.  RTD has tried to negotiate fairly with both railroads, the BNSF and 
UP, to keep the railroads whole, and not give either railroad any advantage over the other. 
These deals are voluntary for the railroads and they enter into the deals only if they can 
maintain their capacity.  In the past, they have entered into agreements where they have 
curtailed their service, such as in Chicago when they allowed absolute curfews whereby 
the freight railroads could not run their trains during certain peak commuter hours.  The 
railroads have learned from these past agreements that this does not work for future 
capacity concerns.  There are also some positive impacts to economic competitiveness to 
the railroads sharing their corridors because such agreements can include eliminating or 
improving at-grade crossings.  These types of operational advantages are good for 
everyone, as they help car traffic flow easier and the freight traffic move smoother 
through town without as much stopping and downtime.   
Best Practices 
The experts agree that it is important for the passenger agency to have the most 
accurate cost estimate possible, and to try to keep the costs from escalating too much.  If 
costs change substantially, people get angry, and it causes concern for the passenger 
agency, the freight railroad, and the public.  
One way to keep cost estimates more accurate is for the transit agency (RTD) to 
have an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with every community along a corridor 
before entering into negotiations with the freight railroad.  This helps to define what RTD 
is doing on the project, and what the community is doing on the project.  For example, if 
a community wants sidewalk near the track and station, RTD may think it is the 
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community’s responsibility, the community thinks it is RTD’s responsibility. Additional 
ROW may need to be purchased, and then costs go up. RTD learned from previous 
experiences, and they were able to negotiate IGAs for the North Metro line before issuing 
a RFP for that line.  This helps keep cost estimates more accurate.  
Think ahead about everything the agency might need from the railroad, and tie it 
all into one package.  For example, the freight railroad may not be willing to negotiate 
small issues like grade separations and crossings or to sell smaller corridor segments 
unless it is tied to a larger deal.  It is not worth the price to the railroads to process such 
small deals (the cost of paperwork, lawyers, etc.).  RTD was able to get things packaged 
together that they otherwise would not have been able to get, while they had them at the 
table for larger acquisition deals.  
The passenger agency needs to show how the railroad will come out ahead even 
before beginning discussions.  They also need to show that they know what they are 
doing and what they are talking about in negotiations. The transit agency needs to employ 
staff members who understand the operations and infrastructure requirements of the 
freight railroad, either as consultants or in-house employees. Passenger rail agencies must 
be able to see things from the freight perspective as a business with stakeholders who 
need to make money.  Approaching the railroad with honesty and good faith is the way to 
achieve good agreements.  
Both the freight and passenger rail sides must have people who know the local rail 
issues, and not just send people from the headquarters, Fort Worth (BNSF) or Omaha 
(UP), to negotiate.  The freight railroads benefit the most when the transit agency can 
help address local rail issues that the higher ups may not be aware of.   
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It is incredibly important for the passenger agency to be able to show that they 
have a secure source of funding and feasible time frame for project completion. The 
freight operations need to see that passenger rail is committed to completing the project 
in a short to medium timeframe to ensure that the costs are accurate.  
One best practice for both the freight and passenger agencies is to not air out 
"dirty laundry" from negotiations.  The two sides should be partners and strive to protect 
the reputations of both entities in the public eye.  Pointing fingers or assigning blame for 
failures in negotiation talks can quickly sour any working or future relationship.  
One expert suggested that all successful agreements are where the agency buys 
the ROW, as RTD did for all of its corridors except the Northwest line. He stated, “It is 
not a good agreement if you don’t control the switches.”  
Several people suggested that incrementally adding capacity is the way to get 
good commuter service.  Examples they pointed to were the Minneapolis North Star and 
Seattle Sounder services.  Starting a high level of service, such as 55 trains a day, can 
disrupt the freight operations significantly and require much higher capital contributions 
for improvements. 
The planning process should not take place in isolation, and the process needs to 
address passenger rail needs, highway needs, and freight flow needs.  Collaborative 
planning can accomplish a win-win-win scenario, for example improved grade crossings.  
Freight rail and passenger rail need combined solutions, not one at the expense of 
another.   
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Future shared use corridors and future of agreements 
Most people agreed that the most feasible and probable location for future shared 
corridors is along the Front Range running north and south of Denver. The interviewees 
had varying opinions of the breadth of a potential Front Range rail system, but it could 
generally span from as far south as Albuquerque, NM to as far north as Cheyenne, WY, 
closely paralleling Interstate 25. The more likely scenario is within 20-25 years, building 
Front Range Rail north from Pueblo to Colorado Springs to Denver and on to Fort 
Collins, mostly along BNSF track with some UP trackage rights.  This corridor would be 
suitable for passenger rail because population is expected to grow along the Front Range 
by over two million people in the next 25 years, from four million to six million. There is 
little room to expand the highway in key highway corridors in the region.  Several 
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) studies supported the feasibility of 
either commuter rail or high-speed rail along the Front Range corridor. The CDOT North 
I-25 Environmental Impact Statement (2011) recommended commuter rail as the 
Preferred Alternative along the northern section of I-25 from Denver to Fort Collins. An 
update to the I-25 commuter rail study was published in 2015 to update the right-of-way 
needs of such a project and provide better cost estimates due to relationships with the 
freight and passenger rail service and changes in the economy (CDOT 2015b). The 
Rocky Mountain Rail Authority (RMRA) completed a High-speed Intercity Passenger 
Rail (HSIPR) Feasibility Study in 2010, which analyzed a high-speed rail corridor from 
Cheyenne, WY to Trinidad, CO as well as along the I-70 corridor from Denver to Grand 
Junction, CO. It concluded that HSIPR is feasible along shorter sections of these 
corridors, from Fort Collins to Pueblo and from DIA to Eagle County Regional Airport 
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near Vail, Colorado (CDOT 2015a). The RMRA recommended a follow-up study called 
the Interregional Connectivity Study (ICS), which was completed in 2014. The ICS found 
HSIPR to be most feasible along the I-25 corridor because it would connect the most 
dense areas of population. Another study, Advance Guideway Feasibility Study (AGS) 
looked at HSIPR along the I-70 corridor from Golden, CO to Eagle County Regional 
Airport. The AGS and ICS recommended two levels of phasing to implement the HSIPR 
vision and did not identify specific sources of funding (CDOT, 2015a). 
According to RTD, Northwest commuter rail is still going to be built as part of 
FasTracks, when RTD has the money.  Current estimates peg completion of the 
Northwest rail line sometime in the early 2040s.  Additional corridor sharing projects 
beyond FasTracks are not on the horizon for RTD.  Amtrak is considering expanding 
service from La Junta to Pueblo as part of a reconfigured Southwest Chief route, with 
current plans to begin thru car service to Pueblo in anticipation of this expansion.  While 
some rail options exist to share track along Interstate 70 with UP running west from 
Denver, few people mentioned this as a likely option in the near future.  
One recommendation from RTD staff was to preserve as much corridor as 
possible to avoid having to deal with negotiating these types of deals in the future, even 
though expanded rail service will likely not be needed for the next 20-25 years.  The 
Northwest rail corridor was offered to RTD in the 1990s for “peanuts” when freight 
traffic was waning, but RTD did not have cash to buy it then.  If they had, they would 
have been able to avoid the contentious negotiations for later acquisition of access to the 
corridor.  The transit agency has tried to learn from this, and would hope to buy 
additional ROW along the corridors for future expansion.  
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Discussion of an eastern freight bypass to move freight rail activity out of 
downtown Denver waxes and wanes with the volume of freight flows. It could free up 
more capacity for passenger rail and more land downtown for redevelopment.  The North 
I-25 EIS decision was based on the assumption that as eastern bypass would be built, but 
the 2015 I-25 commuter rail update study was needed since it does not look like the 
bypass is a feasible alternative. Is there a cooperative solution for moving freight that can 
benefit both parties?  The local experts see more cooperation in the future for freight and 
passenger rail because of pressure on both sides.  
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Figure 5: Proposed I-25 commuter rail, Northwest Area Mobility Study (CDOT 2012) 
Government policy for Shared-Use Corridors 
Most passenger representatives view more government intervention as positive, 
but they do not necessarily think the federal government should mandate policy for 
shared-use corridors.  Shared-use corridors should be looked at on a case-by-case basis 
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because shared-use does not make sense in all situations- it is only one tool in the toolbox 
for expanding passenger rail.   
One way the government can support shared-use is through the continuation of 
federal grant and loan programs such as TIFIA, RRIF, and TIGER programs.  The feds 
can also help by integrating services and facilitating cooperation and collaboration among 
agencies like the EPA, HUD, and USDOT to improve innovation.  The federal 
government should not intervene and dictate, but instead should facilitate cooperation 
amongst passenger and rail operations.   
A few people had specific suggestions for how the government could get more 
involved in shared-use agreements.  Passenger rail is not currently subject to the STB’s 
jurisdiction (except for Amtrak interactions with railroads), but the STB or another 
national body could act as an oversight body to allow disputes or stalled negotiations 
between passenger and freight operations to come before them.  Currently, if an 
agreement cannot be reached, then the passenger agency is the one that has to walk away.  
On the other hand, the general feeling is that the freight rail operators are smart people 
who will figure out a way to work with passengers to prevent the feds from getting 
involved.  Another suggestion is for the federal government to amend the environmental 
process to allow railroads to be at the table during the EIA, so the passenger agency could 




Figure 6: Light rail and CML Lower Downtown, Denver. Photo Credit: Julie Cidell 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 Demand for passenger rail service within and between cities in the U.S. will 
increase the need to develop shared use rail corridors. As local transit and state agencies 
seek to expand their commuter rail service, freight rail corridors are often the most 
feasible locations for expansion or development within an already built-up city. Shared-
use corridors include shared track, shared right-of-way, or shared corridors. Amtrak is the 
only entity that has the legal right to operate on private freight railroads. All other entities 
must negotiate an agreement with a host railroad to operate on their tracks or within the 
railroad right of way.  
This study sought to examine the public-private partnership aspect of passenger 
rail agencies sharing rail corridors with private freight rail companies. The case study 
approach was applied to the Denver metropolitan area and the state of Colorado. After 
the 2004 FasTracks ballot measure was passed to expand RTD’s rail network, the transit 
agency looked to freight corridors to build out the rail lines. This study described and 
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analyzed shared corridors in the FasTracks system. In addition, this study describes how 
the threat of moving the Amtrak’s Southwest Chief out of Colorado prompted a 
collaborative effort between public and private agencies to raise capital to invest in 
upgrading tracks and technology to keep the line moving through southeast Colorado.  
The study used in-depth interviews with railroad personnel, transit agency 
representatives, and rail advocates to answer the following research questions: What is 
the current status of rail corridors in Denver and how have public agencies acquired and/ 
or shared use of rail corridors with freight railroads? How do shared-use rail corridors in 
Denver impact economic competitiveness for both freight and passenger rail service? 
What are best practices for future shared-use rail agreements? This study is significant 
since Denver and Colorado provide a recent case study on shared-use agreements that 
have been both collaborative and contentious, resulting in examples of both successful 
and unsuccessful shared use agreements.  
 The response to the threat of discontinuing Amtrak’s Southwest Chief service 
through Colorado is seen as a successful example of cooperation between public-private 
partners.  The renegotiation of Amtrak’s contract with BNSF resulted in benefits for all 
stakeholders through contributions from federal, state, and private funding to improve 
track and contribute to additional maintenance costs. RTD currently operates light rail 
and commuter rail service and entered into several shared-use agreements with both 
Union Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe. Most of the agreements were negotiated 
as outright purchases of right of way. The Northwest Rail is not built yet, partly because 
of escalating costs to share the corridor and tracks from the host railroad, BNSF, because 
of increased freight traffic along the corridor. The shared-use of a rail corridor involves 
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agreements being reached in three areas: the purchase of the real estate, relocation of 
freight rail and construction of passenger rail, and ongoing operation and maintenance 
agreements or shared-use agreements. 
Private freight railroads are not obligated to share their corridors with public 
agencies other than Amtrak. Negotiations can be contentious, as was the general 
consensus of interviewees involved in RTD negotiations. Cost is often a major obstacle in 
negotiations, and inaccurate cost estimates or out of date estimates can result in major 
sticker shock when it comes time to approach the host railroad. The Northwest rail line is 
an example of a corridor where costs increased over time since the passage of the 
FasTracks ballot measure. Negotiations involving shared track are often more difficult 
than acquiring right of way within a corridor. Economic competitiveness for the freight 
rail industry is not affected by entering into shared-use agreements, otherwise, the private 
companies would not do it. That is part of the negotiation process, making the railroads 
whole.  
  The research on Denver’s shared-use corridors revealed several lessons learned 
and best practices for future shared-use agreements. Passenger agencies should attempt to 
establish the most accurate and timely cost estimate as possible. Creating 
intergovernmental agreements (IGA) is one strategy to lessen the escalation of costs 
during the planning process. Another way to ensure accurate estimates from the freight 
side is to be sure the passenger agency has a secure source of funding and that the project 
can be completed in the short to medium timeframe.  Packaging smaller acquisitions into 
a larger corridor negotiation is a good practice to limit the costs to the railroad company 
of negotiations. It is imperative that the passenger agency knows the railroad business 
93 
and employs people who know the infrastructure and operation needs of the freight 
business. Beginning early in the planning process for potential rail service is key, and 
collaborative planning can result in benefits to the public and private partners. Corridor 
banking is another successful strategy for passenger agencies to reduce the contentious 
negotiations with freight rail when the money is available. RTD has moved forward with 
this strategy to purchase additional ROW on the G-line and North Metro Line, even 
though there is not an immediate plan to build in those corridors. Finally, keep 
negotiations and “dirty laundry” out of the media because this can adversely affect the 
relationship between host railroad and passenger agency. 
 Future growth in shared-use corridors is likely to increase. Several CDOT studies 
point to the Front Range corridor as the next feasible expansion of rail in Colorado, 
followed by the I-70 corridor west of Denver. These corridors will require close 
collaboration and planning with the host railroads in each case. Most interviewees did not 
see the need for federally mandated shared-use policies, but the role of the federal 
government is important for grant and loan programs to support shared-use cooperation. 
Amending the federal environmental process to allow host railroads to be involved during 
the assessment could help smooth the process of acquiring ROW.
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Chapter Four: Public-private partnerships with public transit, local government 
agencies, and ridesourcing in Denver, CO 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an explosion in the shared economy that has 
brought innovation and efficiency to many sectors, from buying and selling goods, to 
renting new forms of lodging accommodations, to transportation provision. Shared 
mobility in particular has boomed since the introduction of bikesharing, carsharing, and 
ridesourcing and their interaction with the on-demand economy that utilizes smart-phone 
application technologies to provide mobility options on demand.  The use of shared 
mobility has the potential to reduce car ownership, expand mobility options, and generate 
higher utilization of public transit services. Ridesourcing, the use of private vehicles and 
drivers summoned by smartphone apps such as Lyft and Uber, along with the entrance of 
autonomous vehicles (AVs), is seen as potentially contributing to the end of private 
vehicle ownership. The co-owner of Lyft, John Zimmer, has proclaimed that “by 2025, 
private car ownerships will all but end in major U.S. cities” (Zimmer, 2016).  However, 
legal issues surrounding employment designations, privacy issues, and regulation by 
public agencies have tempered innovation in the ridesourcing arena. In addition, some are 
concerned about the impact of ridesourcing on the public transit network. Still others see 
ridesourcing as an answer to the first/ last mile conundrum of transit and the easy and 
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cheap way to expand mobility options for many. Public-private partnerships between 
ridesourcing companies and public agencies are just getting off the ground around the 
U.S., with pilot programs between local governments and transit agencies and several of 
the largest ridesourcing companies, Uber and Lyft. With proper integration of 
ridesourcing with public transit and local municipalities, these new P3s could greatly 
affect the cost and efficiency of transportation provision across the U.S. The full benefits 
and shortcomings of utilizing ridesourcing as a partner to provide services or integrate 
with public transit have not yet been fully researched.  
 Using interviews with public and private agencies involved in ridesourcing P3s 
and desktop analysis, this research seeks to address the gap in the literature of P3s and 
ridesourcing by documenting the characteristics of pilot programs across the U.S, and 
addressing two specific partnerships in the Denver metropolitan region. This research 
identifies how transit agencies and local governments are partnering with ridesourcing 
companies to enhance their mobility offerings through improved first-last mile 
connections and on-demand services, document the pilot programs produced thus far, and 
measure their success in achieving the goals of both the private and public sector 
partners. Finally, the research addresses the benefits and drawbacks of contracting out 
services to ridesourcing companies and suggests recommendations for agencies seeking 
to enter into public-private partnerships. 
Research questions 
• How are transit agencies and local governments partnering with ride-sourcing 
companies, both locally and nationally, to address mobility goals? (first-last mile 
connections, use during off-peak transit hours, paratransit substitute) 
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• How successful have Denver area pilot partnership programs been in addressing 
their mobility goals?  
• What are the benefits and drawbacks of public private partnerships between 
public agencies and ridesourcing companies? 
Background  
Facilitated by recent advances in technology, the sharing economy/ collaborative 
consumption has exploded in recent years. The on-demand environment enabled by 
smartphone technology as well as an increased focus on sustainability has fueled the 
explosion in many sectors (Nadler 2014). Rachel Botsman, the author of What’s Mine is 
Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (2011), recently clarified some of the key 
definitions in the collaborative consumption movement. The sharing economy is used to 
describe “an economic system based on sharing underused assets or services, for free or 
for a fee, from individuals” (Botsman, 2015).  Collaborative consumption is “the 
reinvention of traditional market behaviors- renting, sharing, bartering, gifting- through 
technology and on a scale not possible before the internet” (Botsman, 2015). The 
ridesourcing services described in this research are facilitated by the expansion of on-
demand services- “platforms that directly match customer needs with providers to 
immediately deliver goods and services” (Botsman, 2015). 
On-demand technology has facilitated the development of shared mobility 
services as people search for alternatives to the single-occupancy vehicle (SOV). Shared 
mobility encompasses several different mobility services including car sharing, bike 
sharing, ridesharing, and ridesourcing. (Kodransky and Lewenstein, 2014). Bike sharing 
allows individuals to rent a bike for a fee or membership cost for short point to point trips 
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usually less than five miles. Many cities in the U.S. now operate or contract with private 
companies to run bike sharing systems. Examples of bike sharing systems include Denver 
Bcycle, Chicago Citibikes, and New York City bikes. Car sharing refers to a system 
where users can rent a car for short to medium distances for occasional trips. Car sharing 
may utilize several forms, for example round-trip service that requires the user to return 
the car to the same location, one-way service that enables users to return the car to a 
different destination than origin, and peer-to-peer car sharing where individual car 
owners rent their cars to fellow drivers when not in use (Kodransky and Lewenstein, p. 7, 
2014). Companies that operate car shares include Zipcar and Car2Go.  
Ridesharing is differentiated from car sharing in that multiple people share the 
ride to a common origin or destination. Ridesharing includes vanpool, carpool, microbus, 
and demand-responsive transit or paratransit. Paratransit is most often used by older 
adults or people with disabilities who cannot use the fixed-route public transit. These 
systems are usually very expensive per rider, rising from $14 per ride to $33 on average 
from 1999 to 2012, a 138% increase, and are generally operated by public transit 
agencies (FTA report 0081 cited in Feigon and Murphy, 2016). 
Transportation network companies (TNCs) are “app-enabled chauffer services 
that match drivers to passengers (Kodransky and Lewenstein, p. 11, 2014).”  Uber and 
Lyft are the two largest TNCs in the U.S. The term ridesharing is commonly used to 
describe the services offered by TNCs, but ridesourcing and ridehailing are more 
appropriate terms to differentiate between carpool or vanpool and Uber and Lyft. The 
main difference is that ridesourcing does not use the rider(s) own vehicles. TNCs now 
offer a form of ridesharing through services such as UberPool and Lyft Line that match 
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passengers with other riders and drivers going in the same direction. This research 
discusses the impact of ridesourcing on urban areas and focuses on partnerships between 
TNCs and public agencies.    
Literature Review   
The research on ridesourcing is limited because of its relatively recent and quick 
adoption. Privacy and data sharing issues for users of the app-based technology have also 
held back extensive research into the efficiencies and bottom lines of private TNCs. 
Unlike public transit agency data, which is more widely shared, private, for-profit 
companies with competitors keep their data close to the vest. A few prominent data 
sharing agreements have been reached, such as a partnership between Uber and the city 
of Boston, which has been more hospitable to TNCs than other cities (Dungca, 2015). 
The limited previous research conducted on ridesourcing spans a breadth of issues, from 
legal issues to quantitative methods of ridematching, to comparisons of taxis and 
ridesourcing efficiency. Many questions remain unanswered, and this area is ripe for 
research as TNCs are quickly expanding their modal share in urban centers throughout 
the world. 
 Oversight of ridesourcing TNCs also generates issues around collaborating with 
public agencies. Taxi cab companies have long been regulated and subject to oversight by 
government, while TNCs’ recent arrival on the transport scene has managed to skirt many 
of those regulations and employment practices. Cab companies have filed lawsuits 
against Uber, upset over the taxi companies’ loss of revenue, higher operating costs due 
to compliance with regulations, and more extensive and expensive background checks.  
Lyft and Uber have also been involved in litigation about whether their employees are 
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independent contractors or employees, which greatly affects the tax burden and costs of 
TNCs based on the designation (Lichten & Liss-Riordan, 2017). Each state, region, and 
city has treated the TNCs differently, some fostering a friendlier atmosphere of 
cooperation, while others push an atmosphere of regulation.  
Cramer and Krueger (2016) found that TNCs are more efficient than taxis in 
terms of the amount of time the driver spends with a passenger in the car, known as the 
capacity utilization rate. They found that it was 50% for Uber and between 30-50% for 
taxis depending on the city.  The authors point out the inefficient taxi licensing 
regulations and Uber’s flexible labor supply model which can better match supply of and 
demand for drivers as reasons for the differences. Utilization of technology is also seen as 
an important factor in higher capacity utilization rates. Rayle et al. (2016) found that 
ridesourcing trips had a higher vehicle occupancy rate than taxis, and this may be due to 
the social nature of most ridesourcing trips. Ridesourcing trips had an average of 2.1 
passengers compared to an average of 1.1 for taxi trips.  
Both Lyft and Uber tout their abilities to keep drunk drivers off the road. 
Greenwood and Wattal (2015) found that the presence of ridesharing in a city decreased 
rates of alcohol related car fatalities, but that this effect is diminished with “surge 
pricing14F15” in effect. Dills and Mulholland (2016) found a reduction in fatal crashes and 
DUIs in over 150 cities with ridesharing. Through an analysis of transportation survey 
data, Young and Farber (2019) found that in Toronto, 20-29 year olds use ride-hailing 
services at the highest rates and between the hours of 11pm and 5 am for “other purpose 
                                                 
15 “Surge pricing” is a term used by Uber to describe an increase in the price of a ride based on high-
demand. Lyft uses the same strategy and calls it “prime-time” pricing. 
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trips” (not commuting, household trips, etc.), therefore suggesting, but not proving, that 
these ride-hailing trips are likely helping users to avoid drunk-driving. Brazil and Kirk 
(2016), however, found no association with the availability of Uber and drunk-driving 
related fatalities in 100 of the largest U.S. metro areas.  
Some studies have focused on the effects of ridesourcing on traffic volume and 
congestion. There are mixed results on whether they increase or decrease traffic. Li et al. 
(2016) found that after Uber enters a market, traffic congestion goes down, and 
Alexander and Gonzalez (2015) found similar results with high to moderate adoption of 
ridesourcing in an area. A traffic study by Fischerbaum and Bialik (2015) of the site 
FiveThirtyEight based only on number of pickups stated that Uber vehicles were merely 
replacing taxis, as the number of Ubers in the street increased by 3.82 million and taxis 
decreased by 3.83 million. Others question the assertion that ridesourcing does not impact 
congestion levels, pointing out that it is based on assumptions that ridesourcing is 
replacing drive-alone personal car trips and not transit or active transport trips. Most Uber 
and Lyft trips still only carry one passenger. Henao (2017) found that ridesourcing 
increases VMT by 185%, which can clearly impact congestion levels. More research is 
needed on the question of how ridesourcing affects traffic or if it can lead to fewer people 
owning cars in the future. 
Many have wondered if the increase in ridesourcing means the end of public 
transit. Kuhr et al. (2017) does note the potential for widespread ridesourcing to eliminate 
transit, especially if integrated with autonomous vehicles, but only if the price of the 
service drops very low.  Many studies looking at the effects of ridesourcing on public 
transit have found that the services complement public transit rather than threaten it. 
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TNCs could complement and enhance public transit by addressing problems that have 
long plagued transit, including the first and last mile connection, expensive paratransit 
and call-n-ride services, and filling in geographic and time gaps in the network.  A 2016 
survey by APTA reported that users of shared mobility services are more likely to use 
transit and own fewer cars than the general population (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Rayle 
et.al., 2016). Several studies have found that people most frequently use ridesourcing for 
social and recreation purposes (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Young and Farber, 2019; 
Rayle et al., 2016).  These social/ leisure trips are usually during late night hours when 
public transit operates at lower frequencies, and the ridesourcing trips more likely 
substitute for car trips rather than public transit trips (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Young 
and Farber, 2019). Hall et al. (2018) found that Uber was more likely to complement 
transit in cities with low transit ridership and substitute for transit trips in cities that had 
already high public transit ridership. A 2015 study by fivethirtyeight.com (Silver & 
Fischer-Baum, 2015) notes that in New York City, Uber combined with public transit 
trips becomes cost-competitive to car-ownership much more quickly than ridesourcing 
alone. People who combine Uber trips and public transportation can go carless and 
achieve higher mobility than with either mode alone. Young and Farber (2019) 
concluded, however, that the mode share of ride-hailing trips is too inconsequential to 
influence the mode share or ridership of either public transit or cars, but as the share of 
ridehailing trips grows, it will become an issue especially for the younger generation 
(below 40), which had the highest rates of ridehailing use.  
Zimmer’s proclamation of the end of the private vehicle raises some concerns for 
lower-income populations and suburban areas if private vehicles are replaced solely by 
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ridesourcing and AVs rather than enhancing public transit. One obstacle to public transit 
collaboration with the private sector is the differing goals of the two sectors. In a recent 
paper for the Transportation Research Board, Kuhr et al. (2017) point out the potential 
challenges of relying too heavily on private ridesourcing companies. There is the 
potential for service disruption, monopolistic practices, and revenue changes to the public 
sector from falling parking and traffic violations. They also note the social inequity of 
such services because of price and the private companies’ ability to refuse service. TNCs 
are for-profit companies that have no obligation to serve certain geographic areas or 
socio-economic levels or even less-abled passengers. There have been instances where 
Lyft or Uber drivers have refused to pick up blind passengers with service dogs or 
disabled people who require additional time for the service. 
Public agencies have the opportunity to engage with shared-modes, including 
TNCs, to ensure that the benefits of ridesourcing are shared widely and equitably with all 
potential users (Feigon and Murphy, 2016).  Collaboration through public-private 
partnerships can steer for-profit companies to connect with lower-income users and in 
less-dense areas that they might not otherwise choose to service.  Government officials in 
some cities have experience collaborating with bikesharing and carsharing companies and 
can build off these partnerships to enhance shared-use mobility. Feigon and Murphy 
(2016) suggest transforming public transit agencies into mobility agencies that oversee 
multiple modes with the goal to maintain accessibility, equity, and expand mobility 
options. If public agencies engage with ridesourcing through P3s, they can supplement or 
encourage transit rather than threaten it and address the challenges of increased 
transportation via TNCs if the collaboration is negotiated properly (Kuhr, 2017). 
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There is promising potential for collaborative P3s in multiple areas, including in 
the integration of ridesourcing technologies with already established public transit 
services. For example, the app-based technology could improve paratransit and demand 
responsive services that can cost public agencies up to $33 per ride. By either contracting 
with TNCs to directly provide transportation or using their customer technology 
interfacing and ridematching, these services could be provided more inexpensively and 
with improved quality (Feigon and Murphy, 2016). Kuhr et al. (2017) presents a 
framework for P3s in ridesourcing, based on contracts with other transit projects, 
including Denver’s Eagle P3 project to expand commuter rail infrastructure. They remark 
on both public and private sector benefits to ridesourcing P3 and offer P3s as a potential 
solution to the some of the pitfalls of private transportation provision through TNCs. 
Ridesourcing P3 pilot programs in the Denver Metro Area  
In 2014, the state of Colorado was the first to pass statewide legislation to 
regulate TNCs. In some ways, this legislation has made it harder for TNCs to operate in 
the state, especially in rural areas of the state, because of the strict regulations for drivers 
regarding background checks, vehicle inspections, and prohibiting felony convictions. 
Despite this early regulation, the Denver metropolitan region of Colorado is a good study 
area because of the atmosphere of partnership thus far by the state and region. TNCs have 
used Denver as a testing ground for several programs, including being one of the first 
cities where TNCs introduced their ridesharing programs including UberPool and 
LyftLine. UberPool and LyftLine allow users to choose an option to share their ride with 
another passenger for a reduced fare.  The city of Centennial, a suburb of Denver, 
recently operated a P3 pilot program with Lyft and other private and public partners to 
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provide transportation between the Dry Creek Regional Transportation District (RTD) 
light rail station and its nearby service area.  This pilot program used the TNC model in 
place of paratransit and call and ride services to facilitate the first-last mile connection to 
transit. The University of Denver entered into a pilot program with Lyft as well, utilizing 
Lyft as a test for a campus shuttle, safe ride home for students, and a first-last mile 
connection to the University of Denver light rail station. The results of these innovative 
pilot programs will serve to inform future ridesourcing collaborations and how to best 
integrate public transit and TNCs in the future.  
Research methods  
In this research, I use multiple methods to address the research questions in the 
study. First, I conducted an analysis of newspaper articles, academic literature, and 
interviews with experts in public transit, ride-sharing, and local government to develop an 
overview of public-private partnerships with TNCs that have developed in various cities. 
Then I focused on the pilot programs in the Denver metro area.  I used semi-structured 
interviews and analysis of data and reports to investigate the success of the partnerships 
of public agencies with ridesourcing companies in the Denver metropolitan area, how 
these partnerships have addressed the mobility needs in the region, and the costs and 
benefits of contracting with ride-hailing companies.  
I audio recorded most interviews, transcribed the recordings and notes, and then 
coded the interviews to identify common themes.  I use semi-structured interviews in this 
research, which allowed me to develop open-ended, content-focused questions while still 
allowing for flexibility and change during the interview (Dunn, 2010). The interviews 
provide a variety of perspectives from both private and public sector actors, including 
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representatives from Lyft and Uber, the City of Centennial, the City and County of 
Denver, the University of Denver, and the Regional Transportation District (RTD).  
The next section provides a discussion of the results of the research, beginning 
with how different actors in the public and private sector define a partnership. Then I 
provide an overview of P3 pilot programs from the Denver metropolitan region, 
including their goals and purposes. The themes that emerged from the interviews and 
document analysis are discussed next, including the benefits and difficulties of P3s with 
TNCs, the changing role of the transit agency, recommendations for agencies seeking out 
P3s, and the future of such partnerships.  
Discussion of results 
Defining a partnership 
The term public-private partnership is sometimes used to describe the contractual 
relationship between a transportation network company and a public agency. One 
definition of a P3 centers on the transfer of risk, from public to private, private to public, 
where the best entity to take on risk will do so. For example, a public agency may take on 
the risk of public utilities location and relocation in an infrastructure project, while the 
private agency would take on the risk of construction or design malfunction. RTD was 
the first transit agency in the United States to enter into a full Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) P3 agreement to build the Eagle P3 rail line in Denver.  In 
addition, the City and County of Denver recently opened the Performance-Based 
Infrastructure Office to “improve the lives of Denver residents by leveraging private-
sector financing and expertise to build, operate, and maintain City-owned projects when 
that approach would deliver the best value” (Performance-Based Infrastructure, 2019).  
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But there is a substantial difference between partnering to building something like a rail 
line and partnering to provide a service. In a public-private partnership with a TNC, the 
main objective or definition of a partnership may not be the transference of risk. 
Centennial, CO, the public partner in the Go Centennial case study discussed below, has 
a history of contracting with the private sector to provide many of their municipal 
services, including public works. Because of their history contracting out to both public 
and private partners for municipal services, it was not a major leap for them to pilot a P3 
to address first and last mile issues. 
P3s are perceived to be an innovative solution for transit agency service 
provision. According to a transit agency representative, however, contracting is nothing 
new. RTD currently contracts out nearly 50% of its fixed route bus services and 100% of 
their commuter rail operations to private operators. Additionally, they contract out 100% 
of their on-demand service, which includes Call-n-Ride and Access-a-Ride. These 
contractors include taxi cab companies, which RTD has used for decades. According to 
the RTD representatives, partnerships involve more than just payment for services.  What 
makes a true partnership with a TNC is, in the transit agency’s view, the TNC bringing 
something new to the agency, such as being able to utilize the on-demand, ride-matching 
smartphone technology of an Uber or Lyft to better address on-demand transit needs. Or 
to enable the transit agency to have a more flexible non-dedicated vehicle fleet to address 
peak commuter needs and demand. This could be a more cost-effective way of providing 
potentially better quality service. So the reasons to enter into a relationship with a TNC 
are different than just risk transference as in a typical infrastructure P3. And they are 
different than just contracting with, say a cab or bus company. With increased private 
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sector participation at all levels of the public realm, the concept of what a P3 is has 
changed. 
 According to a representative of a TNC, the definition of a “partnership” is it 
must be a special contractual agreement or arrangement. If a public agency uses “off-the-
shelf products,” such as special coupon codes or subsidies, the public agency is merely 
paying for something that does not require a contractual relationship. Competing for and 
being awarded a contract to provide service through an RFP process is considered a 
partnership. As an example, Lyft has a program called Lyft for Business, which enables 
any company to utilize the TNC to provide transportation or subsidies for people, but this 
is not considered a “P3”. 
So why would a transit agency want to contract with a TNC or any other service 
provider? Cities, states, and other public agencies are increasingly looking to the private 
sector to save money in cash-strapped times with reductions in public funding and 
expenditures. The benefits of a typical contract with a private service provider might be 
lower costs and/ or better service. There are additional benefits for both the public and 
private partners in a P3, as discussed below.  Essentially, a partnership with a TNC and 
public agency is defined by both parties as one that goes through an RFP process and is a 
contractual agreement resulting in the contract going to the lowest cost, highest qualified 
bidder. In addition, a true partnership, according to the transit agency, would utilize the 
new technology of the TNC to provide better use of current vehicle fleets and address 




Examples of recent P3s with TNCs in the U.S. 
Public Agency Location Dates Cost/ Subsidy TNC 
partner 
City of Centennial 
(Go Centennial) 
Centennial, CO August 
2016-Feb 
2017 
Free rides to rail 
station 
Lyft 






2016 Up to $3 subsidy Uber 






2016-2018 20% subsidy  









2016 $2 ride + $9 




City of Summit Summit, NJ 2016 Free (with prepaid 
parking permit) or 




Table 6: Selected national partnerships with TNCs 
Case studies and partnership examples 
The metropolitan region of Denver, Colorado has been the site of several 
innovative partnerships between the public and private sector in transportation. In 
particular, in the area of transit provision and service expansion, the Go Centennial pilot 
project stands out as an example of a partnership between the private TNC, Lyft, and the 
City of Centennial. In addition, the University of Denver piloted a project with Lyft. This 
section provides details of these pilot partnership projects, the results of the pilots, and 
the role of each in serving as a model for future partnerships. 
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Go Centennial Pilot project 
The City of Centennial, a suburban area in the Denver metro region, is a young 
city. It was formed in 2001 from unincorporated areas of Arapahoe County, Colorado. 
Centennial has a history of working with the private sector and contracting out many of 
its city services, for example public works, to private companies, including CH2M. After 
winning a grant from Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Innovation Team program, the 
Centennial Innovation Team (I-team) set out to improve mobility within the city15F16. The 
city is included in the RTD service area, but as is typical of suburban areas, it suffers 
from infrequent bus service and poor connections to the light rail station within its 
boundaries. The eligible service area was approximately four square miles. The I-team 
packaged a P3 pilot program to offer free shared Lyft Line rides to and from the Dry 
Creek light rail station (see map below).  
                                                 
16 In 2014, Centennial was one of 12 U.S. cities to be selected for The Bloomberg Philanthrophies’ 
Innovation Team program. It received $1.5 milllion over 3 years to develop an in-house group of 
innovation consultants. The goal of the I-team program is to improve the capacity of cities to effectively 
design and implement new approaches that improve citizen’s lives. Centennial’s focus was improving 
mobility across all modes within the city. The I-team program focuses on using data and innovation to 




Figure 7: Map of Go Centennial coverage area and Dry Creek light rail station (Go 
Centennial report, 2017) 
 
The primary goals of the Go Centennial pilot were to increase ridership to the 
station by maximizing the first and last mile services and increasing ridership at the light 
rail station. In order to provide a direct comparison to the RTD service, Go Centennial 
operated in the same boundaries as the RTD Call-n-Ride service, an existing “on-
demand” service that picks up and drops off people to the light rail station, for a fare of 
$2.60 in 2017 (now $3 in 2019). The service offered a free transfer to other RTD 
services, so in essence, the cost to the rider was free if going to the light rail station. The 
cost to operate the Call-n-Ride service is heavily subsidized, with an average cost of 
$18.50 per one way trip (Go Centennial Report, 2017). Some of the problems with the 
Call-n-Ride service at the time were the need to sign up for a reservation in advance, 
limited capacity during peak commute times, and less flexibility to meet real-time 
demand for the service (Go Centennial report, 2017). The team thought that by providing 
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a free Lyft ride to the station, they could increase the ridership on the light rail and 
increase the quality of service provided. 
The Go Centennial program provided free Lyft rides to and from the Dry Creek 
light rail station. The fully-subsidized service could be used between 5:30 am and 7:00 
pm. Users had to go through the GoDenver app, a multi-modal trip planning app that was 
itself a P3 between the City of Denver and Xerox, later known as Conduent. Through the 
GoDenver app, a rider would be required to select a LyftLine option, which had the 
potential to match riders to share a Lyft vehicle. In addition, the pilot included the ability 
for anyone to request an accessible vehicle (WAV- wheelchair accessible vehicle) 
provided through VIA that would take people anywhere within the service area. The Go 
Centennial report outlines several types of partners involved in the pilot program: funding 
partners, service provision partners, operational partners, and integration partners. The 
program was publicly funded with $200,000 each from the City of Centennial and 
Southeast Public Improvement Metropolitan District (SPIMD) for the service provision. 
Costs for the I-team personnel and the marketing, evaluation and app development costs 
came from the Bloomberg grant. 
Results of Go Centennial 
The partners in the Go Centennial pilot program assessed the results of the pilot 
through a quantitative assessment of trip data and a qualitative assessment, using surveys 
of users and partners involved. The pilot resulted in 1,302 rides from 127 unique users 
between August 2016 and February 2017. Many of the users used the program multiple 
times. The final report assessed the success of the pilot at meeting the various goals of the 
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program. They found that the Go Centennial trips taken via Lyft were not likely replacing 
walking trips, since only 2 percent of trips were less than half a mile or less (p.24).  
One of the best results was in the area of improving services levels for first and 
last mile riders. The average time between booking a ride and the arrival of the vehicles 
decreased from a minimum of two hours on RTD’s Call-n-Ride to an average of five 
minutes for the Go Centennial program, which was a 95% reduction in booking time 
from Call-n-Ride (p. 27). The cost effectiveness of both the first/ last mile services and 
the paratransit service was also greatly improved. The user fee plus subsidy for the RTD 
Call-n-Ride was $21.14 compared to the Go Centennial service which was an average of 
$4.70, a decrease of 78%. The user fee plus subsidy for the RTD Access-a-Ride 
(paratransit) was $47.82 compared to the Go Centennial Access average cost of $20.07 
per ride, a decrease of 42%. However, this is calculated based on whether the accessible 
vehicle has been used continuously during the program. Over $45,000 was spent to have 
the accessible vehicle in service, but it only made around twenty trips, which is 
unsustainable. Increased ridership in a larger service area would better distribute the high 
operating costs of the accessible vehicle.  
 
Figure 8: Cost effectiveness and service improvement outcomes for Go Centennial (Go 
Centennial Final Report, 2017) 
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Some of the goals saw improvements in their metrics, but did not meet the stated 
goal. For example, over 60% of users thought that booking a first/ last mile trip was easy, 
but it did not reach the goal of 90%. They increased the number of first and last mile trips 
to the light rail station by only 4.6%, which was much lower than the target increase of 
50% (See Figure 9: Change in first last mile trips). 
 
Figure 9: Go Centennial influence on first and last mile trips to the light rail station (Go 
Centennial Report 2017) 
 
The success of the pilot was mixed depending on how success is measured, but an 
RTD representative stated, “I consider the Centennial/ Lyft project the premier pilot in 
the U.S., not because of something cool, but because they actually did the research.” 
Because the Go Centennial project was able to compare the side-by-side services of Call-
n-Ride to the Lyft pilot, they could compare ridership and users of each service. A Lyft 
representative evaluated the partnership as 
All in all, the program was a huge success, and a great alpha test that we are 
trying to build on in subsequent rounds. The big successes were, we took a lot of 
people to the station, more than would have gone [without the pilot]. We didn’t 
hit the numbers that Centennial hoped for, but those numbers were very ambitious 
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[improving trips to light rail by 50%]. We were very pleased with the number of 
people who utilized the program. Cost was extremely low...Key takeaway was we 
need to find a better way to do the wheelchair vehicle. (Interview, 2018) 
Both the City of Centennial and Lyft stressed the importance of finding the right scale 
and geography to operate in an economic and scalable fashion. The accessible vehicle 
saw only 19 rides over 6 months, but used about 75% of the project’s service funding. 
The partners knew going into the pilot that this was not a sustainable economic model, 
but they wanted to provide the accessible service for the community.  
RTD’s role in the PPP was as a stakeholder, rather than a partner. This meant that 
Go Centennial services were operating in parallel with the RTD services. If the first/ last 
mile services were consolidated, then ridership would increase, costs would decrease, and 
environmental benefits could increase. Other lessons learned as stated in the Go 
Centennial final report were the importance of formalizing pick-up and drop-off 
locations, improving the back-end integration, expanding the pilot duration, hours, and 
service area, and increasing marketing. They concluded that a larger service area would 
likely foster higher ridership and better utilization of the accessible vehicle, thereby this 
type of program has the potential to cut the cost of on-demand service provision in half 
while also improving the service quality through lower wait times (p.4). The City of 
Centennial has not decided to continue the program at this time, but views the pilot as a 
program that “provided a successful foundation for the planning and launching of a future 
first and last mile program in the region (p. 54).”  
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DU Moves 
The DU Moves pilot project was a program at the University of Denver that was 
designed to test the concept of a campus shuttle, better connect the campus to the light 
rail station and bus stops by providing first and last mile connections, provide more 
mobility options to reduce the need for a car on campus with Lyft rides around campus, 
and provide a safe ride home option for students (See map in Figure 10). Several campus 
studies and master plans called for a shuttle around the campus to provide better access to 
the light rail station on the north end and dorms and academic buildings on the south end 
of campus.  
The University is private, so it was not technically a public-private partnership. 
The partnership involved the University of Denver, Lyft, and Xfinity by Comcast. DU 
acted as the "public" partner, Lyft provided the service and operational support, and 
Xfinity by Comcast and DU provided funding for the subsidized rides. These services are 
defined as “off-the-shelf” coupon subsidies and did not require a contractual agreement 
or data-sharing agreement to be signed. The DU Moves program ran in the summer and 
fall of 2017. The subsidy was $2.25 off any Lyft Line ride in the DUMoves coverage 
area. There were no time parameters or constraints, but each Lyft user could only use the 
coupon ten times. The goal was to get the user cost of a Lyft Line ride to about $2 within 
the coverage area.  
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Figure 10: Map of coupon code coverage area for DU Moves (Source: S. Brady and Lyft) 
Results of the DU Moves pilot 
The total number of rides using the coupon was 131. The rides were split into 
those beginning or ending at the light rail station and any other ride. The majority of the 
rides, 75 of 131, were either to or from the DU light rail station. The peak day for the 
DUMoves rides was Wednesdays. This mirrors results from the public transit literature 
that shows the peak ridership day is Wednesdays. The time periods of the rides were 
117 
divided into AM-peak, midday, PM-Peak, and late-night. The most rides were taken 
during the PM-peak. This option was not heavily utilized as a late-night/ safe trip home 




Figure 11: DU Moves data analysis rides by time of day and day of week  
The location data Lyft provided was at the zip code level. This was a problem in 
fulfilling the goal to use it as a preliminary data source for where people want and need a 
shuttle stop. Although a workaround using two coupon codes enabled Lyft to determine 
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Day of the week of Lyft Line rides 
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grained enough to provide the type of data needed on a small urban campus. The time of 
day data was such a large span of time (6 hour increments) that it also did not provide the 
type of data needed to inform the hours of a future shuttle. The pilot did show that there 
is a need for transportation connections to and from the light rail station.  
Purpose of partnerships/ goals  
Partnerships with TNCs are usually meant to address several goals or purposes: 
improve first and last mile connections, decrease single-occupancy vehicles, encourage 
economic development, and improve customer service. Usually, public agencies are also 
seeking to maximize the amount and quality of service for minimum cost. Although some 
transit agencies have successfully utilized TNCs to take out bus service along a lightly 
used route and replace it with available TNC service (see San Clemente), most agencies 
seek out TNCs for small-scale service provision. The cars that the independent 
contractors use to drive for Lyft and Uber are small vehicles that usually hold between 2-
6 passengers, sometimes more. Their use is limited by their capacity. The TNCs share the 
goal to reduce SOVs and car ownership because this will likely lead to an increase in 
their market for TNC rides.  
First-last mile connections 
One main goal of the Go Centennial pilot was to improve first/ last mile 
connections, which are a challenge in the area. Getting to the Dry Creek light rail station 
via transit is difficult because of infrequent service, and once people were in the car to 
drive, they were likely to continue driving to their final destination. In addition, because 
the area is a mix of about 50% housing and 50% residential, the last mile to employment 
centers was also a challenge for people getting off the rail to their jobs. This challenge 
119 
affects all transit agencies because of the inflexibility of fixed-route buses and rail. RTD 
recently completed a first-last mile strategic plan and put out an RFI for mobility on 
demand services. RTD’s major ridership on the Call-n-Ride service is first and last mile 
connections to transit. 
Lyft and Uber both see their role as valuable to address the first/ last mile 
conundrum.  Lyft notes that first/ last mile connections using Lyft may be the “most 
valuable in areas with a robust backbone of transit, but maybe less dense population,” for 
example in suburban areas with access to rail. Uber also sees its role as complementary to 
transit rather than siphoning rides from public transit.   Based on their own observations 
of how Uber users apply the TNC service to transit trips, they saw the potential of 
partnering with transit agencies to provide complementary services as part of an area’s 
mobility network.  
Reduce Single-Occupancy Vehicle Trips through shared mobility 
One goal of the major TNCs, Uber and Lyft, is to reduce SOV trips and car 
ownership overall. They benefit in the long run if fewer people own cars because their 
customers would likely use a TNC more often. Some recent research (Clewlow and 
Mishra, 2017; Schaller Consulting, 2017; Henao, 2017) has stated that increased mode 
share of Uber and Lyft increase congestion, and therefore increase carbon emissions as 
well.  This has caused backlash from many sides, from the environmentalists to the car-
driving citizens increasingly stuck in traffic.  Partly because of this backlash, and partly 
because their bottom line improves with more paying customers in each car, Uber and 
Lyft have increasingly focused on improving their shared services and increasing the 
rates of shared rides. Lyft has announced a goal of 50% shared rides by 2020, while they 
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are currently at about 1/3 of all rides being shared. Uber also acknowledges that most of 
its trips are still SOV trips, but they are continually making steps toward eliminating cars 
from the road by improving and encouraging Uberpool and Uber Expresspool. Public 
agencies that desire to lower SOV rates can put stipulations in partnerships that riders 
must select a shared ride in order to decrease SOV TNC trips that could contribute to 
congestion, as was the case in the Go Centennial and DUMoves programs.  
Both companies have explored options to complement and encourage the use of 
public transit and have stated that they are not trying to replace or compete with public 
transit.  If fewer people own cars, they are more likely to use all of the other mobility 
options, such as bikes, scooters (both TNCs recently bought scooter companies), transit, 
and TNCs. Uber and Lyft recently announced partnerships with RTD to display public 
transit information in their app. Lyft merely shows “Nearby Transit” options including 
scooters and bikes. Uber states it will eventually allow a customer to purchase a RTD 
mobile ticket through their platform and currently allows the user to compare travel 
modes, including transit, Uber, and Uberpool rides. Lyft also sees an additional role for 
them in partnering with transit agencies: 
Where we are taking empty buses off the road because I say the only thing worse 
than a SOV is a SOB-(bus). [For example in San Clemente], programs where we 
can allow transit agencies to remove failing routes and double-down on trunk 
lines, and then let us handle the lower density routes, in my mind, that is the best 
way for us to work together. At the end of the day what we [all] want is full 
vehicles, full buses, and full Lyft vehicles, and that’s how we solve congestion, 
pollution, and cost issues. (Interview, 2018) 
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Most transportation management agencies, city planners, and transportation officials are 
also trying to decrease the rate of drive-alone trips in their city in order to decrease 
pollution and traffic congestion.  As previously stated, RTD is also concerned with 
getting people to use more shared modes.   
Economic development/ Parking needs 
Economic development also played into the goals of the Go Centennial 
partnership. Southeast Public Improvement Metropolitan District (SPIMD) was one of 
the public funding partners working with City of Centennial and Lyft. SPIMD found that 
employers were having trouble attracting new and talented workers that were most likely 
to want to live downtown. The long commute times to Centennial, which by transit would 
include a long rail trip and an additional walk on the end, made traveling by car shorter 
and easier. SPIMD saw the partnership as an opportunity to expand the economic 
development of the city by attracting new talent to the area.   
The need to reduce the demand for parking has also been the reason for using 
TNCs to provide transit service. The city of Summit, New Jersey provides subsidized 
TNCs to meet parking demand at their rail station rather than building a new and 
expensive parking structure. The city began a partnership with Uber but recently 
switched to Lyft because of its ability to schedule rides in advance. The rides are free for 
people who have already purchased a parking pass, and $2 per ride for people who have 
not. This equates to the same cost as the daily parking fee. The number of residents 
eligible for the program started small, at 100 people, but it has since expanded to 150 and 
was approved by Summit voters (Tarrazi, 2017). The Go Centennial P3 also mentioned 
parking at the light rail as a concern, although not immediate. The average weekday 
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parking utilization rate is near 75%, so parking space is at a premium for light rail users. 
If more people take a ridehailing service to the rail, it could free up parking spots and 
reduce the need for cruising for parking and increase the reliability of finding parking for 
transit users (Co Centennial I-Team, 2017, p. 41) 
Improving quality of service 
Improving the customer experience and level of service for transit users and the 
community in general is another goal of partnerships with TNCs. A major goal of the Go 
Centennial pilot was not only to try to increase ridership at the station, but also to 
“enhance service and allow people to get service [to and from the station] much faster: in 
5 minutes instead of 2 hours [using the Call-n-Ride or access a ride].” The results showed 
success in the service quality, through a 95% reduction in wait time for a vehicle. TNCs 
are also interested in improving their customers’ experiences, and by partnering with a 
city or transit agency, they can offer better experiences such as designated pick up or 
drop off zones in front of a transit station or stop, and utilize the curb for waiting and 
picking up as well. These goals of partnerships can be mutually beneficial and also 
improve service for customers of both the TNC and transit. 
Benefits of P3s for TNCs and public agencies 
 Benefits to TNCs  
As stated above, public agencies, whether cities or transit agencies, seek 
partnerships with TNCs to meet a variety of mobility goals.  In order for these 
partnerships to work, there should be mutual benefits to both partners. Both the TNC and 
the public agency must get something from the partnership beyond just the money they 
would earn or save engaging in a contractual relationship. The representatives of the 
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TNCs identified their biggest benefits of partnering with public agencies as increasing 
their rides, raising awareness of their product and gaining new users, creating good 
relationships with cities and citizens, and especially testing out innovative solutions to 
mobility problems and developing new knowledge of how to solve mobility problems in 
the current climate.  
Both Uber and Lyft representatives acknowledge the short-term benefit of 
increasing the number of rides that their companies generated through partnerships with 
public agencies. Business development and brand awareness is certainly a driver of P3s 
for TNCs. The Go Centennial pilot showed that about 30% of the riders that utilized the 
free Lyft rides to and from the light rail station had never used Lyft or another rideshare 
before taking part in the pilot. However, each TNC noted that their end goal is not this 
short-term access to riders. An Uber rep stressed the organization’s need to be good 
corporate citizens to help solve mobility problems that communities might have, and 
Lyft’s rep noted that having a good relationship with cities and being a good community 
member is an important component of engaging in these partnerships. Lyft has a specific 
transit team, which sits on their commercial enterprise team, to develop these 
partnerships. In the end the team is judged on the number of rides that they generate, but 
the public good component is also a large part of its mission.  
This public good aspect of partnering and an increase in customer rides does not 
outshine the long-term goals of both companies: to position themselves as the go-to 
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company for mobility as a service (MaaS)16F17. The more people they get to try their 
product, alone or in conjunction with a transit agency, the more likely a person may be to 
“get used to the idea that car ownership isn’t an outright necessity like it used to be (Uber 
representative),” and the more people that give up their car, the larger the market for 
MaaS and for a TNC.   
 In addition, the idea that these partnerships can provide a testing ground for 
innovative mobility solutions and an opportunity to generate new knowledge is key to 
TNC willingness to participate in future partnerships. According to Lyft, “we are happy 
to work with transit. Even it if doesn’t go exactly right, we learn from it.” Uber is most 
interested in the “opportunity to advance a collective knowledge base of how transit and 
TNCs…can work together” and “big, bold ideas” to show there are still important step 
function changes to be made. In addition, they want to partner on more than just 
subsidized rides. While there is a value to passengers and citizens if there is a subsidy, 
there are many other places to work together for better passenger experiences. For 
instance, changing the traffic flow at transit locations to make it easier for picking up or 
dropping off, as well as improve the flow of traffic for other modes as well. Uber is 
especially excited about partnerships that are multi-faceted, such as their partnership with 
the City of Cincinnati, Ohio that connects mobility to economic development and career 
                                                 
17 Mobility as a Service (Maas) describes a movement towards transportation being consumed as a service 
rather than a personal product, such as owning a car, bike, or scooter. A key component of MaaS is a one-
stop travel planner, usually a smartphone app, that integrates multiple mobility services and fare payments. 
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development17F18. Using pilot partnerships as a testing ground for innovation, mobility 
improvements, and knowledge building is an important benefit to the TNCs.  
Benefits to the public agency 
 The benefits to the public agency are inherently different than those for the TNC. 
In the end, the partnership is developed in order to address specific transit goals of an 
agency in a cost-effective manner. An RTD representative acknowledged one benefit of 
engaging in a partnership with a TNC is the potential to “carry more people more cost 
effectively or save money if we are able to coordinate our trips with another service 
provider,” especially in terms of on-demand transit provision, such as Call-n-Ride 
services. Service expansion by an agency or company is a true benefit, especially for 
cities that do not currently have the infrastructure to provide transit service themselves. 
One benefit of utilizing a P3 as stated by a Centennial city employee is that it expands 
what the city staff can do, while also providing an avenue for more oversight than an 
internal employee might be given. The contractual relationship provides for specific 
oversight measures by the public agency.   
Difficulties/ barriers with P3 partnerships 
Despite these benefits, there are difficulties that come with developing a 
partnership between public and private agencies. No one in the interviews identified these 
difficulties as having the potential to derail the partnership, but being aware of these 
issues ensure that all parties can make a more calculated analysis of the costs and benefits 
of a partnership. These difficulties may include operational costs, legal agreements, and 
institutional barriers.  
                                                 
18 For more information on this partnership, visit https://www.uber.com/newsroom/cities-as-partners/. 
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There is an operational cost to participation in a partnership for the TNC. While it 
is assumed that the transportation company would benefit through an increase in their 
number of rides, the cost in terms of assigned time for staff is worth noting. When a TNC 
enters into a partnership, it will often assign a person to work with the city or transit 
agency to make sure everything works and that the customer experience is good. 
Sometime Uber and Lyft might subsidize portions of a discounted ride as well when 
promoting certain partnerships.  
For TNCs, the cost of doing business with the public can be paid in time. Speed is 
not a quality that the public sector is often known for. According to a representative from 
a TNC, 
We try to move at the speed of a nimble tech company, and transit agencies are 
beholden to so many bureaucratic rules that often things go very slowly. We 
understand the reasons, but it would be great if we get to the point where these 
types of partnerships are streamlined, and there aren’t so many hoops to jump 
through and so much bureaucratic tape. (Interview, 2018) 
This “bureaucratic tape” can include legal agreements and the institutional requirements 
and barriers to entry for the private sector in transportation. 
Legal agreements have both a monetary and time cost. The potential legal back 
and forth between parties can extend the time needed to implement a P3. For example, in 
the DU/ Lyft pilot project, there were some sticking points in the process of approval by 
the university legal team that slowed down the initial launch of the pilot. As shown in 
chapter 2 (p. 47), legal agreements require legal expertise which can be costly, especially 
for agencies that do not have the expertise in house.  TNC P3 legal agreements, however, 
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are not usually as complex as an infrastructure DBFOM P3 that might require hiring an 
outside legal firm.  In fact, a partner in the Go Centennial pilot P3 stated that legal 
contracts were not a major hurdle to institute the partnership, since, “our legal agreement 
went back and forth twice and was signed really quickly, but I know that’s been a 
challenge in some other cities.”  
Institutional barriers have the most potential to derail a P3. Institutional barriers 
are often put into place by a local, state or federal government in order to receive funding 
from different sources.  Examples of institutional barriers or requirements include 
requiring public participation in a decision-making process, ensuring equity of access, for 
example in terms of cash payments and access to smartphone technology, ADA 
accessibility, and requiring more stringent background checks and drug testing for 
employees. These institutional requirements are a way to ensure the public is being 
served by various infrastructure and planning projects, but they may be seen as barriers 
by both private companies and public agencies seeking to work together.  
Equity is a major concern of transit agencies and rightly so, because the federal 
government requires that a transit agency like RTD abide by Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin 
if an agency is to receive federal funding. In addition, they must meet all requirements of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. However, TNCs have argued in court that 
because they are “technology companies” and not taxi companies that own or lease the 
vehicles used to pick up passengers, they do not have to adhere to the ADA guidelines18F19 
                                                 
19 See an example of an ADA case against Uber here: https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-advances-
mens-ada-complaint-against-uber 
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However, both Lyft and Uber have a mechanism to request an accessible vehicle in some 
larger cities, but the ratio of wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAV) to regular vehicles is 
very low. It has been found that the number of WAVs in NYC are only 554 of the 
118,000 active TNC vehicles (Taft, 2018). While several ADA lawsuits work their way 
through different courts, both Lyft and Uber have made efforts to increase their 
accessibility standards. This is a major concern for public transit agencies interested in 
partnerships with TNCs, since many are specifically interested in using the TNC app 
technology to better process on-demand vehicle requests for services such as Access-a-
Ride or Call-n-Ride in the Denver metro area.  
As stated in the FTA guidance document for the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),  
When a public entity enters into a contractual or other arrangement...with a 
private entity to operate fixed route or demand responsive service, the public 
entity shall ensure that the private entity meets the requirements of [Part 37] that 
would apply to the public entity if the public entity itself provided the service. 
(FTA, 2015, p. 1-5)  
   
As further discussed in the guidance for ADA document, “private entities (e.g. 
contractors) ‘stand in the shoes’ of public entities with whom they contract to provide 
transportation services....while a public entity may contract out its services, it may not 
contract away its ADA responsibilities” (FTA, 2015, p.1-5).  
Representatives from RTD still see these institutional requirements that the transit 
agency must meet to receive federal funding as a major barrier to implementing a 
partnership with a private TNC. 
Those institutional barriers are significant...it’s pretty darn cool that you can hail a 
car by pressing a button on your phone, it’s hard to argue about that, but in those 
129 
confines that we operate in, it makes a partnership prove somewhat difficult.” In 
the transit agency’s mind, “for the most part, TNCs tend not to be able to meet 
those requirements. So it’s problematic, is it not? (RTD interviewee, 2018) 
Some of these regulatory issues are the reason why RTD was initially hesitant, back in 
2016, to jump in “feet first” with the Go Centennial pilot. They wanted to make sure that 
some of these institutional barriers were worked out during this pilot project. If RTD was 
involved as an official partner and used the Go Centennial pilot to replace their Call-n-
Ride service rather than use it in tandem, then they would have had to delay the launch 
date to ensure proper adherence to all requirements. In Lyft’s partnership with San 
Clemente, however, they  
Have figured out ways to comply with FTA requirements so transit agencies can 
integrate our services into their program. We’ve heard, ‘you can’t do this,’ but we 
can and we are. That’s the message we send to transit agencies. This is something 
that is viable, and we can make it work. (Lyft representative, Interview 2018). 
Despite their initial hesitance, RTD is interested in working on how to best meet 
the requirements for a future partnership with a TNC. One way to try to meet these 
requirements is to figure out the best way to offer trips through the TNC, in order to give 
certain trips, perhaps for persons with different abilities, to the transit agency, and send 
other trips to the TNC vehicles. Transit agencies, including RTD, have experience 
contracting out with taxi companies, which usually have the option of dispatching 
accessible vehicles as a part of their fleet. In the transit agency’s mind, the contractual 
agreement must first meet the institutional requirements, including state, federal, RTD, 
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and customer requirements, then they can work on the technology part of trip 
coordination.  
Withholding federal funding from a transit agency is a way to ensure compliance 
with ADA guidelines and Title VI. In terms of equity, there are no regulations requiring 
the TNCs to provide unbanked people, those who do not use banks or do not have their 
own bank accounts, with access to their services. A recent FDIC survey found that 6.5% 
of U.S. households were unbanked in 2017 (FDIC, 2017).   There are also no 
requirements for TNCs to serve lower socio-economic areas. In the Go Centennial pilot, 
the City of Centennial was  
Very cognizant of that equity piece and making sure everybody would be serviced 
so we paid a lot to have that accessible vehicle in the service area. Without doing 
that, I think we could have run into some issues. We also were cognizant about 
finding a way for people without smartphones to use it, and because it was free, 
we were able to allow people without credit cards through that call in center. 
(Interview, City of Centennial representative, 2018) 
As a stipulation to entering into a P3 with a TNC, public agencies could require the TNC 
to provide certain things that they otherwise would have no leverage to require.  
Role of the transit agency 
The role of the transit agency came up in the interviews regarding the agency’s 
mission and role in providing transit versus mobility. How a transit agency defines itself 
and its mission determines whether transit agencies see shared mobility and TNCs as 
complementary or competition.   
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RTD’s current mission statement is to “meet our constituents’ present and future 
public transit needs by offering safe, clean, reliable, courteous, accessible, and cost-
effective service throughout the district (RTD: Facts and Figures, 2019).” According to 
one interviewee, there are two ways of looking at the transit agency’s role in a region. 
One is that their purpose is to “run buses and trains;” another is that they should provide 
mobility options to the region. LA Metro was offered up as one example of an agency 
that embodies the “mobility integrator” definition of a transit agency (Kuhr, 2017). LA 
County recently passed two tax resolutions to provide for multimodal transportation 
options, including mobility hubs and bike lanes, not just bus and rail transit. Their 
mission is to “provide a world-class transportation system that enhances the quality of 
life for all who live, work, and play in LA County (LA Metro, 2019).” The three elements 
of their vision specifically address providing mobility options. Transit agencies must 
innovate or they will be left behind as the private sector quickly enters the transportation 
arena. Choosing to partner with TNCs is one way that agencies signal they are willing to 
look beyond trains and buses to provide more service options to citizens. An RTD 
representative stated: 
The role of the transit agency is not to provide bus service. The transit agency’s 
role (maybe just my opinion) is to improve mobility through the region. Whether 
it’s on a bus, Uber, bike share, or people walking, I don’t think it really matters. 
Whether or not our ridership is decreasing as a result of some other innovation 
that is happening, I don’t think is a metric we should necessarily be paying 
attention to. We should be paying attention to, are more people getting out of 
single occupancy vehicles and shared modes, like a lot of the innovative services 
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are offering now, more. Because that’s really the primary objective, in my 
opinion, of the transit agency: To improve mobility and reduce congestion, by 
making any type of shared mobility more attractive to the general public including 
people who are driving now. So anytime those services can operate better 
together, the consumer understands how they can use a bike share with transit, 
with a TNC for example, that’s a good thing. It operates more as a whole system, 
rather than in competition. (Interview, 2018). 
So transit agencies have the choice to be an agency that provides and integrates 
multi-modal mobility options or one that sees other mobility options as a threat to their 
services. TNCs are providing new services that are increasingly using characteristics of 
transit, such as the LyftLine Saver and Uberpool Express, where passengers share a ride, 
but have to walk to a designated pickup spot and end at a drop-off spot and then walk to 
their final destination. Do transit agencies compete, complement, or coordinate with these 
services? In the Go Centennial pilot, RTD was a stakeholder, but not an official partner. 
The Centennial staff were aware that their pilot could be seen as competition, so they did 
not want to market it directly to RTD Call-n-Ride passengers. By having both services 
compete side by side, RTD saw it as an opportunity to test their Call-n-Ride service 
against the TNC model.  
RTD also recognizes that it does not make sense to have competing services if 
they are serving the same market, so RTD’s position is that they are increasingly 
interested in coordinating their services to avoid duplication and direct competition.  
If anything is to come of substance from this regional discussion of mobility, it’s 
how do we coordinate those [locally free or subsidized] services such that we are 
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able to leverage each other’s strengths rather than compete against each other. 
That’s part of the discussion with TNCs as well. When Uber launched Uber 
Express Pool, there was quite a bit of discussion about how that really looked a lot 
like public transit. (Interview, RTD representative, 2018) 
And with the price differential of Uber Express Pool approaching the cost of a regional 
RTD fare for a shorter ride time, this leads to a discussion of the most effective way to 
expend both public and private funds. “It’s like Lyft and Uber are huge transit agencies!” 
just technologically enabled.  
Another RTD representative, however, asked the questions: “Do you coordinate 
or do you just compete? What’s the matter with competition? What’s wrong with that, 
just let Uberpool compete. People are getting more options for only a small premium, 
able to make a faster, more convenient trip” (Interview, 2018). Because in the end, even 
if RTD does take on the role of mobility integrator, they acknowledge that they are not a 
taxi service.  Complementing and coordinating services could potentially allow TNCs to 
offer a transit combo trip, paired with transit. RTD’s transit service can currently be 
viewed in both Lyft and Uber’s apps, but one-step payment through their apps is not yet 
available.  
Recommendations for creating a P3 with a TNC  
The public stakeholders interviewed in this study provided some 
recommendations for agencies looking to partner with TNCs. Representatives from the 
TNCs also offered some advice for agencies in the hopes that future partnerships could 
become more streamlined. The recommendations center around the importance of data 
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sharing in a partnership agreement, the importance of marketing for a successful pilot, 
and knowing what the market for services is before developing a new service.  
Data sharing 
Many public agencies are enticed by the potential to mine large amounts of data 
from their tech savvy partners at the TNC, hoping to use the mobility data to solve 
problems of congestion, transit, parking, and mobility. The amount of spatial data of 
citizens’ movements is increasing and has the potential to provide solutions to city woes. 
However, TNCs are becoming increasingly concerned with protecting users’ privacy and 
data, especially after there were reports that Uber’s app continued to monitor and record 
the location of app users up to five minutes after their official Uber trip ended19F20. Data 
sharing is a key piece of partnership agreements, but agencies should not be given a 
dump of private citizens’ data. In some cases, data sharing is not automatic, unless a 
specific data sharing agreement is signed. Both public agencies and TNCs expressed the 
importance of data-sharing, and each had suggestions about how to satisfy the need for 
data on the public side and to protect the customer on the private side. 
Privacy issues are very important for TNCs, especially when working with public 
agencies that must adhere to laws such as the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) that 
require governmental agencies make available most public records to the public. 
Agencies should refrain from asking for data just for the sake of it. Agencies can instead 
identify what data are truly necessary and be willing to discuss the data-sharing 
component of a partnership upfront.  
                                                 
20 Uber was found to be tracking user’s locations on their phones, after they were dropped off. Uber has 
since ended this practice.  https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/29/547113818/uber-ends-its-
controversial-post-ride-tracking-of-users-location. 
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It is really important to explain why you want the data, tell [the TNC] the policy 
question that you need to answer. Because if you just say, ‘give me what you got,’ 
that’s not going to work. But if you clearly say, I need this piece of information to 
prove to my council member that X, that’s a much more compelling argument. 
(Interview, 2017)  
Expect to have more access to aggregated data and discuss what level of 
geography is needed to answer the policy questions. According to Uber, “Our stance 
continues to evolve on what we are comfortable sharing and not, the privacy issue is a 
huge one.” In 2016, the city of Boulder partnered with Uber and Lyft to provide rides to 
downtown Boulder over the winter holidays. This program was called “Door to 
Downtown” and provided a $5 credit for up to five downtown trips, funded by the City of 
Boulder and the Downtown Boulder Partnership.  According to an Uber representative, 
the city began by asking for large amounts of location data and personal information, 
such as starting and ending addresses and names, but the availability of the data evolved 
to Uber suggesting using zip codes and anonymous, aggregated data on a larger spatial 
scale. The DU Lyft pilot did not include a signed data agreement either, which would be 
key to getting the kind of data that an agency needs. Zip code level data in a small area 
such as the DU campus were not very helpful to fulfill the mission of using the pilot as a 
simulation for future shuttle use and stop location.  
In the DU Moves pilot with Lyft, DU did not enter into a contractual agreement 
and used “off-the shelf” products to subsidize rides. There was no signed data agreement 
about what Lyft would provide to the University, which affected the type of data that Lyft 
ultimately did provide. Over the course of a year of talks to begin utilizing the subsidized 
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coupon codes, it went from being able to get spatial coordinates for each starting and 
ending destinations along with start and end times for each trip, to later getting zip code 
level data for six-hour increments of time, such as the “late night” or “peak evening 
commute” period. This illustrates the changing degree of comfort with TNCs providing 
customer and trip data, as well as the realization that data are valuable and should be 
provided through a signed contractual agreement. 
Uber has attempted to quell the resounding desire for its data by implementing a 
data platform called Uber Movement, designed for city planners to use regardless of any 
existing partnership with Uber. Data are not available in all markets, but only from select 
cities globally, including Boston, Seattle, Washington D.C., Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles in the U.S. The data are anonymized and aggregated and can 
be used to study travel times, travel speeds, and even new micromobility modes such as 
electric bikes and scooters. The data-sharing piece of a partnership is incredibly 
important to discuss at the beginning of a partnership, but signing a data-sharing 
agreement and negotiating the terms of data-sharing should be based on specific policy 
questions that an agency wants to answer. 
Marketing and the market 
Marketing a new service or product can be challenging, but it is key to the success 
of pilot programs. In their follow-up surveys, the Go Centennial partners found that lack 
of awareness of the pilot program was the main reason people did not use the service.  
On projects like this, the marketing is more than just, hey this exists. People need 
to understand exactly how this impacts them, where to pick up, step-by-step of 
how they are going to do it, before they are comfortable enough to actually take 
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the step and do it. The marketing was a little more challenging and more nuanced 
than I had anticipated (Go Centennial interviewee, 2017).  
In the Go Centennial Final Report (2017), the team recommends starting comprehensive 
marketing early to allow people to plan commutes and understand the new service. 
Outreach to the community should be a natural strength and benefit of conducting a P3, 
since each sector has its own area of expertise and sphere of influence. For the pilot, the 
Go Centennial team decided not to directly market to the Call-n-Ride customers because 
they were cognizant that the program could be seen as a competing service. However, 
even though RTD was not an official partner and running a competing service, the transit 
agency handed out flyers to their Call-n-Ride passengers. They saw the Go Centennial 
pilot as a good way to test the market for a new service while still operating their service 
side by side. If a future partnership of this kind included RTD, then the target market 
would be customers who already use the Call-n-Ride or the Park-n-Ride, as well as car 
drivers. They further suggest marketing heavily to employers to reach employees who do 
not yet use public transit service. 
For future partnerships that seek to develop a new transit service or pilot project, 
the Go Centennial team recommended to keep the restrictions and program requirements 
as simple as possible, in order to help with the marketing.  
To the extent that you can get rid of restrictions in your program, if you can, it’s 
24 hours, 7 days a week, just make it as simple as possible. We were telling 
people Monday through Friday, 5:30 am – 7 pm. Here is our weird service area. 
Are you in the boundary? Here is the coupon code. You gotta go to Lyft, give 
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them the phone number, give them all this stuff. I think that initial step was really 
hard. (Go Centennial interviewee, 2017) 
In addition to developing a detailed and nuanced marketing plan for a new TNC 
partnership, it is important for agencies to know the market for the service. Transit 
agencies have usually developed a strong understanding of their ridership trends and 
users, but other public entities, such as cities, universities, or other agencies that do not 
have as much experience with transportation provision may not. RTD representatives 
focused on the importance of knowing the market when thinking of how a TNC or other 
innovative solution could be incorporated into their service. RTD, which operates the 
largest on-demand service in the country, hosts many transit agencies who are interested 
in how they provide their on-demand service Call-n-Ride. It is important for agencies to 
understand that  
Tech isn’t the first or second thing. First, what is the market? What is the travel 
pattern? Who is our customer? And then what service meets your needs. Then 
maybe tech can help you. It’s the hype. Someone higher up said just get it, not 
knowing anything about transportation, much less on-demand transportation, 
which is an order of magnitude more complex. (RTD interviewee, 2018)  
Knowing why people choose to take transit is key. For example, to downtown 
Denver, people largely choose transit to save on parking cost and avoid congestion: “That 
is the market for transit” (RTD interviewee, 2017).  Do the research about who may be 
willing to use the service. For example, in the Go Centennial pilot, the goal of the 
program was to increase first and last mile trips to the rail station by 50%, but they 
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achieved only a 4.6% increase even though it was a free service. A market for a new 
service will not magically appear.  
RTD acknowledges the difficulty in promoting transit services, and transit across 
the nation only has about 4-5% of the market with ridership currently on the decline. It is 
not realistic to think that a new service, no matter who operates it, will magically draw a 
new market of customers. Customers have options. For example, the Go Centennial pilot 
operated in a suburban location, where transit ridership is closer to .5%. This is arguably 
the metric that the I-team should have been evaluating, rather than thinking they could 
increase ridership to the average metropolitan area numbers. Today, new options in the 
market are the Uber Expresspool and Lyft Shared Saver, which allow for a lower cost, 
shared TNC ride that may require the passenger to walk a short distance to their pickup 
location. These low cost fares that take a person directly to their destination, are the new 
competition for bus and rail service. The price point is closer to the transit fare (which 
recently rose for the average RTD user) and are usually quicker without any transfers. 
The market is expanding with choice, so knowing the market is extremely important 
before establishing a partnership.  
Future partnerships 
Future innovative partnerships between public and private agencies are likely 
throughout the country and in the metropolitan region of Denver. In 2017, the Regional 
Transportation District in Denver released a RFI for “Mobility as a Service, Mobility on 
Demand and Technology” and received 24 responses under the following categories: 
Service delivery (dedicated and non-dedicated vehicles), fixed route shuttles, trip 
planning, integrated payment, mobility on demand trip exchange, and branding. RTD 
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plans to follow up this RFI to explore adding non-dedicated vehicles, including taxis and 
TNCs, to the Call-n-Ride service, which has already been rebranded as FlexRide20F21. RTD 
sees their role in the future as a “mobility integrator.” The new vision of RTD is that 
“RTD’s transit network serves as the backbone for regional shared mobility in metro 
Denver. We are uniquely positioned to maximize this investment and be the regional 
integrator for metro Denver.” In their “Transportation Transformation” summit and 
rebranding effort, RTD specifically highlights the need for pilot projects with private 
sector partners and to identify potential for efficient technology-leveraged investment as 
key goals of the regional approach to mobility.  
RTD is especially interested in how TNCs and RTD can work together to come 
up with a better on-demand service by adding the on-demand technology of a TNC to 
their current Call-n-Ride services. Assigning different fares to different people could be a 
breakthrough use of P3s as well. For example, using a tech on-demand app for the transit 
company, an employer could cover the cost of a Lyft Line ride or the city might subsidize 
part of the fare and that would provide a lot of flexibility for a rider and the service 
provider. Additionally, the ability of a TNC to offer trips paired with public transit 
through their app has incredible potential to change the way people access the transit 
network.  
Conclusion 
As more public agencies look for efficient ways to expand mobility options in 
their regions, they are looking to the private sector as a source of new technology and to 
                                                 
21 For more information about the FlexRide brand, see http://www.rtd-denver.com/FlexRide.shtml 
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expand their transit service provision. The pilot programs discussed here provide 
examples of innovative uses of P3s in transit.  
Public agencies increasingly seek out collaboration with the private sector to 
provide more mobility options to citizens. This study sought to identify examples of 
innovative public-private partnerships between Transportation Network Companies 
(TNCs) and public agencies and describe their successes, benefits, and drawbacks. I 
answered the research questions by collecting and analyzing data from semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and desktop research. Two P3 pilot projects in the Denver 
metro area, Go Centennial and DU Moves, were used to examine the research questions 
within a case study framework.  
As more agencies look to the private sector to decrease costs and improve quality 
of service, P3s in transit provision should be studied to provide informed 
recommendations to stakeholders and evaluate and document the results of these 
partnerships. The full impacts of using TNCs to enhance transit service provision are not 
fully understood. This study fills a gap in the transport literature on ridesourcing and 
more specifically on P3s with TNCs. 
 The Go Centennial partnership between the City of Centennial, Colorado and Lyft 
tested the use of free Lyft Line rides to improve first/ last mile connections to the light 
rail station. While the pilot program did not significantly increase ridership or first/ last 
mile connections at the rail station, it was found to improve the quality of service to 
passengers. The DU Moves pilot project used Lyft to test the concept of a campus shuttle 
and improve first-last mile connections to the light rail station. The predominant use of 
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the subsidized Lyft Line rides were to connect to the light rail station, and the time the 
rides were used was highest during the peak pm commute hours.  
 P3s between TNCs and public agencies address the following goals: improve 
first-last mile connections, reduce single-occupancy vehicle trips, encourage economic 
development, improve customer service, and reduce the demand for parking. For a P3 to 
work, there should be mutual benefit to both parties. The benefits to the TNC include 
increasing the number of rides they offer, raising awareness of their product to gain new 
users, creating positive relationships with cities and their citizens, and testing out 
innovative solutions to mobility issues. The benefits for a public agency include meeting 
their mobility goals in a more cost effective way and improving quality of service. 
Difficulties in establishing a P3 with a TNC, while not insurmountable, include 
overcoming institutional barriers and slower implementation times. Data sharing is an 
important aspect of P3s and should be clarified upfront in a partnership.  
The role of the transit agency is changing, and agencies must choose whether they 
will work with or against TNCs. If they embrace the role of “mobility integrator,” more 
P3s are likely to take place for transit service provision. The transit agency may 
transform into a regulator, nudging TNCs to provide more accessible and equitable 
service through their partnerships.   
 There is much room for future research in the area of P3s in ridesourcing. With 
the recent public offerings of both Lyft and Uber, profitability of the companies will 
become more important to stockholders. In addition, the uncertain effect of autonomous 
vehicles on the transit industry and TNCs is yet to be seen. Future research on the 
viability and long-term results and effects of ridesourcing P3s is needed. A review of 
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these partnerships at the national level is needed to compare successes and failures after a 
pilot period. The financial and social costs of these P3s need to be analyzed to account 
for all costs and benefits (including environmental, social, and economic) to the 






Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Public-private partnerships are expected to increase in the U.S. transportation 
sector, as public funding for transportation becomes scarcer and the importance of 
maintaining and expanding mobility increases. Transportation provision is increasingly 
being pushed towards neoliberal policies of competition and efficiency. This research 
described and analyzed the use of public-private partnerships in the public transit sector. 
The studies provided literature reviews, desktop analyses, and in-depth interviews with 
public and private experts and stakeholders. The research investigated innovative 
infrastructure delivery of transportation P3s, shared-use rail corridor negotiations and 
agreements, and emerging ridesourcing partnerships with transit agencies, using Denver, 
Colorado as a case study.  The studies together provide examples of opportunities for 
engagement of the private sector in the provision of public transportation infrastructure 
and service, as well as discusses recommendations for agencies interested in pursuing 
such partnerships.  
  Chapter two discussed several transportation P3s that were a part of RTD’s 
FasTracks program to expand the regional rail and bus transit network. The innovative 
delivery model of the Eagle P3 was of particular note because it was the first full design-
build-finance-operate-maintain P3 in transit infrastructure in the U.S. The FasTracks P3s 
were found to be a model for future transit agencies interested in pursuing private sector 
involvement in building out new transit rail lines. Chapter three discussed the shared-use 
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rail corridor agreements and negotiations that developed between private freight rail 
companies and public passenger rail agencies, focusing again on the buildout of 
FasTracks in freight rail corridors. Chapter four identified examples of pilot partnerships 
between transportation network companies, including Uber and Lyft, and public agencies 
and discussed the results of Denver area pilot programs. This chapter highlighted the 
changing role of the transit agency and the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
ridesourcing partnerships. 
The research does have some limitations. The case study approach limits the 
generalizability and applicability of the results to all situations. However, the case study 
approach for this type of research was validated by previous research, especially since the 
number of transit P3s in the U.S. is still quite low. This research is most applicable to 
cities in North America where the public agencies are in the early stages of P3 adoption 
in transportation. It is important to be aware that the private sector actors that were 
interviewed tended to stick to the “company line,” and private companies are constantly 
marketing themselves and thinking of the public relations angle that will be reflected 
through their interviews. The data collection and analysis for the FasTracks P3s took 
place prior to all the lines being in revenue service. Although the study was updated with 
ridership numbers since the lines opened, the interviews should be taken as a snapshot in 
time and may not represent current sentiment of all interviewees. 
Defining a public-private partnership 
The individual research projects provided analyses of P3s in specific and diverse 
contexts including the role of the private sector in transit infrastructure provision and 
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financing, private land acquisition for transit infrastructure, and transit service provision. 
When taken together, the research did reveal several overarching themes. The definition 
of a public-private partnership and the benefits of a P3 are context specific and evolving. 
P3s in transit that include private financing mechanisms are fairly new in the U.S. (see 
chapter two). The Eagle P3 rail line in Denver was the first full transit DBFOM in the 
states. This research showed that increasingly for infrastructure P3s, the private sector is 
expected to bring equity to the partnership and financing of the P3 is what is considered 
innovative. But there is a substantial difference between partnering to building 
something, such as the Eagle P3 rail line, and partnering to provide a service. The 
concept of what a P3 is has changed, since it was once innovative to “partner” with a 
private company to design and build transportation infrastructure through the design-bid-
build (DBB) process, and now this process is considered the status quo. “A simplified 
definition [of a P3] is transfer of risk, from public to private, private to public (interview, 
2018)” where the best entity to take on risk will do so (see Chapter 2). For example, a 
public agency may take on the risk of public utilities location and relocation in an 
infrastructure project, while the private agency would take on the risk of construction or 
design malfunction. 
P3s with a TNC, however, are still in the stages of pilot programs, and the 
benefits of these partnerships to the public sector are yet to be fully explored. But risk 
transference is rarely the reason to engage in transit service P3s. Transit agencies often 
seek out these innovative partnerships with TNCs in order to expand service in less dense 
areas or improve the quality of transit service they can provide.  
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The differences between contracting and partnering with the private sector is an 
important distinction since the P3 label signifies a certain level of innovation and 
efficiency that contracting does not. The fundamental question is: Is there really a 
difference between contracting and a public private partnership? For example in the 
shared-use rail corridor partnerships between private freight rail companies and public 
transit agencies, the transit agency pays the freight rail company to utilize their ROW, 
share tracks, or purchase land to operate their trains. This could be called merely a 
contract, payment for services or land. But the private freight rail company does not have 
to enter into an agreement. They are not bidding on a contract. They tend to view it as a 
partnership, meaning it is mutually beneficial and for the public interest. Similar 
distinctions can be made in contracting with a TNC versus creating a partnership. It is 
difficult to develop a side-by-side comparison of such different partnership contexts.  
Changing role of the transit agency 
This research is significant because it addresses the question asked by Bruun and 
Givoni (2015): what kinds of governance work for transport systems? Bruun and Givoni 
(2015) state that with new innovations, like carsharing and ridehailing, there are great 
opportunities, but also risk. Chapter 4 addressed the innovative partnerships between 
transit agencies and ridesourcing companies and finds that the role of the transit agency 
could serve to help mitigate some of the risk of such partnerships with the private sector. 
The changing role of the transit agency became a focus of many of the interviews 
because it is the likely public partner in most of these transportation P3s. The transit 
agency’s identity is changing to become more of a mobility integrator rather than just a 
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bus and rail operator. With more mobility options, the transit agency has a choice to 
maintain the status quo or evolve to keep up with competition and customer preferences. 
RTD’s partnerships with the private sector in the TREX light rail project and the Eagle 
P3 project changed the way the agency approached building capital infrastructure 
projects. It had to relinquish some control over the design and building of these projects 
in order to achieve the cost and time saving benefits of the private sector. RTD is 
beginning to embrace its role as supervisor and integrator rather than builder and operator 
of transportation options in the region.  
The transit agency’s role may evolve to being a “watchdog” for private mobility 
operators to ensure that environmental and social justice is being maintained through the 
private transit provision. If the transit agency ends up contracting out more of its service 
operations or using TNCs or other private operators to enhance their mobility offerings, 
the agency will need to serve as the regulator to ensure proper adherence to industry 
guidelines and institutional requirements. The agency’s influence over the private sector 
will increase, and it can use its power as a liaison with the federal government (which 
provides funding opportunities) to steer private companies into compliance with federal 
mandates and focus more on the social service aspect of transportation.  In addition, the 
transit agency may have the opportunity to address local social needs such as requiring a 
TNC to operate in an underserved geographic area or subsidizing rides for lower-income 
people just as they currently subsidize rides on their buses and trains. Some issues of 
concern with partnering with TNCs such as driver wages and the availability of 
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accessible vehicles can be overcome if the agency takes on the role of industry watchdog 
and technology and mobility integrator.  
Transport geography and future research 
Transportation geographers today conduct a good deal of research on how to 
solve the problems created by automobility: congestion, fatalities, pollution, social 
exclusion, etc. We have reached a pivotal time in history where technology advancement 
and the pace of mobility growth are converging to create a sweeping change in the 
transportation landscape. One of the biggest potential advances in technology is 
automated and connected vehicles (AVs). Ridesourcing companies are betting on the 
technology to lower their labor costs and finally produce a profit for shareholders. 
Transport geographers have experience studying the spatial interactions of multiple 
modes and their interaction with human behavior as well as forecasting the changes in the 
transportation network that technology can bring. Connected and autonomous vehicles 
are likely to usher society into the next transportation epoch, but the full impacts and 
consequences have yet to be determined. Geographers must stay at the front lines of this 
burgeoning technology, influencing policy and practice, and studying the impacts of AVs 
on public transit. 
Increasingly, transport geographers, planners, and policymakers are looking for 
solutions to congestion, population growth, access, and pollutions through a modal shift 
to more active modes as well as transit. Sustainable transport theory argues that 
environmental costs should be included in cost-benefit analyses and investment in 
sustainable transportation should be encouraged for longer-term economic development 
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(Black, 2010). Transport researchers must keep sustainability at the forefront of 
transportation discussions. Geographers look at the spatial aspects of transport, and this 
should include the spatial aspects of mobility equity and carbon emissions produced from 
the transport sector.   
Neoliberalism in transportation has grown, and public transit has not been 
immune to the call to turn to the private sector for more efficiency and cost savings. 
Public transit was once seen as a public service for the common good, and agencies need 
to maintain their authority in providing mobility to all citizens.  A recent opinion piece in 
the New York Times that discussed P3s with ridesourcing companies stated that “risks of 
privatization are grave,” and these companies could draw people away from public 
transport all together, especially more elite and well-off people, which in turn would 
undermine financial support for public transit (Kim, 2019). In addition, the negative 
impacts of heavy reliance on ridesourcing such as congestion and pollution are significant 
externalities that should be at the forefront of partnership discussions. Public transit 
agencies strive to be transparent and are held accountable by their public constituents. 
Partnerships with TNCs could improve mobility and lower costs for one segment of the 
population, but at what other environmental and equity costs? This question is 
fundamental to measuring and assessing the impacts of ridesourcing in a city, and must 
be taken into account by public agencies seeking such partnerships. In any P3 that the 
transit agency enters into, it is paramount that it uses its position to ensure that public 
interests are being protected through the partnership.  
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As shown in the case studies in Chapter 4, TNCs could help solve the first and 
last mile problem, eliminate expensive paratransit and call-n-ride services, and fill in 
spatial and time gaps in the transit network, but they also introduce other negative 
externalities. One solution to leveraging ridesourcing benefits and reducing the negative 
externalities of deadhead, overhead, and chauffeured single-occupancy vehicles is the 
mobility hub. Mobility hubs typically include access to bike and car sharing near a high 
frequency bus or rail stop, harnessing the value of the growing shared economy. Placing 
multiple users in one place increases the opportunities for shared TNC rides, such as 
UberPool and LyftLine. The mobility hub allows TNCs to better complement and 
enhance public transit. Bringing in the private sector through public-private partnerships 
(P3s) with TNCs could help achieve innovation and efficiency in the mobility hub. Public 
agencies have the opportunity to engage with TNCs to ensure that the benefits of 
ridesourcing are shared widely and equitably with all potential users and help to 
encourage transit rather than threaten it (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Kuhr, 2017). 
Partnerships with TNCs would need to result in lowering the cost of ridesourcing to make 
them a viable option for first and last mile connections, which could be done by the 
transit agency subsidizing fares or creating an incentive or preferred partner status for a 
specific TNC company. Partnership in the mobility hubs also generates large pools of 
customers, thereby maximizing ridematching rates and resulting in lower fares.  
Transport geographers are grappling with how to sift through the ever increasing 
“big data” and best use it for policy and decision-making. Mobile phones and ubiquitous 
GPS technology provide 24-hour access to people’s movements and travel, resulting in 
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huge spatial data sets for geographers to wade through. The full potential of this data 
have not yet been realized, but the availability of new data is likely to spur new 
applications and methods to answer transportation research questions. Much of this data 
collection relies on data sharing between public agencies, the private sector, and 
community or institutional stakeholders. An integrated smart card that can be used for all 
modes is the best way to gather data about individual users and their trips. Using one card 
for all modes allows you to track multimodal trips and trip chaining and spatially analyze 
the movement of users within the hub and the city. Data sharing agreements with TNCs 
can be included as a part of a preferred partnership with transit or in exchange for 
providing pick up and drop off zones at the hub. As more data becomes available from 
ridesourcing companies, statistical and spatial analysis can be used to more quantitatively 
measure the impact of partnerships on people’s mobility and accessibility in order to 
more fully assess costs and benefits of service provision partnerships. This research 
shows that although P3s have been used to a lesser extent in the U.S., they are practical 
and possible in the context of growing private sector participation in transportation. The 
research presented in chapter 2 on transit infrastructure P3s in Denver showed that like 
other international P3 studies, the benefits P3s in the Denver case studies were lower 
costs, on-time completion, and transference of appropriate risks.  
Additional future research in transportation infrastructure P3s should include a 
national comparative study across several cities to analyze P3 applications, agreements, 
and results in various contexts. Analysis of the full life cycle of an infrastructure P3 such 
as the Eagle P3 is required to determine whether such long-term concession agreements 
 
153 
end up being a good deal for the public agency and taxpayers. An analysis of the risk 
transfer in agreements like the Eagle P3 and U.S. 36 toll road is also necessary. A follow-
up study is warranted to determine, in light of recent court filings and operations issues, if 
the Denver model of P3s in transport infrastructure can still be seen as a model for other 
agencies and cities interested in pursuing private sector involvement in infrastructure 
provision.  
Future growth in shared-use rail corridors is likely to increase. Future research on 
the operations and maintenance agreements of both shared-use rail corridors and rail 
transit service provision should be undertaken to see how effective negotiated agreements 
were in anticipating future costs and needs of each party. Several past CDOT studies 
pointed to the Front Range corridor as the next feasible expansion of rail in Colorado, and 
the state legislature has now funded a Front Range Rail Passenger Commission to study 
the possibility of building different levels of service in this corridor. The Front Range 
corridor will require close collaboration and planning with the host railroads, and future 
research could help determine the best way to begin service and property acquisition. 
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Survey instrument Paper 1 
Interview Questions 
1. Which of the following categories best describes your current affiliation:  
Transit agency    _____ 
Private contractor    _____ 
Local Government   _____ 
State Government   _____ 
Federal Government   _____ 
Business community   _____ 
Non-profit advocacy organization _____ 
General public    _____ 
Other (please specify)  
 _____________________________________________ 
 
2. Please rate your level of familiarity with each of the following public-private 
partnership (PPP) projects in the Denver area: 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely   Generally Somewhat Not    
Familiar  ____ Familiar ____ Familiar ____ Familiar  ____ 
 
Denver Union Station 
Extremely   Generally Somewhat Not    
Familiar  ____ Familiar ____ Familiar ____ Familiar  ____ 
 
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely   Generally Somewhat Not    
Familiar  ____ Familiar ____ Familiar ____ Familiar  ____ 
 
I-225 Line  
Extremely   Generally Somewhat Not    
Familiar  ____ Familiar ____ Familiar ____ Familiar  ____ 
 
North Metro Line 
Extremely   Generally Somewhat Not    





3. How would you rate each of these projects based on how effectively they address 
transportation needs in the Denver region: 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Effective ____ Effective ____ Effective ____ Ineffective ____ Ineffective ____       Ineffective _ 
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Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Effective ____ Effective ____ Effective ____ Ineffective ____ Ineffective ____       Ineffective _ 
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Effective ____ Effective ____ Effective ____ Ineffective ____ Ineffective ____       Ineffective _ 
 
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Effective ____ Effective ____ Effective ____ Ineffective ____ Ineffective ____       Ineffective _ 
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 





4. How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial benefit for the 
Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD): 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 




5. How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial benefit for the 
private consortium involved in each project: 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 





6. How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial and social 
benefits for the Denver community at-large: 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 




7. How would you rate each of these projects based on the level of information 
provided to the general public about these projects:  
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 





8. How would you rate each of these projects based on its contribution to stronger 
regional collaboration:  
 
Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
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US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 





9.  Overall, how would you rate the success of each of these projects thus far:  
 Eagle P-3 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
Denver Union Station 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
US 36 Bus Rapid Transit 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
I-225 Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 
Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Favorable ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable  ____ Unfavorable   
North Metro Line 
Extremely  Generally Fairly  Fairly  Generally  Extremely 




10. How far do you agree or disagree with the following statements about transit 
public-private partnerships (circle your response as follows: 1=Strongly Agree / 
2=Agree / 3=Neutral / 4=Disagree / 5=Strongly Disagree).  
 
Such partnerships …. 
 
(1) Reduce the financial burden on local taxpayers:      1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(2) Reduce public risk for major infrastructure projects:   1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(3) Transfer most of the burden to the private sector:   1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(4) Transfer most of the risk to the private sector:   1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(5) Spread the financial burden equitably between the  
public and private sectors:      1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 




(7) Make the local economy too dependent on federal funding: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(8) Make the local economy too dependent upon global investors: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(9) Enhance the delivery of major infrastructure projects:  1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(10) Reduce local public accountability for key infrastructure:  1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
(11) Foster regional collaboration:     1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
 
 
















13. To what extent do you feel that these transit public-private partnerships in Denver 
could serve as a model for other regions seeking to expand their transit 
infrastructure?  Please be specific in explaining why or why not these PPPs could 









(For transit agency and other respondents) 
1. If you could choose whether these projects would be conducted as PPPs or 







2. What elements, if any, in these PPP contracts provide assurances that the greater 





3. Do you know what the debt burden will be? Is there a danger that PPP 






14.  Please provide any additional comments about the public-private partnerships 
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